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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
 
“[…] I believe that directors ought to be relatively few in number – say, ten or less – and 
ought to come mostly from the outside. The outside board members should establish 
standards for the CEO’s performance and should also periodically meet, without his being 
present, to evaluate his performance against those standards.”  
Warren E. Buffett (2001) on boards and managers   
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the potential conflict between shareholders and 
managers that may arise in corporations where control and ownership is separated. This 
issue is captured in the corporate governance literature as the principal-agent problem, 
where managers control the operations of the firm and principals provide capital for 
investment projects. Jensen (1986) describes private equity as an efficient approach to 
solving the conflict between managers and shareholders.  
Jensen (1989) argues that private equity portfolio firms have a superior organizational 
structure compared to typical public corporations with atomistic ownership, and that this 
superiority is particularly evident in their portfolio firms. In fact, private equity firms 
implement corporate governance mechanisms in the organizational structure of these firms. 
First, they create incentives for the management of the portfolio firm. Second, they use debt 
to finance their transactions ‒ hence the term leveraged buyout. Moreover, the use of debt is 
an additional incentive for the management to perform well in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
Finally, private equity firms acquire the majority stakes of their portfolio firms, which 
allows them to monitor and advise the management of those firms.
1
 
In this context, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as entailing 
institutions and mechanisms that assure that the suppliers of capital receive an appropriate 
return on their investment. Corporate governance literature provides many findings relevant 
                                                 
1
 Compare besides Jensen (1989) also Kaplan and Strömberg (2009).  
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to Jensen’s arguments. In particular, empirical studies analyze the impact of private equity 
investments on the value of portfolio firms. These studies mostly measure the value effects 
of the portfolio firms with an event study and an ordinary least square regression model.
2
  
However, the literature provides little understanding of the internal governance structure of 
private equity firms. In other words, corporate governance literature fails to provide 
empirical evidence on the monitoring and advice requirements of private equity firms 
themselves. For instance, in their survey paper Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) provide four 
arguments why private equity firms have a superior structure. First, their organization is lean 
and decentralized. Second, they employ experts form different industries to restructure their 
portfolio firms. Third, the compensation structure of private equity managers is based on the 
pay for performance principle, which incentivizes the management to outperform their 
benchmark. Finally, due the fact that private equity funds are closed-end funds with a 
limited lifetime of ten to thirteen years, they have to outperform their benchmark to generate 
returns for their investors. In sum, all these arguments indicate that private equity firms have 
little requirement for internal monitoring, but require advice from outside directors. Yet the 
corporate governance literature does not provide much understanding of the role of the 
board of directors in private equity firms.   
Besides investigations on private equity investments, the corporate governance literature 
provides many publications in recent years on the topic of the board of directors. In 
corporate governance literature, the board of directors monitors and advises the CEO on key 
corporate decisions (Larcker and Tayan 2011: 223). Several empirical studies show that 
characteristics such as board size, number of outside directors and founders influence 
corporate value and performance.
3
 For instance, Coles et al. (2008) find evidence that 
industrial firms with high advisory requirements have larger boards and more outside 
directors on their board than those with less advisory requirements. On the role of founders 
on the board of directors Andres (2008) points out that German family firms in which family 
members actively participate on the board of directors outperform their benchmark. 
                                                 
2
 Compare findings such as Lehn and Poulsen (1989) on going private transactions, Renneboog et al. (2005) on 
LBO transactions in the UK, Betzer (2006) as well as Betzer (2007) on European LBOs, and Achleitner et al. 
(2010) on the announcement effects of hedge funds and private equity investments.  
3
 Compare the publications of Yermack (1996), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), Bonne et al. (2007) on the 
performance of industrial firms and Linck et al. (2008) on the performance of banks.  
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Moreover, Fahlenbrach (2009) investigates the impact of founder and non-founder CEOs in 
industrial firms. His findings indicate that founder CEOs have a positive and significant 
impact on the performance of such firms.  
Taking these findings together, one can say that empirical investigations have considered the 
value effect of private equity investments and the role of the board of directors in industrial 
corporations. However, there is only limited empirical evidence for the organizational 
structure of private equity firms and the specific role of their boards of directors.  
 
1.2. Aim 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of the board of directors in listed private 
equity (LPE) firms and its impact on the performance of such firms. In order to empirically 
answer the research question as to whether certain company and board characteristics impact 
the performance of LPE firms, the thesis applies a unique panel data set. In particular, it 
applies proxy variables to measure the advice requirements, founder status and managerial 
ownership of LPE firms. In doing so, it applies proxy variables such as number of board 
meetings, board size, ratio of outside directors, founder CEO on the board, and CEO 
ownership to the performance variables of Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA).  
 
1.3. Contribution and outline  
 
This thesis uses a unique panel data set with over 600 observations on the corporate and 
board structure of listed private equity firms. The purpose of the dissertation is to show the 
differences and similarities between these characteristics in industrial, family and private 
equity firms. As far as I know there is no literature that investigates on an extensive 
empirical scale the board structure of private equity firms, therefore this dissertation 
contributes in several ways to the existing literature on private equity. First, it empirically 
describes the main differences in firm characteristics between industrial, family and LPE 
firms. These firm characteristics are e.g. performance measure such as Tobin’s Q and ROA, 
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and other characteristics such as total assets, leverage and company age. Second, it seeks to 
investigate the role of the board of directors in LPE firms and its impact on company 
performance.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the foundation for 
the corporate governance literature, first dealing with the principal-agent theory ‒ which 
explains the problem between owners and managers in firms where ownership and control is 
separated ‒ and secondly describing corporate governance and indicating institutions and 
mechanisms that reduce the principal-agent problem. Thirdly the chapter describes the 
superior organizational structure of private equity firms and discusses in particular the 
organizational structure of unlisted and listed private equity firms. Finally, to complete the 
picture of research into corporate governance in the private equity segment, it presents the 
empirical findings on private equity investments. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the literature on the board of directors. The chapter starts 
with an explanation of the performance variables Tobin’s Q and ROA. It goes on to provide 
an overview of the board, founder and ownership literature. I use the literature on the board 
of directors, founders and ownership characteristics to set my hypotheses, which will be part 
of the multivariate analysis of Chapter 5. Chapter 3 ends with an overview of the hypotheses 
on advice, founder status and managerial ownership of LPE firms.  
Chapter 4 presents the unique data set of the present thesis and gives an overview of some 
descriptive statistics. Furthermore, it presents the existing literature on industrial, family and 
LPE firms, with a particular focus on the findings on company and board characteristics. 
Chapter 5 uses the underlying panel data set to answer the hypotheses set in Chapter 3. As 
mentioned above, two performance measures are used: Tobin’s Q and ROA. Besides the 
dependent variables, the thesis uses proxies to investigate the impact of advice from the 
board of directors, the impact of ‘founder on the board’, and the impact of managerial 
ownership on the performance of LPE firms. The chapter starts with an introduction into 
econometric methods. Discussion focuses in particular on the fixed effects and random 
effects model, and the Hausman test. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings on 
the advice, founder and ownership proxies on the performance of LPE firms.  
The thesis ends with the Conclusion in Chapter 6.   
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2. Corporate governance and private equity 
 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the 
same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch 
over their own.”  
Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations (1776) 
 
The following chapter will start with an introduction into the principal-agent theory. The 
general concept of this theory is described in the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
on the theory of the firm. In that paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the potential 
conflicts between shareholders and managers that may arise in corporations where control 
and ownership are separated. The owners’ task to oversee the actions of the management 
becomes difficult in firms with a diffuse ownership structure.  
After briefly expounding the principal-agent theory, this chapter will present an overview of 
corporate governance as a body of institutions and mechanisms that may help solve the 
agency problem, and will proceed to a description of the board of directors as a (theoretical) 
internal corporate governance mechanism. Chapter 3 will then give a detailed overview of 
the theoretical concepts and empirical findings of the board of directors’ literature. The 
empirical analysis of this thesis deals with the board characteristics of private equity firms. 
But all board characteristics, according to the corporate governance literature, are internal 
governance mechanisms. Besides, it is interesting to observe that private equity firms use 
several governance mechanisms such as takeover, debt, monitoring and advice, as well as 
compensation incentives for the boards of their portfolio firms to solve the agency conflict. 
Nevertheless, the empirical analysis of this thesis will focus solely on board characteristics 
and their impact on the performance of private equity firms.  
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The present chapter covers the organizational structure of unlisted as well as listed private 
equity firms. However, the empirical literature of the last two decades mostly focuses on the 
effect of private equity investments at the portfolio firm level. In other words, scholars have 
generally failed to investigate the internal governance mechanisms of private equity firms.  
However, given that Jensen (1986) describes private equity as a superior organization 
structure that solves the principal-agent problem, a better understanding of the internal 
governance mechanisms of private equity firms would certainly be beneficial for corporate 
governance literature. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether the governance 
and incentive mechanisms that private equity applies to its portfolio firms also pertain within 
the private equity firms themselves. In other words, the question arises whether the superior 
organizational structure is consistent internally and externally within the private equity 
industry. A further question is whether there are similarities and differences in firm and 
board characteristics between private equity
4
 and other organizational structures such as 
family or industrial firms.  
With a view to filling the gap in the corporate governance literature, the thesis will, 
therefore, focus on the board of directors of listed private equity (LPE) firms. The chapter 
will close with an overview of the findings on the wealth effects of shareholders and 
stakeholders in private equity investments.   
  
                                                 
4
 I follow here again the hypothesis of Jensen (1986) that private equity is a superior organization structure.  
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2.1. Principal-agent theory and corporate governance  
 
The following sub-chapter will discuss the principal-agent theory, which is partly mentioned 
in the publications of Adam Smith (1776) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). However, 
Jensen (1976) outlines the problem between owners and managers, who in his theory are 
both value-maximizing agents. He points out that in the principal-agent theory managers 
have an information advantage and use this advantage at the cost of the owners. This 
opportunistic behavior causes agency costs, which reduce overall economic welfare and 
value. Corporate governance mechanisms can help solve the problem. This sub-chapter will, 
then, first discuss the principal-agent theory and close with an overview of corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
 
 
 
2.1.1. Principal-agent theory 
 
Adam Smith (1776) provides a theory of markets but without elaborating a theory of the 
firms that operate in these markets. In Smith’s theory they simply use input factors to 
generate their output. He describes firms as profit-maximizing actors. However, he does not 
describe the issue between managers and owners when ownership structure is divided. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) address the theory of the firm and describe different aspects of 
company behavior with a particular focus on property rights.
5
 
The principal-agent theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) explains the conflict between 
shareholders and managers that arises when ownership and control are separated. The 
conflict arises due to the different interests of both parties. Managers have an information 
advantage over shareholders on investment decisions. According to Jensen and Meckling 
                                                 
5
 Compare also the publications of Alchian (1965, 1968), Alchian and Kessel (1962) and Demsetz (1967). 
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managers can use their information advantage and their control over investment decisions to 
maximize their own interests. In the theory of the firm
6
 the interest of the shareholder is 
straightforward: to maximize corporate value and, more specifically, the value of common 
stocks. On the other hand, managers may want to gain recognition, increase their power 
within the firm and industry, or even reduce their workload. There are three potential 
conflicts in this area that can lead to greater agency costs and hence further reduce 
shareholder wealth: managers’ desire to remain in power7, their risk aversion, and the free 
cash flow problem. These will now be described. 
 
 
 
2.1.1.1. Management power  
 
In general, managers prefer to stay in office than lose their job. One way to stay in office is 
to perform well. In theory shareholders will not remove managers when they achieve their 
expected goals. However, managers have different strategies to entrench themselves in 
corporations. First, they can increase their power within the company by increasing their 
equity ownership or sitting in important positions. The increase in power allows them to 
vote against their release. Secondly, they can invest in specific projects, which increase the 
information costs of the firm. This increase makes it difficult for the firm to find an adequate 
successor for the current manager.
8
  
On the other hand, corporations hire management teams to lead the firm well. If 
management teams do not achieve their negotiated goals the shareholders will replace them. 
                                                 
6
 The theory of the firms considers the definition of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
7
 The desire of the manager to stay in power is also called entrenchment.  
8
 Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) address the impact of CEO power on company value. The paper 
describes clearly the different types of CEO power.  
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But the conflict between shareholders and managers can be very costly for the shareholders 
and hence seriously reduce their wealth.
9
   
 
2.1.1.2. Managerial risk aversion  
 
The portfolio management literature suggests that all rational participants in the financial 
market are risk averse. From the shareholder point of view two circumstances matter. First, 
shareholders invest their capital in firms with positive net present value projects. Secondly, 
shareholders reduce their risk by selecting their portfolio and diversifying it by investing in 
different asset classes. The theory of portfolio diversification indicates that if the investment 
in a specific asset fails, the shareholder does not lose all the invested capital, because the 
portfolio is diversified. On the other hand, a manager is more concerned about risk within 
the firm. In general, managers invest their human capital and receive compensation for their 
work. This is partly performance related, and well-performing managers receive an equity 
stake as a reward for past performance. Taking the human capital investment and equity 
stake together, managers are heavily invested in a single firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that they are, therefore, necessarily risk-averse. In other words, they may be 
unwilling to invest in projects with a high downside risk because they can cost them their 
job, as well as reducing their equity stake.  
 
 
 
2.1.1.3. Free cash flow  
 
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the discounted sum of all cash flows at the relevant 
cost of capital that remains after funding all projects with a positive net present value (NPV). 
Conflict between managers and shareholders arises when it comes to the utilization of the 
                                                 
9
 Jensen (1986) describes how private equity firms address managerial incentives and monitoring.  
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free cash flow. In firms with outstanding debt the management has to use a certain amount 
of the free cash flow to oblige the firm’s creditors. After the firm has met its obligations, 
management can use the free cash flow in one of three ways. First, it can pay the free cash 
flow out to the shareholders. Managers can pay dividends to their shareholders or repurchase 
shares, which has in theory the same outcome for the shareholders. However, according to 
Jensen (1986), dividend payment is a weak promise because the dividend payments can 
change over time. Alternatively, managers can issue debt, which is a stronger promise than 
dividend payments. Debt creation is a strong promise because it binds the management to 
pay interest and principal to the creditors and furthermore pay out future free cash flow to 
the shareholders. Jensen (1986) points out that a firm faces bankruptcy charges if it does not 
maintain its interest and principal payments.
10
  
Secondly, management can reinvest the free cash flow in new projects that increase 
shareholder value. However, this argument contradicts Jensen’s definition, because the free 
cash flow results from cash flows after funding all projects with positive NPV. For this 
reason shareholders do not want management to invest free cash flow in projects with 
negative NPV. 
Thirdly, management can hold free cash flow under its control and invest it in financial 
securities. In theory, shareholders know how to use free cash flow efficiently: they can use it 
for consumption or reinvest it in their portfolio. And managers are interested in investing in 
new projects. One reason for this behavior is that managers may mistakenly assume that 
there are still investment projects with a positive NPV. Moreover, managers want to increase 
the assets under their control because it increases their power and prestige. Finally, 
managerial compensation increases with firm size. On the hypothesis that managers want to 
increase the assets under management, Murphy (1999) points out that CEO compensation is 
affected by the size as well as by the industrial sector of a corporation.    
Taking Jensen’s arguments further, Tirole (2001) argues in his theoretical section that 
residual control and cash flow rights remain in the hands of shareholders. In other words, 
shareholders can claim both to control the management and to pay out free cash flow.   
                                                 
10
 Jensen (1986) sees the free cash flow problem as more important in mature industries in which firms have 
stable free cash flows and low growth rates. The same article describes how private equity firms use debt as an 
instrument for management incentives.  
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Jensen describes the life cycle of firms and notes that over their lifetime they require 
different degrees of entrepreneurial and managerial skill, as well as financial capital. He 
argues in his 1989 paper “The Eclipse of the Public Corporation” that the conflict between 
managers and shareholders is more intense in mature public organizations than in growth 
industries. However, the overall benefits of separating management and ownership must be 
greater than the costs, otherwise organizations with such a structure would not survive over 
time. Corporate governance takes a comprehensive view of all the mechanisms that help 
shareholders and managers to solve their conflict of interests.   
 
 
 
2.1.1.4. Solution of the agency problem 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe not only the interest conflict between shareholders and 
managers, but also three approaches that can reduce that conflict. All three approaches 
include transaction costs, which in the corporate finance literature are called agency costs. 
First, shareholders can bind the manager with a contract to act in their interests. Secondly, 
they can monitor management actions to ensure that these are in their interests. Finally, they 
can create incentives that align the manager’s interests with their own.  
One possible solution for the agency problem is a contract that binds the manager to 
maximize shareholder wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that such contracts are 
generally costly, and there are a number of reasons why a contract of this sort cannot be 
perfect. First, it should include every future issue of the corporation and every possible 
action that a manager might undertake to solve that specific issue. Such a contract can only 
exist in theory, not in a world where the future is uncertain. Moreover, managers rather than 
shareholders know how to maximize company value: shareholders hire managers precisely 
because they do not themselves know how to run an organization. So a contract solution that 
binds the manager’s every action will, from the shareholders’ point of view, be counter-
productive.  
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Another solution suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is to monitor management 
actions and investment decisions. However, there are two objections to this idea. First, as 
already discussed with respect to contractual binding, shareholders lack management 
experience and expertise: they cannot distinguish between good and bad decisions. An 
investment decision that was good from the shareholder standpoint might turn out badly in 
future. Effective monitoring of management actions and investment decisions presumes a 
critical awareness of the difference between value creating and value destroying decisions.  
A second instance described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that of corporations with 
diffuse ownership structure. Here a single shareholder with a small ratio of the common 
equity lacks the incentive to oversee management actions. Jensen and Meckling point out 
that monitoring is also associated with agency costs, and in the case of the small shareholder 
these may well outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, shareholders with large equity 
stakes have a proper incentive to monitor the actions of the management, and most large 
shareholders also perform well as monitors.  
Finally, the corporate governance literature outlines the different effects on corporate value 
of monitors such as the board of directors, banks in the role of creditors, and private 
investors such as hedge funds and private equity investors.  
The last approach outlined by Jensen and Meckling to solve the conflict between 
shareholders and management is to create incentives for the management to act in the 
shareholders’ interests. The corporate governance literature calls this the interest alignment 
hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that managerial ownership creates an incentive for 
managers to increase shareholder value because they are themselves shareholders. A 
manager with equity ownership is interested in paying out the free cash flow rather than 
investing it in negative NPV projects or keeping it in the firm. Manager ownership solves 
the conflict of interest by benefitting both parties: management as well as shareholders.
11
  
A large number of empirical analyses provide evidence that private equity firms solve the 
principal-agent problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). In order to complete the 
picture on corporate governance, and in particular on private equity as one specific modality 
                                                 
11
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide the theoretical arguments for the alignment of interest hypothesis. 
Morck et al. (1988), among others, investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and company 
performance.  
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of corporate governance, sub-chapter 2.2. will discuss the organizational structure of private 
equity firms and give an overview on empirical findings with regard to private equity 
investments.  
 
 
 
2.1.2. Corporate governance  
 
The principal-agent theory is the basic concept that makes corporate governance necessary. 
It discusses the conflict that can arise between shareholders and managers and proposes 
institutions and mechanisms that may help solve it. This section discusses four corporate 
governance definitions and corresponding solution mechanisms proposed by Jensen (1993).  
Jensen (1993) divides corporate governance into four categories. First, he describes capital 
markets, which operate under regulatory and legal constraints to safeguard the capital of 
investors. Secondly, the legal-political-regulatory system provides institutions through 
which investors can take legal action to punish misbehavior on the part of managers. 
Thirdly, Jensen mentions the product and factoring markets which, however, react relatively 
slowly to inefficient managerial behavior and can therefore waste valuable resources. 
Finally, internal control systems such as the board of directors can oversee managerial 
actions.   
In general, corporate governance is concerned with institutions and mechanisms to alleviate 
conflict between shareholders and managers and safeguard investors’ capital. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Gillan and Starks (1998), Rajan and Zingales (2000), and Denis (2001) 
provide definitions of corporate governance that focus on different aspects of this issue. In 
their survey paper about corporate governance Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider the 
relationship between the supply of finance and corporations. In their view, corporate 
governance concerns the mechanisms that ensure that financiers get an appropriate return on 
investment. Gillan and Starks (1998) focus on legal aspects, summarizing corporate 
governance as the body of laws, rules, and other factors that control the operations of a 
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corporation. Rajan and Zingales (2000) defines corporate governance as a complex set of 
constraints to ensure that investors realize part of the future profits of a firm. Finally, Denis 
(2001) describes corporate governance as a body of institutional and market mechanisms 
that motivate the self-interested agent to maximize shareholder value.  
 
 
 
2.1.2.1. Legal and regulatory mechanisms 
 
In general, the system of national, transnational, and international laws and regulations 
external to a company, which determines the context in which it operates, is nevertheless 
outside the remit of corporate governance (Denis 2001: 198). However, corporate 
governance literature deals with the question how such systems affect corporate finance, 
including external finance. For instance La Porta et al. (1997) investigate how legal 
protection affects shareholders and creditors. They see the legal system in which a firm 
operates as affecting its ability to access external finance.  
Corporate governance research also investigates the impact of legal changes on shareholder 
wealth. A common approach is to investigate company performance before and after such 
change. For instance, Linck et al. (2008) examine the determinants of board structure pre 
and post the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Finally, a large body of literature addresses the impact of 
antitakeover provisions on shareholder wealth and the employment market for directors.
12
   
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1992) and Coles and Hoi (2003) analyze antitakeover provisions on shareholder 
wealth and the labor market for directors.  
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2.1.2.2. Internal control mechanisms  
 
This section presents different internal control mechanisms of corporate governance: the 
board of directors, executive compensation and ownership, and nonexecutive ownership. 
The characterization of the board of directors as an internal control mechanism is an 
important issue here, as the overall research objective of the thesis is to investigate the board 
of directors of private equity firms. In line with this, Chapter 3 will present the theoretical 
argumentation and findings of the relevant literature and Chapter 4 will present the findings 
of the empirical analysis. Secondly, this section covers the corporate governance view of 
executive compensation and ownership. This will also be part of the literature overview of 
Chapter 3 and of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4. Finally, the section deals with 
nonexecutive ownership as an internal control mechanism.   
First, the legal system in question requires that a corporation should have a board of 
directors, but does not stipulate its size or how many independent directors should sit on the 
board. The board of directors is elected by the shareholders; its function is to monitor and 
advise the management on behalf of the shareholders. Shareholders have neither the ability 
nor the time to oversee management actions themselves, so the board of directors should 
ensure their interests. In practice the CEO and the management team will try to gain the 
understanding of the directors for their investment projects. Following corporate scandals 
such as the Enron fraud case, regulators and investment companies have called for board 
reforms. The general view is that a decrease in board size and an increase in the number of 
outside directors should increase shareholder value. The literature argues that small boards 
do their work more efficiently, because small teams need less time to discuss and make 
decisions on corporate questions. Furthermore, the composition of the board has an effect on 
its monitoring and advisory functions. Boards with a larger proportion of outside directors 
will oversee the CEO and management better than boards with more internal directors. This 
hypothesis suggests that directors who are members of the management team, or are 
otherwise affiliated to the company, will monitor its actions less effectively (Gillan 2006: 
384-385).  
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Empirical research shows that board size and composition have an effect on company 
performance. However, board size and the ratio of outside directors
13
 depend on information 
costs. Duchin et al. (2010) find that a decrease in board size increases performance for firms 
with low information costs. Conversely, a decrease in board size decreases performance for 
firms with high information costs. In line with these findings they further show that an 
increase in the ratio of outsiders has a negative impact on firms with high information costs. 
However, firms with low information costs increase in performance with an increase of 
outside directors.  
Secondly, executive compensation and ownership is a common corporate governance 
mechanism in corporate finance. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) executive 
compensation and ownership is a management incentive mechanism that reduces conflict 
between managers and owners. In theory, executive compensation and ownership align the 
interests of management and owner. Denis (2001) distinguishes two dimensions of 
compensation: cash compensation and pay for performance. Empirical investigations show 
that executive compensation has changed over the last 30 years. For instance, Murphy 
(1999) describes the development of executive compensation from 1970 to 1996 and 
concludes that over this period the median cash compensation for S&P 500 CEOs doubled. 
Taking stock options and other performance-related compensation into account, 
compensation quadrupled over the same period. Murphy also points out that executive 
compensation varies across industries, firm size, and countries.   
On the one hand, compensation for performance, including executive ownership, should 
increase the incentive for managers to increase the value of the firm. But the dark side of 
such compensation is risk-averse behavior. First of all, managers are considered naturally 
risk averse and will prefer cash compensation to pay for performance, because they are 
presumed to have already invested a large portion of their human capital in the firm. It 
follows that performance-related compensation might lead them to invest in less risky 
projects. This behavior, however, is not in the interest of shareholders, who (in theory) have 
diversified portfolios and are not averse to risk at the corporate level (Denis 2001: 202-203).  
                                                 
13
 Defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors on the board.  
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Furthermore, management ownership can lead either to interest alignment or to management 
entrenchment. One of the first empirical investigations of management ownership and firm 
value is the analysis by Morck et al. (1988). Their findings show that management 
ownership of less than 5 percent leads to an increase in corporate value. However, 
management ownership of 5 to 25 percent decreases corporate value and leads to 
management entrenchment. The evidence thus shows that management ownership can align 
the interests of management and shareholders, whereas an overly large stake of ownership 
can lead to management entrenchment. Managers with a large stake in the company often 
have the power to remain in office even if they reduce shareholder value.    
Thirdly, nonexecutive ownership is also considered to be an internal control mechanism. 
Shareholders who hold 5 percent or more of the common equity are defined in the corporate 
governance literature as significant shareholders or blockholders, and they naturally have a 
bigger incentive to oversee management decisions than shareholders with a relatively small 
stake in the common equity. Blockholders may be wealthy individuals, corporations or 
institutional investors. One type of institutional investor is the private equity firm, and such 
firms not only strictly monitor and advise the boards of their target firms,
14
 but also employ 
incentives, for example compensation contracts that include pay for performance and equity 
stakes for the management.  
Finally, debt is an instrument with a disciplinary effect that is often used in private equity 
transactions. Denis (2001) defines debt as one of four internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. In his theoretical paper Jensen (1986) describes the free cash flow problem and 
the conflict that arises between managers and shareholders in firms with large free cash 
flows when managers use the cash flow for consumption at the expense of the shareholders. 
Jensen’s “control hypothesis” offers a solution to this problem. He recommends that firms 
should use the free cash flow to pay dividends or repurchase shares. In doing so, 
management can choose the amount of a dividend payment or share repurchase, and they 
can reduce these in future. However, because of this flexibility, dividend payment or share 
repurchase is considered a weak promise on the part of management. In contrast, debt 
creation is a stronger promise to pay out future free cash flows to the shareholders, because 
                                                 
14
 Target firm is the common term in the corporate governance literature for firms in which private equity 
companies invest.  
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debt binds the management both to pay interest and to repay principal. Management can lose 
some or all control rights if it does not fulfill its obligations. For this reason, Jensen 
recommends that dividends should be replaced by debt.  
Private equity firms have taken up Jensen’s basic idea of using debt financing as a market-
based solution to the agency problem. During the 1980s they created the concept of 
leveraged buyouts. In the leveraged buyout transactions of that decade private equity firms 
bought target firms and financed these transactions with up to 90 percent debt – so called 
leverage. The typical candidates for leveraged buyout transactions were firms in the mature 
life cycle with no growth potential. Leveraged buyouts create value by solving the free cash 
flow problem. Section 2.2 will consider the private equity industry and leveraged buyouts in 
greater detail. 
 
 
 
2.1.2.3. External control mechanisms  
 
In addition to internal (and legal) corporate governance mechanisms, external control 
mechanisms such as mergers and acquisitions ‒ in which, for example, an acquiring firm 
purchases the common stock of a target firm in order to control it ‒ can provide a solution 
for the principal-agent conflict. The idea of such acquisitions is that the acquiring firm will 
improve the operations of the target firm and create value for its shareholders (Netter et al. 
2009: 3).  
Corporate governance research shows that poorly performing firms are more likely to be 
targets in takeover transactions. This mechanism creates an incentive for self-interested 
managers to perform well in order to avoid a takeover transaction, because poorly 
performing managers will likely lose their jobs, as well as control over the firm, in a 
takeover transaction. Such managers will, therefore, seek to increase the firm’s value in 
order to survive in the market (Denis 2001: 206).  
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In theory the acquiring firm pays an appropriate price for the target firm on the market and 
creates value through the transaction. However, takeover transactions are related to so-called 
control contests, in which different acquirers bid for a target and thus raise the target price. 
However, takeovers are also time and money consuming: besides the transaction price the 
acquiring firm has to create an internal transaction division and hire transaction consultants. 
Moreover, target firms can use various anti-takeover tactics to avoid an unwanted offer 
(Netter et al. 2009: 2).  
Most studies on takeover transactions find that the value for the shareholders of the target 
firm increases upon the announcement of a transaction. This suggests that takeover 
transactions create value for the target firm shareholders. However, these studies also find 
evidence that acquiring firms pay too much in takeover bids. The evidence on takeover 
transactions suggests that target shareholders increase their wealth, whereas the shareholders 
of the acquiring firm lose wealth in the transaction. In other words the takeover transaction 
is an investment project with a negative NPV for the shareholders of the acquiring firm.
15
   
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) show that the number of takeover transactions increased from 
the beginning of the 1980s to the end of that decade. Between 1989 and 1992 the transaction 
volume decreased, and it increased again from 1992 to the end of the 1990s. Turning the 
focus onto private equity transactions
16
 the same authors establish that private equity 
transactions rose from 1980 and reached their peak in 1988. After 1988 there was a sharp 
drop in these transactions. They conclude that corporate governance mechanisms changed 
over that period of time. Transactions in the 1980s were heavily leveraged: market 
participants used debt as a corporate governance mechanism to solve the conflict between 
management and shareholders. The mindset of participants changed in the 1990s, and they 
started to use monitoring and incentive-based compensation plans as corporate governance 
mechanisms to solve the conflict between managers and shareholders.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 Netter et al. (2009) provides an overview of several takeover papers e.g. Offenberg (2009), Moeller et al. 
(2004) and Eckbo and Thorburn (2009).  
16
 Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) discuss findings on going private transactions and mention that most of these 
are private equity deals.  
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2.1.2.4. Product market competition    
 
Finally the product market is the last category of corporate governance. In general, every 
firm sells its products for a competitive price on its market. Firms with poor corporate 
governance systems tend to use their resources inefficiently. These firms often struggle with 
their performance on the product market and the cost of capital. In contrast, firms with good 
corporate governance systems will attract both investors to finance their projects and 
customers for their products. Consequently they will be able to produce with relatively low 
capital costs compared to firms with poor corporate governance systems. In the long run 
poorly governed firms will face financial distress and even bankruptcy. Jensen (1993) 
concludes, however, that product market competition is a weak instrument to solve the 
conflict between shareholders and managers. 
Summary: The present sub-chapter has discussed all four corporate governance categories 
described by Jensen (1993). One specific corporate governance mechanism, among all 
others presented in this sub-chapter, is private equity. As a better understanding of the board 
of directors in private equity firms is the primary aim of this dissertation, the next sub-
chapter will present an overview of the organizational structure of private equity, as well as 
the empirical findings in this area. 
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2.2. The private equity industry  
 
In order to establish a foundation for a better understanding of the private equity industry, 
the following sub-chapters will describe the different organizational structures of this sector, 
with this section outlining the organizational structure of private equity firms, both unlisted 
and listed.  
The corporate governance literature of the past decades only defines private equity in 
general, without differentiating between unlisted and listed private equity (LPE) companies. 
For instance, Jensen (1986) describes private equity in this sense as an efficient approach to 
solving the principal-agent conflict
17
, and Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) describe private 
equity firms as specialized investment companies which acquire target firms using equity 
and debt. While other investment companies predominantly or solely use equity financing to 
purchase portfolio firms, private equity companies use a relatively small portion of equity 
and a large portion of debt for their transactions.  
 
The more specialized private equity literature largely provides empirical findings on the 
effects of portfolio firms. The present section will give an overview of these findings
18
 to 
complete the picture on private equity research, and in doing so will at the same time 
indicate the focal area of the thesis as a whole; for there is a notable lack of literature on the 
internal governance mechanisms of private equity firms. The thesis addresses this gap by 
using company and board characteristics made available due the fact that LPE firms are 
publicly traded, and therefore have to disclose information on their operational, financial, 
management, and business areas.  
                                                 
17
 Jensen (1986) refers in his paper to the term leveraged buyouts, which is used in the corporate governance 
literature synonymously for private equity.  
18
 This sub-chapter will refer to scholars such as Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Kaplan (1989), Andres et al. (2007), 
as well as Achleitner et al. (2010), to show that private equity transactions create value for shareholders. On the 
other hand, the effects on the stakeholders in private equity transactions will also be considered. For this 
purpose the sub-chapter will refer to findings of Kaplan (1989), Asquith and Wizman (1990), Warga and 
Welch (1993), Harris et al. (2005), and Billett et al. (2010).  
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2.2.1. Private equity: a superior organizational structure  
 
The corporate governance literature describes private equity as a construct of private equity 
firms employing general partners and investment professionals, and of private equity funds 
in which investors commit their capital as limited partners; finally it describes the 
restructuring process of portfolio companies.
19
  
Metrick and Yasuda (2011) define private equity funds by four characteristics.
20
 First, an 
investment firm is classified as a private equity firm when its business model is private 
equity: i.e. these firms raise capital from investors
21
 to acquire and restructure portfolio 
firms. Second, according to Metrick and Yasuda (2011) private equity funds only invest in 
private companies.
22
 This means that private equity funds either acquire private firms or take 
public firms private after the acquisition. Third, private equity funds actively monitor and 
advise the management of the portfolio companies to increase the value of these 
companies.
23
 Finally, private equity firms create value for their investors through the sale of 
their portfolio companies via different channels, such as initial public offerings, secondary 
buyouts, or strategic sales.  
Most of the literature on private equity refers to private equity transactions conducted by 
private equity limited partnerships. However, the literature on private equity is cited here 
                                                 
19
 In their paper on venture capital and private equity investments Metrick and Yasuda (2011) describe the 
structure of private equity funds. Compare also further sources on fund structure for instance Bergmann et al. 
(2009), Kasper et al. (2012), or Lahr (2010).  
20
 Although, Metrick and Yasuda (2011) characterize private equity funds, this definition can be used similarly 
for private equity firms, which are the general partners and investment professionals managing these funds.     
21
 The investor of private equity funds are mainly institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance 
companies as well as wealthy individuals. These investors are also called qualified purchasers in the private 
equity industry, because they invest a significant amount in private equity funds. On the other hand, small 
investors can participate in private equity investments due private equity fund of funds.   
22
 The literature on private equity refers to public acquisitions where the private equity firms just invest as 
minority shareholder as co-investments (see for instance Kasper et al. 2012).  
23
 See Jensen (1989) or Kaplan Strömberg (2007). 
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with a view to differentiating between unlisted and listed private equity firms. The following 
sections will accordingly present an overview of the organizational structure of these firms.    
 
 
 
2.2.1.1. Unlisted private equity: organizational structure  
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2008: 3) state that private equity firms are generally organized as 
limited partnerships or limited liability corporations. As well as describing their legal 
structure, Jensen (1989) notes that private equity firms are lean decentralized organizations 
with relatively few investment professionals and employees, who in the 1980s almost 
always had a financial background, for example in investment banking. Over the past three 
decades this background has changed: nowadays private equity firms employ experts from 
different industries to create value for their investors.
24
 Acharya et al. (2013) investigate the 
impact of partners’ backgrounds on private equity fund returns, specifically examining how 
general partners with a strategic and financial background impact fund returns.   
The private equity firms described above raise investment funds, which they then invest in 
portfolio firms. Kaplan and Strömberg (2008: 3) indicate that private equity companies raise 
their investment funds through so called private equity funds, which are legally investment 
vehicles with general and limited partners. Generally, private equity funds are organized as 
closed-end funds with a limited lifetime of ten years and an additional option to extend the 
lifetime up to thirteen years. Investors (also called limited partners) commit their capital 
until the fund has matured, before which point they cannot withdraw their capital. The 
general partners manage the funds within this period, whereas the limited partners have little 
to say. General partners are investment professionals from the private equity firms. In 
contrast, limited partners are wealthy individuals and institutional investors such as banks, 
insurance companies or mutual funds. However, the investment behavior of the general 
                                                 
24
 Our sample shows that private equity boards consist of former bankers, accountants, lawyers and engineers.  
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partners is regulated by a number of common covenants ‒ e.g. restriction on debt, or 
investment limits for a single firm ‒ which protect the investments of the limited partners.  
Limited partners provide most of the investment capital. In contrast, the general partners 
invest at least 1% of the investment capital. Typically, the general partners use the 
committed capital to invest in portfolio companies. Private equity firms generally use the 
first five years to invest in portfolio companies and the last five years to sell the portfolio 
companies and return the capital to the investors.
25
    
Figure 2.1: Organizational structure of unlisted private equity firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Axelson et al. (2009: 1550) describe the compensation structure of general partners in 
private equity firms. First, general partners receive an annual management fee, which is a 
certain age of the committed capital, and an additional fee for the capital employed after the 
                                                 
25
 Compare also the paper of Sahlman (1990) on the structure and governance of venture capital firms, and 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) on the structure of venture capital funds.  
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investments have been realized. Second, general partners receive a performance fee, which 
is known as carried interest and is usually 20% of the fund’s earnings. Finally, general 
partners can additionally charge deal and monitoring fees for the companies under their 
management.
26
 
In private equity transactions private equity firms pay regular premiums to acquire portfolio 
firms. In public to private transactions, in which private equity firms purchase public firms 
and take them private, portfolio firm shareholders receive premiums of 15‒50% over the 
current stock price. For example, Bargeron et al. (2008: 376) investigate the difference in 
premiums paid in public acquisitions, and find evidence that public bidders pay 36% higher 
premiums than private bidders (ibid. 390), and that private equity firms pay even less than 
other private or public bidders. Furthermore, when private equity firms are involved in 
public transaction target shareholders receive 63% less than from public acquisitions. 
Finally, because private equity firms finance their transactions with debt, the corporate 
governance literature refers to private equity transactions as leveraged buyouts (LBOs). 
Typically, private equity firms use 60‒90% debt to finance their acquisitions.27  
 
 
 
2.2.1.2. Listed private equity: organizational structure  
 
Besides unlisted private equity firms there is also a pendant in the form of so-called listed 
private equity (LPE) firms. The literature on private equity provides several terms relating to 
LPE firms such as publicly traded private equity, quoted private equity or liquid private 
                                                 
26
 For fee structure see Metrick and Yasuda (2010), Axelson, Strömberg and Weisbach (2009), and Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005).  
27
 On the use of debt in LBO transactions see Jensen (1986), as well as Jensen (1989).  
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equity.
28
 As far as I know the abbreviation ‘LPE’ is generally accepted in private equity 
literature and will, therefore, be used in this dissertation.
29
  
The corporate finance literature provides different definitions of LPE. According to Bilo et 
al. (2005) a LPE firm is one that is conducted in the private equity industry and whose funds 
are traded on an exchange. Bilo et al. (2005) classify LPE firms in three categories. First, 
listed investment firms can be classified as LPE firms if their core business is private equity. 
Second, private equity firms can also be categorized as LPE, even if they are not listed on an 
exchange, if their investment funds are quoted on an exchange. Finally, an investment 
company can be classified as LPE when investments in private equity are made directly or 
indirectly through its funds.  
On the other hand, Lahr (2010) defines LPE firms from the investor’s perspective, seeing 
LPE firms as firms that provide investors with the possibility to participate in private equity 
investments. In many cases private equity investors are wealthy individuals and institutional 
investors who invest a qualified amount in private equity funds. According to an article in 
the Financial Times private equity firms such as Blackstone, Apollo and Carlyle require a 
minimum investment of $1‒5 m from their investors. On the other hand, small investors can 
participate in private equity investments by buying shares in an LPE firm. For instance, the 
share price of Blackstone was in the last 52 weeks in the range of $26.06‒43.59.30 
Furthermore, banks and other financial service companies provide indexes and ETFs that 
allow small investors to participate in a broad portfolio of LPE investments.  
Lahr (2010) follows Bilo et al. (2005) in classifying different types of listed private equity 
firms, but adds to the existing literature in distinguishing between direct and indirect 
participation in private equity investments. His definitions also focus on the management 
aspect and differentiate between internally and externally managed LPEs.  
 
                                                 
28
 See, for example, Cochrane (2005), Bilo et al. (2005), and Lahr and Kaserer (2010).  
29
 Empirical research on LPE is a relatively new area in the corporate governance literature compared to 
traditional unlisted private equity research. The term LPE is used in the publications of Bilo et al. (2005), 
Fleming (2010), Brown and Kräussl (2010), and Bergmann et al. (2010). 
30
 The data source is Bloomberg and the 52 week range is calculated between 16-10-2014 and 16-10-2015.   
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Figure 2.2: Organizational structure of LPE firms
31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lahr’s first definition suggests that the LPE business model is similar to that of Warren 
Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway. First, LPE investment companies32 are committed to the 
private equity model, employ their own investment professionals, and invest directly in 
portfolio companies. With regard to accounting aspects, they consolidate their investments 
on their balance sheet and sometimes also report detailed portfolio information. The dark 
side of this type of LPE is that the debt at portfolio firm level is also reported on the 
financial statement of the LPE investment firm. As a consequence, the consolidation of the 
                                                 
31
 Figure 2 shows the organization structure of LPE. The gray fields in the figure high light the organizational 
parts of the LPEs structure, which are not public, but rather private.  
32
 Lahr (2010) uses the terms company, firm and partnership to define the different types of LPE firms.  
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usage of debt in the financial statements increases the investment risk of the LPE firm. 
Second, LPE firms are, like LPE investment firms, internally managed. These companies 
have the legal structure of PLC, AG or Corp. depending on where the company is 
headquartered. In contrast to LPE investment companies, LPE firms invest in their portfolio 
firms through general partner funds and limited partnerships. Because LPE firms invest their 
capital through general partner funds, they receive management fees as their primary 
income. Considering the definition of LPE firms, it seems, then, that the business model of 
unlisted private equity firms is retained, the only difference being that the private equity firm 
is not private anymore but listed on the stock market.  
The last two types of LPE were both internally managed. However, there are also two 
externally managed LPE types. LPE funds are externally managed, but invest directly in 
limited partnerships of private equity firms as limited partners, and can also realize co-
investments with unlisted private equity firms. Despite the fact that LPE funds are externally 
managed entities, investment decisions on the portfolio firm level will be made by the 
general partner of the limited partnership. Finally, Lahr (2010) defines an LPE fund of funds 
as an intermediary between private equity investors and LPE funds, which passes the capital 
from investors to LPE funds. 
Given the description of LPEs presented above, the question arises if there might be 
differences in the structure between LPE, family, and other industrial firms. As the business 
models and organizational structures of these firms differ, there may also be differences in 
their corporate and governance structure. Accordingly, Chapter 4 will present descriptive 
findings on corporate and board characteristics of family and industrial firms and at the same 
time provide unique descriptive findings on the corresponding characteristics of LPE firms.  
To complete the picture on private equity research in corporate governance, the next sub-
chapter will present empirical findings on private equity investments. Its primary goal is to 
show that there have been many empirical findings regarding wealth effects on private 
equity portfolio firms, but relatively few on the internal governance structure of such firms.  
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2.2.2. Empirical findings on private equity investments   
 
The theoretical principles of private equity transactions are laid out by Jensen (1989), who 
argues that these transactions create value by improving the financial, governance, and 
operational aspects of their portfolio firms. On the other hand, scholars such as Kaplan 
(1989) suggest that private equity creates value through other sources such as tax 
deductions. Kaplan (1989) finds evidence that 4-40% of the value creation in private equity 
transactions can be explained by tax deductions.  
In the first place, after a buyout private equity firms as a rule create management incentives 
to increase shareholder value. Among these are large equity stakes, which constitute an 
upside incentive for the management (although in the 1980s this was an unusual practice in 
public corporations). On the other hand, managers of private equity portfolio firms have to 
invest a significant amount in the portfolio firm. Taking the equity stakes and the 
management investment into account, they participate on the upside as well as on the 
downside. 
Secondly, private equity firms use leverage as a mechanism to increase the management 
incentive not to waste the free cash flow.
33
 The increase in leverage binds the management 
to make interest and principal payments. If management defaults, the firms will be forced by 
the creditors to file for bankruptcy. Additionally, leverage increases the company value, 
because expenses for debt are tax deductible.   
Thirdly, in a typical leveraged buyout private equity firms acquire majority control over the 
target firm (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009). This enables them to establish a concentrated 
ownership with a lean and efficient organizational structure throughout their portfolio firms. 
For instance, they can use their majority ownership to monitor management actions in 
portfolio firms more effectively. Cornelli and Karakas (2012) establish that the board size of 
portfolio companies significantly decreases after a leveraged buyout (LBO): in their sample, 
board size decreased on average from 6.5 to 5.5 directors. In management buyouts (MBO) 
                                                 
33
 The increase in leverage creates pressure on weak managers not to waste the free cash flow on investment 
projects with negative net present value, which is described as a free cash flow problem by Jensen (1986). 
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average board size decreased from 6 to 4 directors. In sum, the board size of LBO portfolio 
companies decreased by 15 percent and the board size after MBO transactions by 30 
percent. On the number of meetings Acharya et al. (2013) establish that portfolio companies 
average twelve meetings per year. They also observe that private equity firms do not hesitate 
to replace poorly performing portfolio company management, with one third of the CEOs 
being replaced in the first 100 days. Finally, most top private equity firms are organized 
around specific industries and hire top professionals with a strategic and operational 
background. For instance, Jack Welch, the legendary CEO of GE, was affiliated to Clayton 
Dubilier.  
As a consequence of the governance aspects mentioned above, several scholars have 
published empirical findings on the effects of private equity investments on portfolio firms.    
 
 
 
2.2.2.1. Performance of private equity investments  
 
There is a general consensus in the corporate governance literature that private equity 
investments generate value for shareholders. Several authors investigate the short term and 
long term effects on shareholder wealth. For instance, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) study public 
to private transactions in the US during the 1980s and establish that going private 
transactions generate abnormal stock returns of between 16.3% and 20.5% around the 
announcement. They also find evidence for Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis.34 
Andres, Betzer and Weir (2007) investigate LBO transactions in Europe and find positive 
abnormal returns of 24.20% around the announcement window.
35
 Finally, Achleitner et al. 
(2010) also find significant positive results for private equity investments on the German 
                                                 
34
 Lehn and Poulsen (1989) investigate hostile takeovers from 1980 to 1987. For their event study they estimate 
the event window for [-1;+1], [-10;+10] and [-20;+20] days around the announcement.  
35
 Andres, Betzer and Weir (2007) study European LBO transactions from 1997 to 2005. The event windows in 
their study are [-1;+1], [-5;+5], [-15;+15] and [-30;+30].  
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stock market, with private equity investments creating wealth effects of 5.9% around the 
announcement date.
36
 
In addition to the above-mentioned short term effects, corporate governance literature also 
investigates operating performance and productivity change after private equity investments. 
For instance, Kaplan (1989) examines the change in operating performance in US MBO 
transactions. He finds that companies which underwent MBO transactions increase their 
operating performance
37
 and net cash flow within three years after the transaction. Boucly et 
al. (2008) study the operating performance of LBO transactions in France. In order to take in 
long term effects, they examine performance over three years after the LBO transaction and 
find evidence that private equity portfolio firms generate excess performance measured by 
return on assets. Moreover, these authors establish that LBO portfolio firms increase in 
sales, assets, and employment ratios after an LBO.
38
  
Guo et al. (2007) investigate public to private transactions between 1990 and 2006. 
According to them, public to private transaction in the 1990s and 2000s were priced more 
conservatively and with less leverage than transactions in the 1980s. Moreover, the increase 
in operating and cash flow margins were much smaller than in the 1980s.  
Two recent papers investigate private equity fund returns. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) apply 
the internal rate of return to measure private equity fund performance. Their empirical study 
demonstrates that private equity funds generate only 80% return of the S&P 500. In contrast, 
reputable private equity funds which have operated for at least five years generate fund 
returns of 170% of the S&P 500.
39
 Finally, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) point out that fund 
managers’ skills affect fund performance. Acharya et al. (2013) close this gap by studying 
the skills of private equity general partners in relation to fund performance. They establish 
that private equity partners generate abnormal performance in organic deals by, for instance, 
                                                 
36
 Achleitner et al. (2010) investigate private equity investment in the German stock market from 1998 to 2007. 
They use event windows from [-1;+1], [-2;+2], [-10;0], [-20;0] and [-20;+20].  
37
 More specifically, Kaplan (1989) investigates operating income before depreciation.  
38
 Boucly et al. (2008) estimate the excess return on asset by calculating the return on asset of the portfolio firm 
minus the median return on asset of the portfolio firm’s peer group.  
39
 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) estimate mean and median fund returns. Private equity funds which have operated 
for at least five years generate a median performance of 150% of the S&P 500 and a mean performance of even 
170%.  
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cutting costs, or expanding to new customers or new geographies. On the other hand, 
partners with a background in finance generate abnormal performance in non-organic deals 
by pursuing M&A activities.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.2. Productivity  
 
Examining the productivity changes of private equity portfolio firms, Harris et al. (2005) 
find evidence that MBO transactions in the UK increase productivity. MBO portfolio firms 
are less productive than their peer group before the transaction. After the MBO, productivity 
increases due to outsourcing and reduction in labor intensity. This implies that MBO 
transactions reduce agency costs and enhance economic efficiency.  
It may, then, be concluded in general that private equity investments create value for 
shareholders. On the other hand, scholars such as Kaplan (1989), Warga and Welch (1993), 
Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008), Billett et al. (2010), and Davis et al. (2013) establish that 
private equity investments decrease stakeholder wealth for bondholders.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.3. Bondholder wealth  
 
Asquith and Wizman (1990) examine the price reaction of bonds in leveraged buyouts. In 
general the authors find that the announcement of a leveraged buyout has a negative impact 
on bond returns of between -1.1% and -2.2%. However, bonds with covenant protection 
react positively to LBO announcements. Bonds with strong covenant protection show 
average abnormal returns of +2.6%. Warga and Welch (1993) investigate the effects of 
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LBOs on bondholder wealth and find that the announcement of an LBO transaction causes 
negative abnormal returns of -2.75% to -7.33% for unconvertible bonds.
40
 They also 
investigate whether shareholder gains are at the expense of bondholders (known as the 
wealth transfer hypothesis ‒ see below).41 Here they point out that bondholder losses only 
describe a small fraction of shareholder gains. A recent empirical study of Billett et al. 
(2010) shows the bond price reaction to LBO transactions over the period 1980-2006, 
covering 407 LBO deals. These authors establish that bonds with covenant protection show 
positive abnormal returns of 2.30%, whereas unprotected bonds show negative abnormal 
returns of -6.76%. In order to answer the wealth transfer hypothesis, which explains the 
gains of one group by the losses of another, Billett et al. (2010) investigate whether 
bondholder losses are a source of shareholder gains. They come to the conclusion that 
private equity investors consider potential wealth expropriation and prefer target firms 
without change-in-control covenants. Finally, change-in-control covenants have a significant 
effect on the outcome of the deal. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.4. Employment  
 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) investigated the effect of leveraged buyouts on corporate 
productivity in the 1980s and established that LBO transactions had a significant positive 
effect on total factor productivity (TFP): the productivity of LBO portfolio firms increased 
by 8.3% above mean industry productivity three years after the buyout. Focusing on the 
employment and compensation effect of LBO transactions, they found that both factors 
declined for white-collar workers but remained unchanged for blue-collar workers. 
                                                 
40
 Warga and Welch (1993) use different price datasets with abnormal return variance of between +2.63% and  
-7.33%.  
41
 This hypothesis is known as wealth transfer hypothesis, where the authors try to explain the gains of one 
group (shareholders) with the losses of the other group (bondholders).  
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Amess and Wright (2007) examined the effects of MBOs and MBIs on employment and 
compensation in the UK. Using a panel regression they established that MBOs as well as 
MBIs had a negative impact on compensation, but MBOs showed a higher employment 
growth rate relative to their peer group than did MBIs.  
Boucly et al. (2009) showed in an empirical study that French LBOs created additional 
employment within three years of the transaction. LBO portfolio firms exhibited an average 
excess growth rate of 13% for employment.  
More recently Davis et al. (2013) have investigated the effects of private equity investments 
on employment, productivity, and compensation. They establish that leveraged buyouts 
decrease employment by 3% within two years and by as much as 6% within five years of the 
transaction. They conclude that employment positions are at great risk after LBO 
transactions. Moreover, private equity firms tend to increase total factor productivity by 
building new production plants, and to reduce labor costs by lowering compensation.  
 
 
 
2.2.2.5. Taxes  
 
Investigating tax benefits in management buyouts from 1980 to 1986, Kaplan (1989) saw 
the pre-buyout debt ratio and related tax deduction as important characteristics for private 
equity investors in the USA. He found evidence that tax benefits in management buyouts are 
between 21% and 143% of the premium paid. This implies that they are an important source 
of wealth creation in management buyouts. Newbould et al. (1992) investigated tax benefits 
in US leveraged buyouts after the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986. Their findings suggest 
that TRA’86 reduced tax benefits in LBO transactions. However, the limitation of their 
empirical study is that the results are based on a relatively small sample of only 23 LBOs, 
and on the brief time period of 1988-1990.  
Renneboog et al. (2007) studied public to private transactions in the UK. Among other 
results, they found that tax payments prior to private equity transactions were not related to 
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wealth effects. However, private equity firms paid higher premiums for target firms with 
low levels of debt than for those with high debt levels. However, they concluded that this 
finding provided only weak support for the tax benefit hypothesis.  
As mentioned above, Billett et al. (2010) establish that bonds with change-in-control 
covenants protect bondholders against wealth expropriation in leveraged buyouts. Besides 
the wealth expropriation hypothesis they also test the tax benefit hypothesis proposed by 
Kaplan (1989). Their findings suggest that private equity investments are dominated by 
wealth expropriation rather than by tax benefits. 
 
Summary: This chapter has revealed the issue that arises from the separation of ownership 
and control, known in corporate governance literature as the principal-agent problem. And it 
has discussed four corporate governance mechanisms as corresponding solutions for the 
principal-agent problem as defined by Jensen (1993). Finally, the chapter has presented the 
literature on private equity. In doing so, it has shown that private equity is one specific 
corporate governance modality or mechanism. Furthermore, the empirical literature on 
private equity investments finds evidence that private equity improves the governance of 
portfolio firms due to its different incentive mechanisms. However, there is a lack of 
literature on the internal governance mechanisms of private equity firms themselves.  
Taking the argument forward, the next chapter will, therefore, present the theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings on internal governance mechanisms discussed in the board 
of directors literature. It will, furthermore, implement the findings of this literature on the 
private equity industry. The main purpose of the chapter will be to develop hypotheses on 
the internal governance mechanisms in private equity firms.  
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3. Literature overview and hypotheses development  
 
“Companies win when their managers make a clear and meaningful distinction between 
top- and bottom-performing businesses and people, when they cultivate the strong and cull 
the weak. Companies suffer when every business and person is treated equally and bets are 
sprinkled all around like rain on the ocean.” 
Jack Welch  
 
Chapter 3 provides the foundation of my own empirical analysis, which will be presented in 
Chapter 4 and 5. First, this chapter will define two depending variables, which will be used 
in the empirical analysis. Since the empirical analysis of Morck et al. (1988) corporate 
governance scholars have been using Tobin’s Q to measure the market performance of 
firms. Beside the market performance the accounting performance is a widely used 
performance measure in corporate governance. The accounting performance measure in this 
thesis is the Return on Assets (ROA). For this reason sub-chapter Chapter 3.1 and 3.2 will 
discuss Tobin’s Q and the ROA.  
 
Second, sub-chapter 3.2 to sub-chapter 3.5 will present the literature on board size, outside 
directors, board meetings and committees, founders on the board, leadership structure and 
ownership. These sub-chapters include the theoretical argumentation and empirical evidence 
on the board of directors in general and in particular on founders, leadership structure and 
ownership. The main purpose of these chapters is the discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical findings and the implication on the private equity research. In other words, I will 
use the argumentation and findings in sub-chapter 3.2 to 3.5 to develop the hypotheses for 
my empirical analysis. Finally, I will finish chapter 3 with a summary of my hypotheses.  
  
Literature overview and hypotheses development 38 
 
 
3.1. Performance measures in corporate governance  
 
The following section will present an overview of the dependent variables to be used in the 
empirical analysis. First, this section will define two performance variables widely used in 
the corporate governance literature: Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin’s Q is a 
market-based performance measure calculated as the market value of the firm divided by the 
firm’s replacement costs. ROA is an operating performance measure. Secondly, this section 
will present an overview of the performance literature in corporate governance.  
The proxy used here for Tobin’s Q is market-to-book ratio, which has been used as a 
performance measure in the majority of empirical studies in the finance literature. Tobin’s Q 
has its origins in the publication of Brainard and Tobin (1968) on econometric models and 
financial model building. The authors define the market value of equity as a multiple of the 
market valuation of equities and the stock of capital at replacement costs. Corporate 
governance literature has been using Tobin’s Q since the work of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Recent empirical analyses show that Tobin’s Q is 
determined by industry classification, book value and company age, as well as by listing on 
a specific index and by the legal system governing the firm’s HQ. All these aspects will be 
discussed in this section in light of selected papers that use Tobin’s Q to measure the market 
performance of firms. Furthermore, this section will debate the various definitions of ROA. 
These two performance variables will be used for the empirical analysis to cover the market 
performance as well as the accounting performance of the sample firms.   
 
 
 
3.1.1. Tobin’s Q as a market-based performance measure in corporate governance  
 
One of the first empirical investigations on ownership structure and corporate performance 
was the paper of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) analyzing the relationship between large 
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blockholders and the market and accounting performance of U.S. companies. Basing their 
conclusions on a broad sample of 511 observations, Demsetz and Lehn use the ownership of 
blockholders as a measure of corporate governance. In their empirical analysis they use the 
blockholdings as dependent variables and the performance measures as independent 
variables (ibid. 1156). Company performance is measured with market and accounting 
variables, including the market value of common equity, stock market returns, return on 
equity, and the standard deviation of these variables (ibid. 1165). The authors find no clear 
evidence that large blockholders impact either the market or the accounting performance of 
the firms under consideration.  
Another milestone paper is the publication of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) which uses 
Tobin’s Q for an empirical study. These authors study the relationship between management 
ownership and the value of a firm. In a cross-section analysis they use Tobin’s Q as proxy 
for the market value of the firm. In a sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms they establish a mixed 
relationship between management ownership and corporate performance. To test their data 
they adduce two theoretical arguments. First, the convergence-of-interests hypothesis 
suggests a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and management ownership; secondly, 
the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that market valuation might be adversely affected for 
a specific range of high management ownership (ibid. 294). They consequently divide 
management ownership into three groups: 0-5%, 5-25% and more than 25%. The empirical 
results suggest that Tobin’s Q increases sharply for management ownership of 0-5%, that it 
decreases for ownership of 5-25% percent, and that it increases again for ownership of more 
than 25%.  
Taking the findings of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) together, corporate performance 
and management ownership have a U-shaped relationship. This suggests that management 
ownership between 0-5% and 25% confirms the convergence-of-interests hypothesis, 
whereas management ownership between 5-25% does not. On the contrary, it confirms the 
entrenchment hypothesis.  
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny define average Tobin’s Q, which they use as a measure of 
company performance, as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its 
physical assets (ibid. 296). More precisely, market value is defined as the sum of the market 
value of common stock, estimated market value of preferred stock and debt. The 
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replacement costs are the costs of the firm’s plant and inventories. The definition of Tobin’s 
Q suggests that this ratio increases with valuable intangible assets, which may be monopoly 
power, goodwill, a stock of patents or even good management. The authors call Tobin’s Q a 
very noisy signal of management performance (ibid. 296); however it is still an appropriate 
proxy for an empirical analysis of management performance and ownership.   
Daines (2001) investigates the legal aspects and its effects on Tobin’s Q. The existing 
literature suggests that legal systems affect corporate value. For example, LaPorta et al. 
(1999) argue that legal rules may affect corporate value and ownership structure. 
Furthermore, Winter (1977) argues that Delaware law in particular improves corporate 
value. On the other hand Cary (1974) argues that for several reasons Delaware law has a 
negative effect on a firm’s value.  
For a sample of more than 4,000 exchange traded U.S. corporations between 1981 and 1996 
Daines (2001) applies three empirical methods to show the effects of Delaware 
incorporation on Tobin’s Q.42 For his first analysis he applies the ordinary least square 
(OLS) model, and checks his findings with a pooled OLS regression and a fixed-effects 
regression model (ibid. 537). Consistently with the argumentation of Winter (1977) he finds 
a positive and significant relationship between Delaware incorporation and Tobin’s Q (ibid. 
532-533). Furthermore, he finds that IPO firms incorporated in Delaware increased in share 
value from 29% in 1981 to 61.4% in 1996 (ibid. 539). According to Daines (2001), 
Delaware law reduces agency costs and managerial entrenchment once ownership is 
dispersed.
43
 Based on the theoretical arguments of Romano 1985, Jarrell et al. 1988, Jahera 
and Pugh 1991, and Coates 1999, Daines studies the probability of a takeover bid for 
Delaware firms. His findings show that Delaware firms receive significantly more takeover 
bids than those listed elsewhere (ibid. 543).
44
 In sum, Delaware legal rules have a positive 
effect on corporate value in general and on the value of IPO firms in particular, because 
Delaware’s legal system favors takeover bids and increases the probability of a takeover.   
                                                 
42
 His sample distinguishes between firms incorporated in Delaware and those incorporated in other states.  
43
 Following the theoretical model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the argumentation of Grossman and 
Hart (1988). 
44
 20.11% of Delaware firms receive a takeover bid, whereas only 14.40% of other firms do so. Daines shows 
similar findings for acquisitions.  
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Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Daines 
(2001) estimates Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s market value to its replacement cost (ibid.  
530). After controlling for firm size, diversification, industry, investment opportunity and 
profitability, Daines compares the difference between Delaware and non-Delaware firms 
and concludes that legal systems can be seen as an intangible asset with a positive or 
negative effect on corporate value (ibid. 530).
45
  
In contrast, Morck and Yang (2001) show the impact of the S&P 500 listing on average 
Tobin’s Q. In their paper they (2001) analyze passive investment strategies for a twenty-year 
period from 1978 to 1997 and establish that an S&P 500 listing has a positive and significant 
effect on average Tobin’s Q. Given this finding they also control for firm size, industry 
membership, R&D expenses, total debt and industry fixed effects (ibid. 21-22), which 
strengthens their empirical conclusion that membership in the S&P 500 positively affects 
average Tobin’s Q.   
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) consider shareholder rights and their effect on Tobin’s Q. 
They establish that firms with high shareholder rights earn 8.5% more abnormal returns than 
firms with low shareholder rights (ibid. 107). They then construct a Governance Index, 
which measures shareholder rights in terms of restrictions on those rights and adds one point 
to the firm’s governance account for every restrictive provision (ibid. 114-116). Because of 
the number of restrictive provisions, firms with low shareholder rights are grouped in a 
higher range than firms with high shareholder rights.
46
 For an empirical analysis the firms 
are categorized in deciles. Companies from the first decile are called “democratic”, and 
firms from the last decile are ranked as “dictatorships” (ibid. 116). The authors construct two 
portfolios with the first and the last decile to compare the return characteristics of 
“democracy” and “dictatorship”. Through a sample period from 1990 to 1999 the 
“democracy” portfolio outperforms the “dictatorship” portfolio (ibid. 123).  
Using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for corporate value, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick also study the 
relationship between their Governance Index and corporate value (ibid. 125). To compute 
                                                 
45
 According to Daines’ definition (2001) corporate value is estimated as the market value of outstanding 
common stocks (using the stock price at the end of the fiscal year), preferred stocks, and debt equal to book 
value, divided by replacement costs.  
46
 The catalog of provisions which restrict shareholder rights has 24 provisions. Thereby the possible range is 
between 1 and 24 (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003: 115).  
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Tobin’s Q they use the Fama and French (1997) industry adjusted regression model, adding 
a vector with governance variables to the regression model for greater precision. They also 
include the log of the book value of assets and the log of company age, as well as a dummy 
for Delaware firms and the listing on the S&P 500 (ibid. 126).
47
 The result for Tobin’s Q is 
positive and significant for the “democracy” portfolio over the period from 1990 to 1999 
(ibid. 127).  
Finally, these authors regress the Governance Index and the “democracy” portfolio on the 
operational measures of net profit margin, return on equity and one-year sales growth (ibid. 
129).
48
 For the “democracy” portfolio all coefficients are positive but not significant (ibid. 
129). In other words, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) show that the shareholder rights 
developed in democratic firms have a positive impact on corporate performance. 
In contrast, Andres (2008) studies the relationship between founding-family ownership and 
corporate performance. In a sample of 275 German exchange-traded companies he defines 
family firms as those with a family blockholding of at least 25% (ibid. 435). Andres further 
examines the impact of active founder families in the board of directors in German 
exchange-listed companies. In this context he distinguishes between founder CEOs, 
descendant CEOs, and professional CEOs (ibid. 439-440). In his empirical analysis he uses 
Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA) as performance measures.49 Andres employs a 
random effect GLS regression and a pooled regression model to test the effect of founder 
families on performance. His findings show that family firms in Germany outperform firms 
with a widely-held ownership structure and also other types of blockholders. Not that a 
family blockholding in itself creates value: outperformance of blockholding family firms can 
be observed only in firms where at least one family member actively participates on the 
board of directors. Andres concludes that the superior performance of family firms is only 
given under certain conditions (ibid. 439-440). 
On the other hand, Dybvig and Warachka (2015) argue that Tobin’s Q and ROA do not 
appropriately measure firm performance. The authors suggest that performance and 
                                                 
47
 This approach follows Daines (2001) for Delaware firms and Morck and Yang (2001) for S&P 500 firms.  
48
 The operational measures are defined as net profit margin, which is income divided by sales. For calculating 
the return on equity Gompers, Ishii and Metrick use income divided by book equity.  
49
 In particular Andres (2008: 435) calculates ROA based on EBIT and EBITDA.  
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governance measures should maximize the corporate value of net invested capital. The 
authors point out that the book value in the denominator measuring Tobin’s Q can be 
adjusted by write-offs or intangible assets. For example, write-offs can reduce book value, 
whereas intangible assets are only considered by production costs.  
Assuming that a firm has a market value of €100 and only one tangible asset with a value of 
€100 in t0: in this case Tobin’s Q would be equal to 1. Considering that this tangible asset 
has a life cycle of four years. In this case the book value of the tangible asset is €75 in t1, 
€50 in t2, €25 in t3 and €0 in t4. This example shows that book value decreases over time by 
its write-offs. Taking this into account, Tobin’s Q will increase from 1 in t0 to 2 in t2. In 
other words, Tobin’s Q only increases in this example due the fact that the firm writes off its 
tangible assets.  
Dybvig and Warachka (2015) consequently suggest that operating efficiency and cost 
discipline are more appropriate measures of corporate performance and efficient corporate 
governance than Tobin’s Q. They also discuss how operating efficiency and cost discipline 
affect Tobin’s Q, suggesting, in particular, two ratios for analyzing operating efficiency. The 
first ratio is defined as gross profit
50
 divided by net invested capital. The second is defined 
as operating expenses divided by net invested capital.  
Dybvig and Warachka’s empirical findings suggest operating efficiency and cost discipline 
will lead to more precise results in corporate governance research. For this purpose they 
estimate six different ratios incorporating ‘gross profits’ and ‘operating expenses’ in the 
nominator and ‘total assets’, ‘sales’ and ‘plant, property and equipment’ in the denominator. 
In particular, the authors find that gross profit divided by property, plant and equipment is a 
better operating efficiency measure than Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 Gross profit measures the scale efficiency whereas operating expenses measure the cost efficiency.  
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Figure 3.1: Overview of ratios considering scale-based and cost-based operating efficiency
51
  
 
 
 
3.1.2. Return on assets as an operating performance measure  
 
The second performance measure besides Tobin’s Q is return on assets (ROA). While 
Tobin’s Q measures market performance, ROA is an accounting based performance measure 
(Brealey and Myers 2000: 828). Generally, ROA is defined as fiscal year income divided by 
the total corporate assets (Berk and DeMarzo 2011: 30). According to Siegel and Slim 
(2000: 379) ROA measures return on each dollar of assets invested, which they also see as 
overall earning power or profitability. The corporate finance literature provides different 
approaches to measuring fiscal income. Two common approaches to estimating ROA are 
                                                 
51
 Own representation based on Dybvig and Warachka (2015). Ry measures the scale-based operating 
efficiency and Rc measures the cost-based operating efficiency. PPE is defined as property, plant and 
equipment.   
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EBIT and EBITDA. Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2005) suggest calculating ROA as the ratio of 
EBIT (or EBITDA) divided by total assets. Finally, Berk and DeMarzo (2013: 43) observe 
that ROA is less sensitive than ROE
52
 to leverage due the fact that interest expenses are 
taken into account. Nevertheless, ROA is sensitive to working capital. For instance, an 
increase in a firm’s receivables and payables, which has no impact on profitability, will 
increase total assets and ceteris paribus decrease ROA. These authors suggest the ratio return 
on invested capital (ROIC) to solve this issue.  
ROA is an accounting based performance measure and therefore a subject of international 
accounting standards like IFRS, which sets clearly defined standards to measure EBIT, 
EBITDA and the valuation of total assets. In contrast, Tobin’s Q is defined as the market 
value of a firm divided by its replacement costs. However, the assessment of market value 
for calculating Tobin’s is affected by several exogenous variables, as discussed in the last 
section. This section will end, therefore, with a brief definition of ROA as stated above.  
 
 
 
3.2. Board of directors and corporate governance 
 
Adams et al. (2010) provide a well-structured survey of the literature on the board of 
directors, based on the work of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). The survey gives an 
overview into the determinants and actions of the board. Furthermore, it provides an 
overview of the theoretical framework as well as empirical findings on board literature. 
Empirical research in recent years has been studying the relationship of structural 
differences across boards, and the implications on behavior. For example, one can study the 
ratio of outside directors and assume the difference in structure will affect the behavior of 
the management. Doing so, one might presume that given a certain ratio of outside directors 
the board would dismiss the CEO if corporate performance is poor (Adams et al. 2010: 59).  
                                                 
52
 ROE stands for return on equity and is defined as the ratio of net income to common equity.  
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One important concern in studying board structure is the endogeneity problem. This arises, 
among others, when unobserved variables are correlated with the error term in the regression 
model. Referring the endogeneity issue to the given example with the ratio of outside 
directors and CEO performance, one could also argue that poor past performance of the 
CEO will increase the number of outsider directors, because more outside directors will 
implement more monitoring and advice by the board which, according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), has a positive impact on performance.   
Furthermore, boards operate as teams, where the effort of all members impacts the firm. 
Adams et al. (2010) mention the team problem as an example for the relationship of effort 
and the size of the team. Larger boards do not necessarily mean more effort from every 
single board member. The team problem suggests that as the share of a member’s output 
decreases, the member will supply less effort. A further challenge is the complexity of 
corporations. In a real life approach every firm uses its own structure to solve management 
and governance problems. This makes it difficult for research to develop abstract models 
that will capture the relationship of governance structure and firm behavior. Concluding the 
challenges in board research, Adams et al. (2010: 63) point out that modern corporate 
governance literature overlaps with management, psychology and sociology literature, 
which provide new research models and approaches.  
The following sections present the literature and empirical evidence on board size, outside 
directors, board committees and meetings, founders on the board, leadership structure, and 
finally ownership structure. Besides the theoretical arguments and empirical findings, this 
section develops hypotheses for the empirical analysis of Chapter IV.  
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3.2.1. Board size, outside directors, and company performance 
 
One of the first empirical studies on board size is the paper of Yermack (1996), which 
investigates the relationship of board size and corporate performance. Yermack argues that 
small boards tend to work more efficiently than large ones. His main hypothesis is that 
corporate value depends on the quality of monitoring and decision-making by the board of 
directors (1996: 189). Furthermore, board size is a significant determinant of a board’s 
performance. Thus, limiting the size of the board of directors improves its effectiveness 
(ibid. 186). To investigate his hypothesis Yermack (1996) uses a panel dataset with 3,438 
observations for 452 US companies between 1984 and 1991. For the estimation of the 
hypothesis he uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and a fixed-effect regression 
model (ibid. 194). 
Regarding improvement of the effectiveness of the board of directors Yermack (1996) 
pursues three main research questions. First, he investigates board size and corporate value 
(ibid. 189). Using Tobin’s Q, he finds a significant and inverse association between board 
size and Tobin’s Q. Studying the relationship between board size and corporate 
performance, Yermack considers numerous control variables such as company size, industry 
membership, stock ownership, growth opportunities and alternative corporate governance 
structures. Furthermore, in his cross-sectional analyses Yermack finds that the negative 
relation between board size and firm value decreases as boards become large from small-to-
medium sized. Secondly, he tests whether past corporate performance affects current board 
size and concludes that there is no significant influence there. However, he finds evidence 
supporting the opposite influence. In his regression analysis he finds a significant influence 
of past board size on current firm value (ibid. 198-200). Finally, he investigates the effect of 
announcement of board size reduction on stock returns. His event study includes only six 
companies that reduced their board size for corporate governance reasons. These six firms 
realized positive significant abnormal returns around the event period (ibid. 201). 
Coles et al. (2004) investigate the question if a single board size is efficient for all firms.  
Regulators and institutional investors argue that large and outsider-dominated boards are 
more efficient than small and insider-dominated ones (ibid. 1). However, these authors are 
skeptical that a one-size-fit-all approach is always optimal. For this purpose they study the 
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impact of board size and board independence on performance. To do so, they investigate the 
impact of the number of directors and the proportion of outsiders on Tobin’s Q (ibid. 2).  
Corporate governance theory suggests that the members of the board monitor and advise top 
management. Therefore, one might think the larger the board and the greater its 
independence the more efficient the monitoring and advice would be (Coles et al. 2004: 1). 
In contrast, several papers
53
 show evidence that small boards are more effective than large in 
monitoring and advising the board of directors. According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and 
Jensen (1993) large boards have coordination problems and directors in large boards tend to 
behave as free-riders. In contrast to the monitoring function of the board of directors, there is 
only a limited amount of empirical evidence on their advisory function. One of their main 
functions is to provide top management with information (Coles et al. 2004: 3). On the one 
hand, outsiders can provide top management with new information and this can be seen as 
additional advice. On the other hand, insiders have more firm-specific information and can 
support management in uncertain environments. Coles et al. (2004) expect that Tobin’s Q 
will increase for large boards in diversified firms, and for firms with relatively high debt 
ratio (ibid. 2004: 8). Tobin’s Q will also increase in R&D intensive industries with a large 
fraction of insiders on the board (ibid. 10).  
The sample of Coles et al. (2004) includes 2,740 observations for a time period form 1992-
1998 (ibid. 10). To test their hypothesis these authors run several OLS regressions and 
control their findings in a 2-stage OLS regression (ibid. 23-25). They establish that board 
size has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q for diversified firms and high debt 
firms (ibid. 15-17). They conclude that these firms have a greater advice requirement and 
benefit from large boards. In contrast, in firms where firm-specific knowledge is an 
important factor Tobin’s Q drops with an increasing ratio of outside directors (ibid. 25).  
Coles et al. (2008) re-examines the same authors’ working paper of 2004 and investigates 
the relationship between board structure and corporate performance. As in their earlier 
paper, they address the conventional wisdom, which suggests that greater board 
independence allows more effective monitoring and increases firm value (2008: 329). In this 
context, recent regulators, institutional investors and stock market exchanges require greater 
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board independence for listed corporations in the U.S. For instance, in 2002 the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act required that audit committees should consist entirely of outside directors. 
Furthermore, the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq require listed companies to employ 
independent boards with a large body of outside directors. The TIAA-CREF pension fund, 
one of the largest pension funds in the world, announced that their funds will only invest in 
firms with a large ratio of outside directors.   
The sample of Coles et al. (2008) includes more than 8,000 observations on board, firm and 
CEO characteristics. Compared with the sample of the 2004 working paper, the number of 
observations has quadrupled. First, Coles et al. (2008) investigate the relationship between 
firm characteristics and board structure. Doing so, they seek to capture the advisory 
requirement of companies with the proxy variables of firm size, diversification and leverage 
(ibid. 338-339).
54
 The findings of the first regression model suggest that advisory 
requirement has a positive and significant impact on board size. Moreover, the relationship 
between outside directors and advisory requirement is positive and significant, which 
supports the hypothesis that firms with greater advisor requirements tend to have more 
outside directors. In other words, larger firms tend to have larger boards and more outside 
directors. Secondly, Coles et al. (2008) examine the determinants of board composition. The 
findings of the regression model show that companies with high advisory requirements have 
a) larger boards and b) more outside directors on their boards than companies with lower 
advisory requirements. On the other hand, R&D intensive companies have more inside 
directors on the board. This finding is in line with the literature, because the integration of 
outside directors is more costly in companies with high R&D expenditure than in companies 
with low R&D expenditure. Furthermore, Coles et al. (2008) study the relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and board structure. In general the coefficient of board size has a negative impact 
on Tobin’s Q. However, for large firms with a high advisory requirement Tobin’s Q 
increases with board size. This finding implies that large complex firms with diversified 
business fields and high leverage benefit from large boards (ibid. 342). But in R&D 
intensive firms inside directors have a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q (ibid. 
344). Additional robustness checks, such as controlling for endogeneity, support these 
findings (ibid. 348-349).  
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 Coles et al. (2008) follow the theoretical argument that large firms operating in different business segments 
require larger boards. Furthermore, firms with a high debt ratio also require more advice.   
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Bonne et al. (2007) address the conventional wisdom of several shareholder advocates, who 
argue that smaller boards with a large proportion of outside directors boost corporate 
performance. In a similar sense, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required that audit 
committees should consist only of independent directors. In light of the conventional 
wisdom and the regulatory changes Bonne et al. (2007) analyze the determinants of 
corporate boards using a sample of IPO firms and their board structure development 10 
years through the initial public offering. In particular, these authors investigate the relation 
between development of board size and independence.  
Their well-structured paper discusses three main hypotheses: i) the scope of operations 
hypothesis ii) the monitoring hypothesis and iii) the negotiation hypothesis. The 
argumentation of Fama and Jensen (1983) on corporate organization suggests that larger and 
more complex firms face more complex processes, which lead to larger and more 
hierarchical organizations. Furthermore, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2005) as well as Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2014) argue that companies growing into new product lines and new 
markets will seek new board structures. Therefore the number of directors will increase to 
ensure their supervisory function as regards managerial performance. Moreover, monitoring 
costs are affected by the operating environment of the firm (Bonne et al. 2007: 70). For 
instance, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2005) argue that firms with high R&D expenditure will 
have small boards with a small proportion of outsiders, because the cost of monitoring is 
high for high-growth firms.
55
 In line with this argumentation Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2007) as well as Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) argue that high-growth firms have high 
monitoring costs and therefore will tend to have small, more insider-dominated boards than 
mature firms (cf. also Bonne et al. 2007: 70-71). Finally, the theoretical argumentation of 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) shows that high-performing CEOs will negotiate more 
insider-dominated boards. In line with this argumentation Kieschnick and Moussawi (2004) 
develop the hypothesis that a board’s independence is determined by the influence of the 
CEO and institutional investors. They propose that board independence will decrease if the 
influence of the manager or the institutional investor increases.  
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 Cokes, Daniel, and Naveen (2007) argue that R&D expenditures is a proxy variable for high-growth firms.  
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In line with previous literature Bonne et al. (2007) use several multivariate regression 
models to estimate their panel data on the dependent variables of board size and proportion 
of independent directors. First they investigate their three hypotheses and the impact of these 
on board size. Consistently with the scope of operations hypothesis the proxy variables firm 
size, firm age and number of business segments have a positive and significant impact on 
board size. These findings imply that growing firms increase in board size (ibid. 79). The 
findings on the monitoring hypothesis show that free cash flow, industry concentration and 
takeover defense have a positive and significant impact on board size. Furthermore, the 
results of the regression model show that R&D expenditure, return variance
56
 and CEO 
ownership have a negative and significant impact on board size. These findings support the 
monitoring hypothesis.  
Secondly, Boone et al. analyze the proxy variables for the monitoring, scope of operations 
and negotiation hypotheses, and establish significant results for market-to-book ratio and 
CEO ownership. Both variables have a negative impact on the fraction of outside directors 
(ibid.  84-85). Testing the negotiation hypothesis, they find significant evidence for all proxy 
variables for CEO negotiation on board independence. In particular, CEO tenure and CEO 
ownership have a negative and significant impact on the proportion of outside directors. 
Furthermore, outside directors’ ownership, venture backing and the Carter-Manaster 
underwriter ranking have a positive and significant impact on the proportion of outside 
directors. 
Linck et al. (2008: 314) investigate the determinants of corporate boards of more than 
53,000 US firms from 1990 to 2004, specifically board size, board independence, and board 
leadership (ibid.  311). In the corporate governance literature boards of directors provide 
monitoring and advice for management, which includes costs and benefits. Following the 
theoretical arguments and prior empirical research
57
 on boards of directors, Linck et al. use 
the number of directors for the proxy ‘board size’, the fraction of outside directors for ‘board 
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 Linck et al. (2008) refer to Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Raheja (2005). 
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independence’, and a dummy variable for ‘board leadership’58 whether the CEO is at the 
same time chairman
59
 or not.  
For their empirical analysis Linck et al. select several independent variables of firm 
characteristics and ownership structure (ibid. 315).
60
 In line with their hypotheses the 
coefficients for the market value of equity, debt, number of business segments and company 
age have a positive and significant impact on board size, and the coefficients of market-to-
book value, R&D expenses, stock price volatility and CEO ownership have a negative and 
significant impact on board size, as predicted. Directors’ ownership has a negative impact on 
board size, which is contrary to their predictions (ibid. 321). The regression model on board 
independence also shows positive and significant coefficients for the market value of 
equity
61
, debt, number of business segments, firm age, directors’ ownership and free cash 
flow. Market-to-book value, R&D expenses, stock market volatility, CEO ownership, CEO 
age and performance have a negative and significant impact on board independence. Finally, 
Linck et al. investigate the relationship between board leadership and board structure. Their 
findings show that market value of equity, stock price volatility and CEO tenure have a 
positive and significant impact on board leadership. On the other hand, market-to-book ratio, 
R&D expenses and performance have a negative and significant impact on board leadership.  
Linck et al. apply three further robustness checks to confirm their findings on board 
structure. First, they apply a principal components analysis and create two new proxy 
variables for their test. The results confirm the findings that complex firms have larger and 
more independent boards, whereas firms with higher monitoring and advisory costs have 
smaller and less independent boards (ibid. 322). Secondly, they divide their sample into sub-
samples for small, medium and large firms and conclude that the board structure of small 
firms can be explained by fewer factors than medium and large boards. For instance, CEO 
age has no significant impact on board independence for small enterprises. On the other 
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 The dummy variable board leadership equals one if the CEO is the chairman at the same time, zero 
otherwise. 
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 The term ‘chairman’ refers indiscriminately in this thesis to female and male chairpersons. 
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 These independent variables for the regression analysis include total assets, market value of equity, market to 
book ratio, CEO ownership, director’s ownership, and institutional ownership.  
61
 Linck et al. (2008) use the logarithm of the market value of equity. Furthermore, the authors use the 
logarithm of number of business segments for their empirical analysis.  
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hand, CEO age has a negative and significant impact on board independence for medium 
and large boards. Overall, the robustness checks support the findings of the first regression 
model. Finally, Linck et al. test whether board structure changed after the Sarbanes-Oxley 
act (SOX) in 2001. Using a dummy variable for the impact of SOX, they find evidence that 
board independence increased after SOX. Moreover, ownership structure had a weaker 
impact on board structure after SOX.   
Duchin et al. (2010) study the effectiveness of outsiders on the board of directors (ibid.  
195). Based on the corporate governance regulation form 2002-2003
62
 and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 the authors investigate outside director composition and its impact on 
company performance (ibid. 196). In contrast to the regulators, who require a basic increase 
in outside directors, the authors believe that a one-size-fit-all approach does not increase the 
effectiveness of boards.   
Theoretical research in corporate governance has recognized that the effectiveness of outside 
directors on monitoring and reducing agency conflict between shareholders and management 
is limited (ibid. 195). Furthermore, according to Duchin et al., the challenge of board 
endogeneity has not been resolved so far in empirical research on the effectiveness of boards 
and outside directors. Many empirical investigations only study the impact of board 
independence on performance, which does not address endogeneity concerns (ibid. 196). For 
this reason Duchin et al. look at changes in board composition after an exogenous event, 
such as the regulation required by the NYSE and Nasdaq between 1999 and 2003. They use 
three variables to measure the information costs of firms. Corporate governance literature 
shows that effective monitoring and advising by outside directors depends on the 
information environment of the firm. If information costs of a firm are low, an increase in 
the number of outside directors might increase performance. In contrast, if the information 
costs of a firm are high, an increase in outside directors need not necessarily increase 
performance. The reason is that in some cases information costs are higher than the increase 
in performance (ibid. 196). To measure information costs of the sample firms Duchin et al. 
use analyst forecasts. Firms with more (and more precise) information measured by the 
number of forecasts have lower information costs and are less complex than firms with 
fewer forecasts and more forecast errors (ibid. 201-202).   
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For their empirical analysis Duchin et al. use a sample of 15,820 observations for the period 
from 1996-2005 (ibid. 201). They use a base line regression and control for fixed effects. 
Using Tobin’s Q, ROA and stock returns as performance measures, they establish that the 
effectiveness of outside directors depends on information costs (ibid. 200). Their main 
finding is that firms with low information costs increase their performance by increasing the 
percentage of outsiders on the board. However, if acquisition costs for information are high, 
the increase in outside directors decreases performance. This finding is consistent with the 
theoretical view in corporate governance (ibid. 195-196). These authors conclude that firms 
will compose their boards optimally if they understand the issue of information costs.  
Larmou and Vafeas (2010: 65) investigate the relationship between board size and firm 
performance in firms with poor past operating performance
63
. Using a sample of 257 firms, 
they apply a baseline regression model, an event study and finally an OLS regression model 
to investigate their research question (ibid. 72-77).  
The corporate governance literature has several arguments both in favor of and against large 
boards. For example, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that large boards do not operate 
efficiently, because in large boards it becomes less likely that directors criticize the decisions 
of the CEO. Furthermore, larger boards tend to become less productive, generating 
coordination issues and slower decision making. In large boards directors become free riders 
and more risk averse. Jensen (1993) maintains that large boards will tend to be in favor of 
the CEO, because they are easier to control. On the other hand, boards provide primary 
monitoring and advice mechanisms. An increase in board size might therefore also increase 
the capacity of the board. In this context Lipton and Lorsch (1992), as well as Jensen (1993) 
point out that both overly small and overly large boards are detrimental to effectiveness.   
The empirical design of Larmou and Vafeas (2010) includes several empirical methods to 
study the impact of board size on firm performance.
64
 First, they identify firms with three 
years of poor operating performance and use these for further analysis (ibid.  67). Secondly, 
they study the impact of several independent variables, including board size, on corporate 
performance (ibid. 72-74). Using market to book ratio and stock market returns over the past 
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three and five years respectively as dependent variables, they show that board size has a 
significant and positive impact on both performance measures.  
Concluding the analysis of the impact of board size on performance, Larmou and Vafeas 
apply an additional event study that measures abnormal returns around the announcement of 
change in board size (ibid. 76). The result of this study is positive and significant for 
increases of board size around the event window. On the other hand, the result for decreases 
in board size is negative, but not significant. This implies that the capital market reacts in 
favor of an increase in board size for poorly performing companies. However, the findings 
of the event study cannot be confirmed by an OLS regression.  
Several papers address the issue of bank boards. The findings on bank boards are, for several 
reasons, important for the empirical analysis in the present research. First, banks, as well as 
private equity firms, operate in the financial industry, which plays an important role in the 
economy. The failure of financial corporate governance can create significant costs for the 
whole economy and can lead to financial crises. Yet corporate governance literature 
provides little understanding of the role of governance either in banks or in private equity 
firms.  
Adams and Mehran (2012) and Pathan and Faff (2013) address the issues of bank board 
structure and bank performance. Adams and Mehran study the relationship between board 
structure and performance. Their paper addresses in particular the impact of board size and 
board independence on performance. Furthermore, they analyze M&A activities in the 
banking industry and bank board complexity to address endogeneity issues.  
In recent year several empirical studies have investigated the role of the board of directors 
and its impact on corporate value. However, most studies excluded companies from the 
banking and insurance industries. Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the listing 
rules of NYSE and Nasdaq follow a “one-size-fits-all” approach, which emphasizes greater 
board independence. Addressing these issues, Adams and Mehran use a sample of 35 bank 
holding companies from 1986 to 1999 to study the impact of bank board structure on 
Tobin’s Q. Using a fixed effect regression model, they show that the proxy variable ‘board 
size’65 for board structure has a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q (Adams and 
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Mehran 2012: 257). On the other hand, board independence measured by the proxy variable 
‘fraction of outside directors’ has no significant impact on Tobin’s Q. The authors 
investigate two further factors that might diminish the impact of board size on performance. 
In particular, they use proxy variables for M&A transactions, such as ‘directors added after 
M&A transactions’ and ‘number of M&A directors’ to study the potential M&A impact on 
Tobin’s Q (ibid. 259-260). Their findings suggest that M&A activities are not the main 
explanation of board composition and performance (ibid. 261). Finally, they analyze 
whether performance is diminished by complexity, which they measure with the proxy 
variables ‘firm size’ and ‘number of Tier 1 subsidiaries’ (ibid. 263). The impact of the 
independent variables on complexity suggests that large boards do not support management 
when dealing with complexity in the banking industry (ibid. 264).  
Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies (BHC) from 1997 to 2011 Pathan 
and Faff (2013) develop seven hypotheses to analyze the relationship between bank structure 
and performance. In particular they investigate the impact of board size, board independence 
and gender diversity on bank performance, and they also study the market power of banks 
and other governance mechanisms. Following the argumentation of Fama (1985) that the 
failure of bank governance creates massive cost for the economy they use the introduction of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and the financial crisis as proxy variables for their 
analysis.
66
 For their empirical analysis they use the GMM estimation technique (ibid. 1574).  
Based on the GMM regression model, Pathan and Faff establish that board size and board 
independence have a negative and significant impact on the dependent variable ‘pre-tax 
operating income’. Regarding the proxy variable for gender diversity, which is the 
percentage of women on the board, they establish a positive and significant impact on 
performance (ibid. 1581). Looking at the proxy variables ‘women on the board after SOX’ 
and ‘women on the board during the financial crisis’, the regression model shows negative 
and significant coefficients for both variables. The findings on women on the board might be 
negative because of the regulatory requirements after SOX. According Pathan and Faff 
women on the board have a positive impact on performance up to a certain point, however 
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beyond that point performance will decrease rather than further increase. These findings 
suggest that board size and independence have a negative impact on performance, whereas 
the percentage of women directors before SOX and the financial crisis has a positive impact 
on performance.  
These authors see a possible association between market power and performance. For this 
purpose they separate their sample into two groups. The first group covers banks with low 
market power and the second banks with high market power. They use tow proxies for 
market power. The first proxy for market power is the Herfindahl Index; the second is 
weighted market shares across states. They establish that banks with low market power, 
board size, and independence decrease in performance. The percentage of women on the 
board increases bank performance before SOX and the financial crisis. The coefficient for 
the percentage of women on the board after SOX and during the financial crisis is again 
negative and significant. For banks with high market power they only establish significant 
results for the percentage of women directors during the financial crisis, which has a 
negative impact on performance.  
As in their approach on market power, Pathan and Faff separate their sample into sub-
samples with staggered and non-staggered boards. The findings on non-staggered boards are 
statistically insignificant; they establish, however, that board size, board independence and 
the percentage of women directors during the financial crisis have a negative and significant 
impact on performance. On the other hand, the only positive coefficient in their regression 
model is the percentage of women directors before SOX. Their finding suggest that bank 
performance increases with the increase of women directors before the introduction of SOX 
in 2002 and the financial crisis (ibid. 1582).   
Pathan and Faff’s paper concludes with estimations for small, medium-sized and large 
banks. In this context they confirm their findings for small banks. However, the coefficients 
in the regression models for medium-sized and large banks are not significant. They suggest, 
therefore, that the governance recommendations on board size, independence and the 
percentage of women directors is obvious for small banks, but not for large and medium-
sized banks. Their empirical analysis concludes with the regression results of bank board 
structure on the five alternative performance measures; these confirm their earlier findings 
(ibid. 1586).  
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In summary, this sub-chapter has reviewed the literature on monitoring and advice by the 
board of directors. Furthermore, it has discussed board size and the fraction of outside 
directors, which are two widely used explanatory variables to describe monitoring and 
advice.  
In general, one might assume that larger and more independent boards lead to more efficient 
monitoring and advice. However, Yermack (1996) suggests that board size has an inverse 
impact on corporate performance because quality of monitoring decreases in line with the 
number of board members. In other words, the monitoring effort of single directors 
decreases with an increase in the number of directors. Coles et al. (2008) also question if the 
“one size fits all approach” is a reasonable concept to investigate the effectiveness of a board 
of directors.
67
 In particular they observe that firms with greater advisory requirements have 
larger boards and that these are dominated by outsiders. On the other hand, the authors find 
that R&D intensive firms require smaller, insider-dominated boards. Bonne et al. (2007) 
show that board structure changes over time, increasing, for instance, ten years after an IPO 
as a firm grows into new product lines and markets. In other words, an increase in 
operational scope will increase board size.  
Finally, this sub-chapter states that information costs impact the effectiveness of monitoring 
and advice by outside directors. Duchin et al. (2010) find that the effectiveness of outside 
directors decreases with this increase in information costs.  
Chapter 4 will discuss the underlying panel data set in detail, and show that most LPE firms 
launched their public offering between 1997 and 2007. In other words, LPE is a relatively 
new organizational structure compared to other public corporate structures such as industrial 
or family firms. Moreover, LPE firms entered the public equity market to collect equity for 
additional investment activities. This argument is in line with Bonne et al. (2007), who argue 
that firms initially entering the public equity market use their new funds to grow into new 
production lines and markets. On the other hand, the private equity industry is known for its 
incentivized management compensation structure. Although, private equity managers 
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receive a management fee of 1‒2%, they are incentivized to achieve an agreed hurdle rate to 
receive a performance fee that is usually 20% of the fund’s earnings.68 Taking this argument 
into account, it would seem that LPE firms require advice rather than monitoring.    
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Board size has a positive impact on LPE performance. 
Hypothesis 2: Outside directors have a positive impact on the performance of LPE firms. 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Number of board committees and board meetings  
 
One of the first papers to examine the relationship between board meetings and company 
performance was the paper of Vafeas (1999). For his empirical investigation Vafeas used a 
sample of 307 firms over the period 1990-1994 (ibid. 119). Corporate governance literature 
suggests an unclear relationship between board meetings and firm performance. On the one 
hand, scholars like Jensen (1993) argue that board meetings are an important mechanism, 
because it is useful for outside directors to meet and exchange with other outside directors 
and management. Jensen mentions that boards usually react to corporate crises. In this 
context they should meet more frequently, to be able to work proactively on company issues. 
In contrast, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that directors suffer from lack of time. 
Moreover, organization theory suggests that larger boards need more time to make 
decisions. Therefore, board activity will increase with the increase in board size. In this 
context, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that the optimal board size is between seven and 
nine directors. As mentioned above, Yermack (1996) also finds a negative relationship 
between board size and corporate performance. Focusing on the monitoring function of 
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outside directors corporate governance literature documents that additional outside directors 
increase monitoring activity, which demands more time (Vafeas 1999: 116). Finally, in 
corporate governance theory the separation of the CEO and chairman leads to more efficient 
monitoring. On the other hand an outside chairman should intensify board activities, because 
outside directors need to be informed more often than inside directors (ibid. 117). Based on 
theoretical argumentation, Vafeas investigates the conflicting views on the nature of boards 
to find empirical evidence on board meetings and company performance.  
In the first section of his empirical analysis Vafeas (1999) uses an ordinary least square 
(OLS) and a 2SLS regression model. Considering both regression models, he finds 
significant results only for board size, insider ownership, and excess returns of the past 12 
months.  The results of the OLS and the 2SLS regression model suggest that board size has a 
positive impact on board meetings. However, insider ownership and excess returns of the 
past 12 months have a negative impact. Using market to book ratio as dependent variable 
Vafeas finds that board size has a negative impact on firm performance, whereas insider 
ownership and excess returns of the past 12 months have a positive impact. The findings on 
board meetings are, however, unclear. The results of the OLS regression suggest that board 
meetings have a negative and significant impact on company value. The coefficient ‘board 
meeting’ is also negative in the 2SLS model, however statistically insignificant. In light of 
these findings Vafeas investigates past performance and changes in board activity in the 
second section of his empirical analysis.   
His results show that excess returns in the past 12 months have a negative and significant 
impact on board meetings. Furthermore, the operating performance measure ROA of the 
prior 12 months also has a negative and significant impact on boards meetings. These 
findings suggest that board meetings increase after periods of poor performance and 
decrease after periods of good performance (ibid. 132). Vafeas concludes that board 
meetings improve operating performance for poorly performing firms, therefore an increase 
in frequency of board meetings tends to be an efficient mechanism for firms suffering from 
operating problems (ibid. 140). 
In contrast, Adams (2003) investigates the anecdotal evidence that the work of the board is 
done in committees. Hence she (ibid. 3) studies the meeting, committee and compensation 
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structure of boards, which can help to explain their complex nature. For her analysis she 
uses a sample of 352 Fortune 500 firms publicly listed in 1998 (ibid. 5).   
For her empirical analysis Adams distinguishes three types of board function (ibid. 4). She 
argues first that boards have a monitoring function, which is the classical view in the 
corporate governance literature. Besides that, boards have an advisory function, which 
assists the CEO in strategic questions. Finally, she mentions stakeholder interest, which is an 
important component of corporate value (ibid. 4). According to Jensen (2001) corporate 
value maximization cannot be achieved if stakeholder interests are ignored. Adams (2003) 
seeks to express the three functions of the board in terms of committee structure and number 
of board meetings. Furthermore, she measures board effort in terms of board compensation 
and argues that board members will increase their effort if compensation is high and 
decrease their effort if compensation is low.  
The first regression model shows that company size and the stock price volatility of the past 
five years both have a positive and significant impact on compensation. These findings 
support Adams’ hypothesis that board effort is higher in larger firms and in firms in an 
uncertain environment (ibid. 14). She finds, moreover, that company size and diversification 
have a positive and significant impact on compensation in the monitoring committee.
69
 
These findings are in line with Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), who argue that larger firms 
need more political and legal experts. Moreover, Adams finds that company size and age, 
and the ratio of capital expenditure divided by sales, have a positive and significant impact 
on stakeholder compensation (ibid. 15-16). These findings again suggest that larger and 
older firms need political and legal expertise. Adams also studies the quality and quantity of 
directors’ effort. She measures the quality of effort with the compensation per meeting unit 
and the quantity with the number of meetings unit. In this context, she finds that an increase 
in company size increases the frequency of meeting as well as the compensation per meeting 
unit. This finding suggests that both quantity and the quality of effort increase with company 
size, which is in line with the labor market literature (ibid. 18). Adams concludes her 
empirical analysis with robustness checks, which confirm her findings (ibid. 21-22) that, in 
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 In this section of her analysis she uses the Tobin regression model to estimate corporate characteristics on 
committee compensation.  
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sum, company size, stock price volatility, and diversification increase board compensation, 
and company size increases the frequency of board meetings.  
In a cross-sectional analysis Hayes et al. (2004) study the structure of committees in 
S&P500 listed boards of directors (ibid. 2). In particular, they analyze the effect of CEO 
characteristics on committee structure and performance (ibid. 2004: 4). The data for the 
empirical analysis includes 5,915 observations for different directorships and 2,264 
committees of S&P500 firms for the time period 1997-1998 (ibid. 8). For their empirical 
investigation these authors use the Poisson and the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
models
70
. As mentioned in the first paragraph, they analyze the effect of CEO characteristic 
on committee structure and performance. Variables for CEO characteristics are for example 
CEO ownership, founder on the board and the composition of directors.
71
 On the other hand, 
committee structure and performance are measured by the number of committees, the 
number of committee functions and Tobin’s Q.72  
Hayes et al. find empirical evidence that the number of committees is positively related to 
the number of directors. Furthermore, company size also has a positive and significant 
impact on the number of committees. Finally, they conclude from their findings on the 
number of committees that firms that pay dividends have more committees than firms that 
do not pay dividends (ibid. 17). Besides the results for the number of committees, they 
establish that CEO ownership is negatively related to committee function (ibid. 17). This 
finding implies that firms with high CEO ownership have fewer committee functions. On 
the other hand, committee functions more often occur in firms with large boards, more assets 
and more board meetings. Finally, the percentage of shares held by outsiders on the 
acquisition committee, ethics committee, succession committee and technology committee 
has a negative significant impact on Tobin’s Q. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q is positively 
related to the percentage of shares held by outsiders serving on the finance & investment and 
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 Compare for example page 37 and 38, where Poisson and OLS regressions are used to estimate the effect of 
CEO characteristics on the number of committees and the number of committee functions.  
71
 CEO ownership, founder on the board and the number of directors are all independent variables in the 
regression models.  
72
 The number of committees and committees function, and performance measured by Tobin’s Q are all 
dependent variables in the regression models.  
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the strategy committees (ibid. 18-19). They conclude that boards with older directors have a 
negative significant impact on performance (ibid. 19).   
Brick and Chidambaran (2010) study the assertion of regulators and shareholder advocates 
that board activity can generally increase shareholder value. In particular, they investigate 
whether or not an increase in board monitoring and advice increases company value (ibid. 
534). Hence their empirical analysis investigates the relationship between the number of 
board meetings, committee structure and company value. Using a panel dataset of board and 
company characteristics from 1999 to 2005 they consider the regulatory change of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.  
The corporate governance literature (see Vafeas 1999 and Adams 2005) suggests that both 
the board and its activities may grow with an increase in investment opportunities. In this 
context Vafeas (1999) argues that the number of board meetings increases with an increase 
in company complexity and investment opportunities. These arguments imply that the 
frequency of meetings and the committee structure are determined by corporate events 
(Brick and Chidambaran 2010: 535). Besides the meetings and committee structure, the 
SOX Act requires as a general principle more independent board members and greater 
committee independence. In consideration of this argumentation Raheja (2005) shows that 
insiders ensure the information flow and that an increase in the number of independent 
directors increases information costs. Such an increase may, therefore, decrease shareholder 
value in information-intensive firms. In corporate governance literature CEO duality, where 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board, increases CEO entrenchment and decreases board 
activities. On the other hand CEO duality might improve information coordination between 
the CEO and the board of directors.  
Brick and Chidambaran’s initial estimates are based on board meetings and monitoring, 
CEO ownership, and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables.73 First, the results suggest that CEO 
ownership, the volatility of the past 60 months and the return of the past 12 months have a 
negative and significant impact on board meetings and monitoring. On the other hand 
                                                 
73
 The dependent variable for board meetings is the logarithm of the number of meetings. The monitoring 
variable is the logarithm of the number of meetings multiplied by the number of independent directors. 
Furthermore, Brick and Chidambaran use the dollar value change in the portfolio of stocks and options held by 
the CEO for a one percent change in equity value as proxy for CEO ownership. Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
ratio of the total market value of the firm to the book value of the firm’s assets.  
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Tobin’s Q, investment activities, and total assets have a positive and significant impact on 
board meetings and monitoring. Secondly, Tobin’s Q, CEO duality, and CEO tenure have a 
positive and significant impact on CEO ownership. However, CEO age and board 
independence have a negative and significant impact on CEO ownership (Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010: 541). Finally, board meetings, monitoring, and the level of shareholder 
rights
74
 have a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q. The proxy variables 
‘acquisition activity’ and ‘restatement accounting figures’ have a negative and significant 
impact on company value (ibid. 543). Brick and Chidambaran extend their empirical 
analysis to an examination of the relationship of company value and board meetings and 
monitoring before and after the SOX Act of 2002. Their results show that board meetings 
had a negative and significant impact on Tobin’s Q before the SOX Act. However, the 
coefficient of board meetings turns positive after the SOX Act, but not significant. 
Concluding their empirical analysis, these authors show that the SOX Act has a positive and 
significant impact on audit committee meetings and the proportion of independent directors 
in the audit committee. 
In summary, the corporate governance literature suggests that board committees and 
meetings provide monitoring and advice for the board of directors. For instance, Jensen 
(1993) argues that board meetings are a useful mechanism, because outside directors meet 
and discuss matters with the management. Vafeas (1999) argues in this context that the 
board and its activities may grow with an increase in investment opportunities. This again 
suggests that board activities provide advice via board committees and meetings.  
On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that boards meet more frequently to react to 
corporate crises. Taking this into account, Vafeas (1999) finds that board meetings increase 
in frequency after periods of poor performance and decrease after periods of good 
performance. The arguments of Jensen (1993) and Vafeas (1999) suggest that board 
committees and meetings provide advice, as discussed above, as well as monitoring for 
poorly performing firms. 
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Finally, Hayes et al. (2004) find empirical evidence that the number of board committees is 
positively related to board and company size. In other words, board activities may increase 
because boards have a wider scope and complexity of operations. 
In this thesis I follow the argumentation of Jensen (1993) and Vafeas (1999), who point out 
that the number of board committees and meetings suggest that the boards of LPE firms 
require advice.   
 
Hypothesis 3: The number of board committees has a positive impact on the performance of 
LPE firms. 
Hypothesis 4: The number of board meetings has a positive impact on the performance of 
LPE firms. 
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3.3. Family ownership and founder-managers  
 
The following section will present several papers that investigate the role of company 
founders on the board of directors. In recent years, corporate governance literature has 
studied the impact of i) family ownership, ii) family control rights and iii) family 
management on corporate performance. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) study the 
impact of family ownership and management on performance and establish that family 
ownership has a positive impact. Villalonga and Amit (2006) investigate the role of families 
in family firms. Separating family ownership from control rights and management, these 
authors argue that founder CEOs increase accounting and market performance. Andres 
(2008) observes a positive relationship between active founder families and performance in 
Germany.
75
  
Researchers like Jayaraman et al. (2000), Adams et al. (2009) and Fahlenbrach (2009) 
investigate the impact of founder-CEOs on company performance. For instance, 
Fahlenbrach focuses only on founder-CEO characteristics. He finds that founder-managed 
firms outperform non-founder-managed firms on the stock market. On investment behavior 
he observes that founder managed firms spend more on R&D and acquire more targets in 
their own industry than non-founder-managed firms. Finally, the findings of Li and 
Srinivasan (2011) suggest that the involvement of founders as board directors has a positive 
impact on corporate governance.   
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 German company law separates the board of directors into “Vorstand” (Management Board) and 
“Aufsichtsrat” (Supervisory Board). Andres (2006) argues that founders on either board have a positive impact 
on corporate value. 
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3.3.1. Founding family ownership, control rights and management  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the impact of founding family ownership on the 
performance of U.S. stock market listed companies. Their empirical analysis is based on a 
sample of S&P 500 firms from 1992 through 1999. They establish that family firms 
outperform non-family firms. Following prior literature on corporate ownership and 
performance, they set the threshold between “young” and “old” at 50 years.76 The evidence 
for “young” and “old” firms is both positive and significant on ROA and Tobin’s Q. These 
findings support the view that family ownership has a positive and significant impact on 
company performance.  
A further question they address is the role of family members in top management positions 
(ibid. 1306-1307). In order to determine whether family members in top management 
positions have a positive or negative impact on performance, the authors investigate the 
independent variables ‘CEO hire’, ‘CEO founder’ and ‘CEO descendant’. First, they argue 
that families might try to maximize their control by appointing a family member as CEO. 
Secondly, family CEOs might be less capable and talented than hired CEOs. In this context, 
Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) argue that professional CEOs are potentially more accountable to 
shareholders and directors than family CEOs. On the other hand, family CEOs can bring 
special skills to the company, which hired CEOs might not provide. In this context Morck et 
al. (1988) argue that family CEOs can bring innovation and expertise to the company, which 
creates value. Another argument in favor of family CEOs is that family members often act as 
stewards. In line with the stewardship theory, family CEOs identify strongly with the 
company and see its performance as their own well-being.  
Firms with family ownership perform better, then, than those without. But family firms 
perform even better with a family member as CEO than with a professional CEO (Anderson 
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 Following the argumentation of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) set a variable for firms younger than 50 years and a variable for firms older than 50 years.  
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and Reeb 2003: 1317). Finally, the dummy variable ‘founder is CEO’ has a positive and 
significant impact on ROA and Tobin’s Q.77   
Villalonga and Amit (2006) study three family ownership characteristics a) family 
ownership, b) family control, finally c) family management. Their question is whether these 
three characteristics create or destroy company value. Applying a sample of all Fortune 500 
firms between 1994 and 2000 they find evidence that family ownership creates value under 
certain circumstances. First, family ownership creates value when the founder is still active 
in a leading position either as CEO or as chairperson (ibid. 388). This does not, however, 
diminish the agency problem between owner and manager, or between small and large 
shareholders. According to the theoretical arguments of Jensen and Meckling (1976), large 
shareholders reduce agency costs by monitoring management, but create agency costs by 
expropriating minority shareholders. This finding indicates that the benefits of family-
ownership with the founder as CEO or chairman are larger than the costs. Secondly, 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) find evidence for the hypothesis that descendant-CEOs extract 
private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. This finding still holds, even with the 
founder as chairman on the board of directors (ibid. 388). Finally, investigating the control 
mechanisms, the authors find evidence that a founder increases company value most when 
no control-enhancing
78
 mechanisms are established; descendant-CEOs, however, destroy 
value both with and without such mechanisms. 
In his paper Andres (2008) studies the relationship between founding-family ownership and 
company performance. In a sample of 275 German exchange-traded companies he defines 
family firms as firms that have a family blockholding of at least 25% (ibid. 435). He also 
examines the impact of active founder families sitting on the board of directors in German 
stock-market-listed firms. In this context he distinguishes between founder CEOs, 
descendant CEOs and professional CEOs (ibid. 439-440). In his empirical analysis Andres 
uses Tobin’s Q and ROA as performance measures,79 and employs a random effect GLS 
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 In line with the corporate governance literature, Anderson and Reeb (2003) use ROA and Tobin’s for 
investigating the relationship between family ownership and ‘family member is CEO’ on company 
performance.  
78
 Villalonga and Amit (2006) control in their empirical analysis for different voting rights, multiple share 
classes, pyramids, crossholdings, and voting agreements.  
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 In particular Andres (2008: 435) calculates ROA on the basis of EBIT and EBITDA.  
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regression and a pooled regression model to test the effect of founder families on 
performance. His findings show that family firms outperform firms with a widely-held 
ownership structure and also other types of blockholders. In this context he points out that 
family blockholding is only superior if family members actively sit either on the board of 
directors as executive managers or on the supervisory board. Turning the focus on founder 
CEOs, his empirical analysis of Andres shows that founder CEOs have a positive and 
significant effect on market and accounting performance in German exchange-traded 
companies (ibid. 439). He concludes that family firms only perform better when family 
members actively participate as members of the management board (ibid. 439-440).  
 
 
 
3.3.2. Founder CEOs and founders on the board of directors  
 
Jayaraman et al. (2000) pursue the research question of the impact founder CEOs have on 
company performance and if founder management has specific characteristics.  The authors 
study the relationship between founder CEOs and the stock market performance of the past 
36 months. Their sample includes 94 U.S. stock-market-listed companies, of which 47 have 
founder CEOs. They argue that founder CEOs do not in general impact company 
performance; however, specific conditions could have a positive impact on the performance 
of founder-CEO managed firms (ibid. 1217-1218). They set up the hypothesis that founder 
CEOs might have a positive impact on smaller firms (measured by market capitalization), or 
on firms at the beginning of their life-cycle.  
Following the theoretical arguments of the management science and corporate governance 
literature, Jayaraman et al. present arguments both for and against founder CEOs (ibid. 
1216). First, founder CEOs might perform better than non-founders, because they have a 
certain reputation to lose. So they will invest greater effort in their company to ensure 
company success. Secondly, founder CEOs invest their time and capital in the company. The 
personal fortune of the founder is tied to that of their company, which will reduce agency 
costs. Furthermore, entrepreneurs characteristically set risky goals and have a high need to 
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achieve them. Finally, founders often start businesses in industries where they have long 
managerial experience. All these characteristics may well generate superior performance. On 
the other hand, following the principal-agent theory, there might be a conflict of interest 
between the founder and other shareholders. In this case founders would tend to increase 
their own utility rather than company value. Moreover, founders might desire to retain 
control over corporate decisions and funds. In this context founder CEOs would likely 
refrain from liberal cash payouts or dividend policies.  
Jayaraman et al. (2000: 1220) establish that there is no general relationship between stock 
market performance and founder CEOs. However, testing the hypothesis that founder CEOs 
have a positive impact on performance in smaller firms, they find significant evidence for 
their hypothesis (ibid. 1220-1221). Furthermore, their findings also confirm that founder 
CEOs have a positive and significant impact on stock market returns in younger firms (ibid. 
1221).  
Adams et al. (2009: 137) study the relationship between founder CEOs and company 
performance in Fortune 500 firms. According to these authors, several empirical papers 
show a positive and significant relationship between founder CEOs and company 
performance. Their major contribution to the corporate governance literature is their focus 
on endogeneity problems in founder and performance research. However, they also present 
unique findings on founder CEO turnover.  
Using an OLS regression model in the first section of their empirical study, these authors 
establish a positive and significant impact of founder CEOs on Tobin’s Q and ROA. In their 
second section they use the proxy ‘dead founders’ and ‘number of founders’ as instruments 
for the variable founder CEO regarding the endogeneity issue (ibid. 142).
80
 The results of 
their probit model show that the proxy ‘dead founder’ has a negative and significant impact 
on the ‘founder CEO’. The negative and significant result shows that ‘dead founders’ cannot 
be ‘founder CEOs’, which makes the proxy a very good control variable. Secondly, the 
death of a founder is an exogenous shock and has no direct effect on company performance 
(ibid. 142). Furthermore, the finding for the proxy ‘number of founders’ is positive and 
significant. As mentioned above, ‘number of founders’ is also an exogenous event and 
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therefore a good instrumental variable for ‘founder CEO’. According to Adams et al., the 
effect of the proxy ‘number of founders’ should be positive and significant. After controlling 
the variable ‘founder CEO’ for endogeneity problems, the authors (ibid. 144) use the 
dummy founder CEO as independent variable to study the effect of founder CEOs on 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results of their regression model show that founder CEOs still 
have a positive and significant effect on performance, which is in line with their earlier 
results.  
Finally, Adams et al. investigate the relationship between company performance and a 
founder CEO’s departure. Surprisingly, they establish a negative and significant relationship 
between good performance in the past and the retention of the CEO title. In order to answer 
this question they develop four hypotheses. First, the bad governance hypothesis,
81
 which 
postulates a negative relationship between poor performance and CEO replacement. 
Secondly, the controlled succession hypothesis, which implies that CEOs are more likely to 
step down after periods of good performance: following the ‘paradox of entrepreneurial 
success’ hypothesis of Wasserman (2003), they expect founders to step down when the 
company is performing well. According to the arguments of Wasserman (2003) the 
likelihood for stepping down as CEO increases when projects and critical milestones have 
been achieved. Finally, the ‘wealth effect hypothesis’ implies that founders have invested a 
large stake of their wealth in the company and therefore want to retire when the company is 
performing well. Employing a probit regression the authors confirm ‘controlled succession’, 
the ‘paradox of entrepreneurial success’, and ‘wealth effect’.  
 
Fahlenbrach (2009) studies the characteristics of founder-CEOs and successor-CEOs. In 
particular he translates the organizational differences of founder firms into differences in 
company behavior, valuation and performance (ibid. 439). This approach contributes 
additional findings to the corporate founder literature.  
According to Fahlenbrach, founder-CEOs are less likely to be removed from office than 
other CEOs and consider their company as a life achievement: they have strong intrinsic 
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between poor performance and CEO turnover in firms with bad governance structure.   
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motivation and are inspired to pursue an optimal shareholder value strategy rather than 
concentrating on short-term actions. Furthermore, founder-CEOs have more influence and 
more power in decision-making due their equity stake and their status as entrepreneurs. 
Moreover, the equity stakes of founder-CEOs reduce the principal-agent problem. Finally, 
founder-CEOs make different investment decisions due their different attitude toward risk 
(ibid. 440).   
For his empirical analysis Fahlenbrach uses a data sample with 2,327 large, publicly listed 
U.S. firms during the period 1992-2002. He constructs a panel dataset with 361 sample firms 
for 1,468 company-years (ibid. 440). In his empirical analysis he runs multiple regressions 
to find evidence for his hypothesis. First, he uses a two-stage least squares instrumental 
variable regression. In the first stage he instruments the variable for the founder-CEO. In the 
second stage he includes the instrumented variable ‘founder-CEO’ as an independent 
variable in his regression model and studies the effect on the dependent variable Tobin’s Q 
(ibid. 448-449). The results of this regression model indicate that founder-CEOs have a 
sizeable positive and statistically significant impact on company value (ibid. 448). These 
results are in line with the findings of other empirical studies (Anderson and Reeb 2003, 
Palia and Ravid 2003, and Adams et al. 2009). Furthermore, Fahlenbrach calculates equal-
weighted and value-weighed portfolios which invest in founder-CEO managed firms. Both 
portfolios outperform the benchmark. His equal-weighted portfolio would yield an average 
annual excess return of 16.34% and the value weighed portfolio an average annual excess 
return of 13.87% (ibid. 451). He further studies these portfolio returns in a cross-sectional 
regression model and points out that the coefficient on the variable founder-CEO dummy 
has a value of 36 bps and is statistically significant at the 2% level (ibid. 454). Finally, 
Fahlenbrach studies R&D expenditure and M&A transactions. He finds that founder-CEOs 
spend up to 5.4% more on R&D and invest more actively in industrial knowledge than 
successor-CEOs (ibid. 456-461).  
 
Li and Srinivasan (2011) investigate the role of founders on the board of directors. In 
particular they study the impact of founders on company performance, CEO compensation 
and retention, M&A decisions, and board meeting attendance.   
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In light of the arguments between Jensen (1993), Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), they suggest that founder involvement in the board of directors can 
provide the company with valuable monitoring and advice (Li and Srinivasan 2011: 455). 
Their empirical analysis includes more than 11,000 company-year observations from 1996 
to 2004. Assuming that founder involvement provides value for the company, they apply a 
fixed-effect regression model with founder variables to the dependent variable Tobin’s Q 
(ibid. 459). The coefficient ‘founder on the board’ has a positive and significant impact on 
Tobin’s Q. This finding is in line with the results of Villalonga and Amit (2006), who show 
that company value increases with the founder on the board and a hired CEO. Moreover, the 
coefficient that the current CEO is a member of the founding family has a negative and 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q. Li and Srinivasan also analyze the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of successor CEOs (ibid. 461). In a regression model which controls for 
company, industry and year fixed effects these authors show that founders on the board have 
a positive and significant impact on pay-for-performance sensitivity. In contrast, the 
coefficient for ‘former CEO’ with an equity stake is negative and significant. This finding 
underlines the impact and skills of ‘founder on the board’. Li and Srinivasan’s findings on 
CEO compensation suggest that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity increases, whereas 
overall CEO compensation decreases, in firms where the founder is still actively 
participating on the board (ibid. 462). Investigating CEO tenure the authors find evidence 
that the likelihood of a replacement of the CEO increases when the founder is on the board 
(ibid. 463). Furthermore, estimating the returns of the acquiring company around the M&A 
event window,
82
 they establish that firms with a founder on the board have 1.99% higher 
returns (ibid. 464). This finding suggests that founders provide valuable advice for 
investment decisions. Finally, they ask if the presence of the founder has a positive impact 
on board meeting attendance, and find evidence that directors’ attendance is better in 
founder-director boards than in boards with a former CEO with equity stakes (ibid. 465). 
The robustness checks confirm the results and do not affect their inference.  
 
In conclusion, founder CEOs have specific characteristics that might have a positive impact 
on company performance. Following the argumentation of Jayaraman et al. (2000), founders 
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have a reputation to lose. Furthermore, the financial wellbeing of the founder is tied to the 
wellbeing of the company. Moreover, a specific characteristic of founders is setting risky 
goals and an intense need to achieve them. Concluding these arguments, founders invest 
great effort into becoming successful entrepreneurs. Finally, managerial experience supports 
entrepreneurs in creating value in their industry.  
The theoretical arguments and empirical findings of Jayaraman et al. (2000), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Andres (2008), Adams et al (2009), and Fahlenbrach (2009) support the 
argumentation given above. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that founders of private 
equity firms have certain skills that create very high value. In particular, the Forbes 
magazine reports that Stephen Schwarzman, one of the co-founders of The Blackstone 
Group, is one of the most successful self-made billionaires in the private equity industry. 
Schwarzman and his co-founders founded Blackstone in 1985 with $ 400,000 assets on the 
balance sheet, whereas the firm has today $ 290,000,000,000 assets under management.  
This thesis follows the argumentation given above and applies the explanatory variables 
‘founder on the board’, ‘founder chairperson’ and ‘founder CEO’ to measure the impact of 
founders on performance of LPE firms.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Founders on the board of directors have a positive impact on performance of 
LPE firms.  
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3.4. Leadership structure  
 
This section presents the literature on leadership structure, which considers the question 
whether the positions of CEO and chairman should be separated or not. Following the 
principles of corporate finance, company actions are associated with costs and benefits. 
Considering this principle, researchers and practitioners should ask whether certain actions 
increase or decrease shareholder wealth. In the context of leadership structure, conventional 
wisdom among regulators and institutional investors is that separation of the CEO and 
chairman benefits shareholders (Brickley et al. 1997: 190). For instance, Mary Shapiro, a 
former SEC Commissioner, recommends separation of the two positions, which will reduce 
the power of the CEO over outside directors. Michael Jensen also recommends separation, 
arguing that this increases board effectiveness (ibid. 193).  
Nevertheless, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman is also associated with costs. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that monitors can create agency costs by perquisite 
taking, effort level, and investment preferences. With increasing tenure, CEOs generally 
gain, and pass on, special knowledge about strategic issues and investment opportunities. 
One way to reduce information costs is to offer the chairman position to the resigning CEO. 
Alternatively, firms can create an incentive mechanism by offering an effective CEO the 
double position of CEO and chairman. Finally, Alexander Hamilton points out that dual role 
executives might increase agency costs as a result of disputes or the difficulty of assigning 
blame (Brickley et al. 1997: 194). 
Brickley et al. (1994) also investigate the costs and the benefits of separating the positions of 
CEO and chairman. For their empirical investigation they apply a sample of 737 firms for 
the fiscal year 1988. First, they investigate the relationship of leadership structure to CEO 
compensation. The regression models find no relationship here. The results suggest that 
company size and performance have a positive and significant impact on CEO compensation 
(ibid. 203). This finding does not support the argument that leadership structure leads to 
agency costs measured in terms of the increase in CEO compensation. Secondly, these 
authors show that companies in which CEOs are promoted to the additional position of 
chairman perform better than those in which the CEO leaves the company without such 
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promotion (ibid. 205). This result indicates that promotion to both positions represents an 
incentive mechanism. Thirdly, Brickley et al. show that the CEO’s past stock market 
performance has a positive and significant impact on the promotion in question (ibid. 207-
208). Finally, they apply an event study to demonstrate the market reaction to the change in 
leadership structure (ibid. 213-217). The first event study of a split between CEO and 
chairman positions shows negative and significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). 
The results for the full sample show a market reaction of -0.71, i.e. -71% (ibid. 215). This 
finding suggests that market reaction to the announcement of a split position is negative. The 
second event study examines market reaction to the announcement of joint CEO/chairman 
positions. The results of this event study are positive but not significant. Brickley et al. 
conclude that there is no significant announcement effect on combining the two positions; 
indeed, the findings might be anticipated by market participants (ibid. 217). Another issue 
that might arise in the event study is the effect of secondary information. In this case the 
announcement of the change in leadership structure might include private information about 
investment opportunities and future cash flows.    
 
Adams et al. (2005) study variability of performance as a measure of the power of the CEO. 
They argue that executives can only impact company outcomes if they have influence over 
crucial decisions. For their empirical analysis they focus solely on the power of the CEO 
over the board, investigating the formal position of CEO, the status of founder and the status 
as the board’s only insider (ibid. 1403-1404). 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) ‒ along with a wide range of management literature on 
managerial decision-making ‒ argue that in firms where CEOs make decisions that 
significantly impact outcomes, risk arises from judgment errors. In this context the risk of 
judgment errors might increase shareholder volatility. In their paper Adams et al. support the 
hypothesis that firms with powerful CEOs might have more variable firm performance, 
because (among other reasons) decisions with extreme consequences are more likely to be 
taken by a powerful CEO (Adams et al. 2005: 1404).  
These authors use a sample of 336 firms over the period 1992-1999 for their empirical 
analysis (ibid. 1410). Their main dependent variables are performance variables and the 
variability of performance. They measure the performance for their empirical analysis with 
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Tobin’s Q, ROA, and stock returns, whereas variability is measured by the standard 
deviation of these variables (ibid. 1411). The empirical model of the analysis is the Glejser 
test, which they first use to estimate the performance of the sample firms and in a second 
stage to apply controls for the standard performance deviation (ibid.1415-1419).  
Adams et al. establish that stock returns are more variable for firms managed by powerful 
CEOs. By using the empirical approach of Hambrick and Abrahamson, which controls for 
the industry ratings of managerial discretion, they find significant evidence for all three CEO 
power proxies (ibid. 1429). 
 
In summary, CEO duality has costs and benefits as discussed in the previous sub-chapter. 
On the one hand, a benefit of this structure is that it reduces information costs between CEO 
and chairperson. Moreover, CEOs accumulate specific knowledge and skills with increasing 
tenure that can be used to create value for shareholders. Finally, CEO duality creates an 
incentive for CEOs to perform well in order to be promoted to joint CEO and chairperson 
position.   
On the other hand, one of the most negative significant aspects of CEO duality is the 
increase in the CEO’s power. As indicated above, CEO duality reduces monitoring and 
advice by the board of directors, which may in turn increase judgmental errors of the CEO.  
This thesis follows the argument that CEO duality will lead to errors of judgment and 
thereby has a negative impact on corporate performance.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Duality will lead to judgment errors and decrease the value of LPE firms. 
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3.5. Ownership literature  
 
The corporate finance literature has been following the convergence of interest hypothesis 
since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) on company theory. According to these 
authors, an increase in managerial ownership decreases agency costs. In this view the 
manager is at the same time a shareholder, which creates an incentive mechanism to increase 
shareholder value. Asymmetrical information and opportunistic behavior will also 
disappear
83
 as the interests of manager and shareholders converge, which will lead to 
shareholder maximization.  
In an empirical study, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)
84
 show, on the other hand, that 
ownership between 5 and 25 percent has a negative impact on corporate value. In light of 
their findings and the theoretical argumentation of Berle and Means (1932), managerial 
ownership can create an entrenchment mechanism. This mechanism is known in the 
corporate finance literature as the entrenchment hypothesis. In firms where managerial 
ownership is small and the ownership structure is not concentrated, managers will increase 
their own benefits. These benefits are, for example, consumption on the job, perquisite 
taking, empire building, and investment projects that destroy shareholder value. Moreover, 
founders with a small equity stake can misuse their status as founder, and their long tenure, 
to entrench themselves.  
The following section will discuss the literature on managerial ownership, in order to 
develop a hypothesis on board ownership. Following a discussion of the literature on board 
ownership, a hypothesis will be developed for this modality. The ownership holding of the 
chairman will then be discussed and a hypothesis again framed. Finally, the focus will turn 
to CEO ownership, as the management literature sees CEO decisions as having a significant 
impact on corporate performance.  
                                                 
83
 In this concept asymmetric information and opportunistic behavior disappear, however the contract to 
achieve convergence of interests is costly, which makes it from the micro-economic view second-best.   
84
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) also show that managerial ownership up to 5% and managerial 
ownership of more than 25% have a positive and significant impact on company performance. This finding 
supports the convergence of interest hypothesis.   
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3.5.1. Board ownership  
 
The relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance is one of the 
most studied empirical issues in the corporate governance literature. Morck et al. (1988) 
examine the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate value. For their 
empirical analysis they test the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment 
hypothesis, using an OLS regression model to establish a relationship between Tobin’s Q 
and the type and scale of management ownership. In order to analyze the impact of different 
levels of managerial ownership they divide the equity ownership of the board into three 
groups: 0-5%, 5-25%, and more than 25%. They establish in their study that board 
ownership of 0-5% and board ownership of more than 25% both have a positive and 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q. These findings imply that board ownership reduces 
opportunistic behavior and conflict between shareholders and management. Furthermore, 
board ownership in these two ranges supports the convergence of interest hypothesis of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). On the other hand, board ownership of 5-25% has a negative 
and significant impact on corporate value. This finding is in line with the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The findings of Morck et al. are thus U-shaped, where corporate performance 
increases with the increase of board ownership from zero to five percent. The further 
increase of the ownership from five to twenty five percent decreases performance, and 
ownership of more than twenty five percent again increases corporate performance.  
 
Short and Keasey (1999) investigate the relation of managerial ownership to corporate value 
for UK firms. In fact they use director equity ownership as an independent variable to 
investigate the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis. Like 
Morck et al. (1988), they distinguish three levels of director ownership and use equity 
ownership, squared, and cubed ownership as proxy variables. The dependent variable in the 
regression model is a valuation ratio (VAL), which measures market value and is an 
approximation of Tobin’s Q.  
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These authors establish a significant and positive relationship between director ownership 
and corporate value. This finding is in line with that of Morck et al. (1988) and with the 
convergence of interest hypothesis of Jensen Meckling (1976). Their coefficient of squared 
ownership is negative and significant. The negative relationship implies that increasing 
ownership leads to entrenchment. This finding is also consistent with the literature. Finally, 
cubed ownership is again positive and significant, which is consistent with the convergence 
of interest hypothesis. Finally, their findings for managerial ownership in UK boards is in 
line with those of Morck et al. (1988).  
 
In a recent study, Bhagat and Bolton (2013) investigate the relationship between managerial 
director equity ownership and corporate performance, using a panel dataset from 1998-2007 
with more than 13,000 observations for their regression analysis, ROA as an operating 
measure, and Tobin’s Q as a market measure. Director ownership is measured by the dollar 
value of common stock rather than percentage of ownership. In contrast to Morck et al. 
(1988) and Short and Keasey (1999), these authors support the hypothesis that an increase in 
director ownership will raise corporate performance, as predicted in the convergence of 
interest hypothesis. Their findings suggest that director ownership has a positive and 
significant impact on Tobin’s Q as well as on ROA. They argue that director ownership 
increases directors’ efforts, creating an incentive mechanism to increase shareholder wealth. 
They further establish that director ownership has a positive impact on M&A decisions. 
Firms with greater director ownership are less likely to be involved in value-destroying 
acquisitions (ibid. 132).   
 
 
3.5.2. Chairperson ownership 
 
Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo (2010) use a sample of 68 Spanish exchange-traded firms 
to investigate the relationship between the risk behavior of the CEO and chairman. The 
dependent variable in the empirical analysis is corporate performance measured by Tobin’s 
Q, and the main proxy variables are CEO and chairman ownership. These authors seek 
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evidence for the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis 
regarding CEO and chairman ownership. Following the approach of Short and Keasey 
(1999) they square the shareholdings of the CEO and chairman to examine the effect of 
different ownership levels. In line with the argumentation of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
they assume that CEO and chairman ownership will increase the incentives of the board 
leaders to maximize shareholder value. On the other hand, a specific ownership level might 
lead to entrenched leadership, which may well become risk-averse. This view follows the 
argumentation of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). The authors find evidence for the 
convergence of interest hypothesis as well as for the entrenchment hypothesis. First, 
chairman ownership has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q, which is in line with the 
convergence of interest hypothesis. Secondly, the square of chairman ownership has a 
negative and significant impact on Tobin’s Q, which is in line with the entrenchment 
hypothesis. These findings imply that chairman ownership has a positive impact on Tobin’s 
Q, however this effect changes when ownership reaches a certain level.  
A potential shortcoming in the study of Minguez-Vera and Martin-Ugedo is their 
assumption about the role of the CEO and chairman. Management theory suggests that the 
role of the CEO is to lead the company and make decisions on investment and strategic 
questions. On the other hand the role of the chairman is to supervise the management, thus 
the duty of the chairman is to monitor and advise the CEO. 
 
 
 
3.5.3. CEO ownership   
 
Bhagat and Black (2002) study the relationship between independent boards and corporate 
performance. As well as their research question as to whether board independence affects 
corporate performance, they analyze the effect of CEO ownership on performance. They 
assume that CEO stock ownership has a positive impact on performance and that CEO 
ownership is affected by the past performance of the CEO. In other words stock ownership 
contains a double incentive mechanism. First, the CEO will be rewarded for the good 
Literature overview and hypotheses development 82 
 
performance of the past; secondly, stock ownership creates an incentive for the CEO to 
perform well in the future. The authors show that past CEO performance has a positive and 
significant impact on CEO stock ownership. This finding suggests that stock ownership 
serves as performance-based compensation. However, they find no statistically significant 
evidence that the CEO will continue to perform well after receiving the reward.    
Following the approach of Short and Keasey (1999), and applying the proxy-variables 
percentage stock ownership and squared percentage stock ownership of the CEO, Kim and 
Lu (2011) investigate the relationship between CEO ownership and corporate performance. 
They predict that in general CEO stock ownership will have a positive impact on corporate 
performance, creating an incentive for the CEO to raise corporate performance. On the other 
hand, they predict that squared stock ownership will have a negative impact on performance. 
According to Morck et al. (1988) CEOs will entrench as soon as their stock ownership 
increases to a certain level. In this context CEOs will become risk averse and will avoid 
risky investment, which will have a positive effect on the wealth of the CEO but a negative 
effect on shareholder wealth.  
In line with Morck et al. (1988) these authors establish that the proxy-variable ‘CEO stock 
ownership’ has a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q. This finding implies that 
stock ownership is an incentive mechanism and increases shareholder wealth. However, the 
proxy-variable ‘squared CEO ownership’ has a negative and significant impact on Tobin’s 
Q, which suggests that CEOs use their ownership to entrench. Finally, Kim and Lu examine 
in their analysis whether external governance mechanisms
85
 and CEO ownership are 
substitutes.  
 
In summary, this sub-chapter has described the concept and empirical findings of Jensen and 
Meckling’s convergence of interest hypothesis of 1976, which posits that an increase in 
managerial ownership increases the incentives of management to act in the interest of 
shareholders, and consequently decreases agency costs. On the other hand, Berle and Means 
(1932) and Morck et al. (1988) argue that managers can misuse their ownership stakes to 
                                                 
85
 Kim and Lu (2011) define four external governance variables: the industry concentration ratio, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the Economic Census Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and institutional ownership 
concentration.  
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entrench their position. The corporate governance literature describes incentives and 
ownership as an inverse U-shaped relationship
86
, with managerial incentives increasing with 
increase in ownership and then decreasing from the maximum point of the inverse U with 
any further increase in ownership. Form this point additional ownership leads to 
entrenchment rather than incentive. I follow both hypotheses and assume that relatively low 
ownership stakes will increase the performance of LPE firms as stated by the convergence of 
interest hypothesis. However, I assume that a relatively high ownership stake might decrease 
the performance of LPE firms as described by the entrenchment hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Ownership increases managerial effort and has a positive impact on the 
performance of LPE firms. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Ownership might lead to managerial entrenchment and decrease the 
performance of LPE firms.   
 
                                                 
86
 The inverse U-shape relationship shows managerial incentives on the Y-axis and managerial ownership on 
the X-axis.   
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The following table gives an overview of the hypotheses that will be used in the empirical 
analysis of Chapter 5. The table also provides a short definition of the variables and 
indicates the expected result.   
 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of hypotheses on firm performance 
Hypothesis Variable Expected sign 
H: Board size Number of directors "+" 
H: Outside directors Number of outside directors "+" 
 
Fraction of outside directors "+" 
H: Committee and meeting structure Number of board committees "+" 
 
Number of board meetings "+" 
H: Founder Founder on board "+" 
 
Founder chairperson "+" 
 
Founder CEO "+" 
H: Leadership structure Founder duality "-" 
 
Duality "-" 
H: Ownership Board ownership "+/-" 
 
Chairperson ownership "+/-" 
  CEO ownership "+/-" 
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4. Data sample and descriptive statistics 
 
“Truth is ever to be found in simplicity, and not in the multiplicity and confusion of things.” 
Isaac Newton 
 
This thesis uses a unique panel data set with over 600 firm-year observations on corporate 
and board characteristics of listed private equity (LPE) firms. The purpose of the chapter is 
to show the differences and similarities between the characteristics of industrial, family, and 
LPE firms. As far as I know there is no literature investigating the board structure of private 
equity firms on a large empirical scale; therefore this dissertation contributes in several ways 
to the existing literature on private equity.  
First, sub-chapter 4.1 will present the panel data set and provide initial descriptive findings 
on the board data of LPE firms. I apply a unique panel data set covering 71 LPE firms with 
661 company-year observations to investigate the role of board of directors in LPE firms. 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the panel data set, which will be 
used in the multivariate analysis of Chapter 5. 
Second, the thesis describes empirically the main characteristic differences between 
industrial, family, and LPE firms. In particular, section 4.2 shows the main differences and 
similarities in total assets, leverage, company age, and performance, using performance 
measures such as Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
Third, I investigate the role of the board of directors in LPE firms and its impact on 
performance, again comparing the findings on the board structure of industrial, family, and 
LPE firms. This sub-chapter provides all the findings on firm and board characteristics 
mentioned above as literature overviews.  
Finally, section 4.2 will present descriptive findings on the performance of LPE firms, and 
indicate the behavior of board meetings and committees around the financial crisis of 2008. 
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In particular, it will show the difference in performance between LPE firms with founder 
managers on the board and those without.  
 
 
 
4.1. Data description and descriptive statistics  
 
The main research question of this thesis is how the board structure of private equity firms 
impacts economic performance. For this purpose I apply a unique panel data set covering 71 
LPE firms from 1998 to 2012 with 661 company-year observations. As most LPE firms 
launched their IPO between 1999 and 2007, as shown in Figure 4.1, the present panel data 
set is unbalanced.
87
 For instance, between 2007 and 2012 large private equity houses such as 
Blackstone, KKR and Carlyle headed toward the public equity market.
88
  
The underlying data set here is a panel data set, which means that it includes information 
across LPE firms over time. The firms in the present data set are characterized as private 
equity companies.
89
 The issue identifying private equity firms is that there is no legal 
definition for private equity and no publicly available data source where private equity firms 
are registered. Therefore, the underlying sample was collected through a Bloomberg 
database. The procedure was as follows: 
First, all private equity transactions available on Bloomberg from 1980 to 2013 were 
extracted. This request yielded transaction results of over 8,000 private equity transactions 
with more than 500 acquiring firms. Using the result of the private equity transactions the 
list of acquiring firms was reviewed to identify private equity firms. For this purpose, I first 
verified if the acquiring firm was clearly defined as a private equity firm on Bloomberg. 
                                                 
87
 See Figure 4.1 “IPOs of LPE firms between 1992 and 2012” in section 4.1.  
88
 We use Bloomberg data base to collect information on the initial public offering (IPO) data. The table on the 
following page shows the date of the sample firms’ IPO.  
89
 There are also other types of private equity companies, for instance fund of funds or management companies 
which solely act as intermediaries between investors and private equity investment companies.  
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Firms are defined as private equity firms if their core business is private equity. 
Consequently, all non-private-equity firms, such as strategic acquirers, banks, or insurance 
companies were eliminated. All the private equity firms yielded by Bloomberg were then 
scrutinized on the basis of the information on the firm’s homepage, to verify that they were 
in fact engaged in the private equity industry, and the filing date of the IPO was checked to 
ensure the public market listing. Finally, the LPE firms of the sample were compared with 
LPX, which is an index of LPE firms. Three LPE firms were consequently to the sample 
from the list constructed with the Bloomberg data.  
In general, private equity firms are limited partnerships with restricted disclosure 
requirements. However, when former limited partnerships go public they have to implement 
disclosure requirements. This allows data on firm and board characteristics to be generated 
from annual reports and other filings.  
 
Table 4.8: Stock market listed private equity firms 
# Company Name Country IPO Date Investment Focus 
1. 3i Group plc  UK 1994 Diversified 
2. AB Novestra  SE 2000 Diversified 
3. Altamir Amboise SCR  FR 1998 Diversified 
4. American Capital, Ltd.  US 1997 Diversified 
5. Amphion Innovations PLC  UK 2005 IT/Health Care 
6. APEN AG  CH 1999 Diversified 
7. Apollo Investment Corporation  US 2004 Diversified 
8. Ares Capital Corporation  US 2004 Diversified 
9. Aurelius AG  DE 2006 Diversified 
10. Avanti Capital PLC  UK 1997 Diversified 
11. BlackRock Kelso Capital Corporation US 2007 Diversified 
12. Blackstar Group SE  MT 2000 Diversified 
13. Blackstone Group LP  US 2007 Diversified 
14. bmp media investors AG   DE 1999 Diversified 
15. Bure Equity AB  SE 1993 Diversified 
16. CapMan Oyj  FI 2001 Diversified 
17. China Merchants China Direct Investments Limited  CN 1993 Financials 
18. Citadel Capital  EG 2009 Diversified 
19. Clairvest Group Inc.  CA 1987 Diversified 
20. Compass Diversified Holdings  US 2007 Diversified 
21. DeA Capital S.p.A.  IT 2000 Financials/Health Care 
22. Deutsche Balaton AG   DE 1997 Diversified 
23. Deutsche Beteiligungs AG  DE 1985 Industrials 
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24. DEWB AG  DE 1998 Technologies 
25. Dinamia Capital Privado  ES 1997 Diversified 
26. East Capital Explorer AB  SE 2007 Diversified 
27. EIH PLC   UK 2007 Diversified 
28. Eurazeo  FR 2001 
Industrials/Consumer 
Discretionary 
29. Fifth Street Finance Corp.  US 2008 Diversified 
30. Fortress Investment Group LLC US 2007 Diversified 
31. GIMV N.V.   BE 1997 Diversified 
32. Gladstone Capital Corporation  US 2001 Diversified 
33. GP Investments  BR 2006 Diversified 
34. Harris & Harris Group, Inc.  US 1992 Nanotechnology 
35. Heliad Equity Partners GmbH & Co. KGaA  DE 2004 Diversified 
36. Hercules Technology Growth Capital, Inc.  US 2005 Diversified 
37. ICG Group, Inc. / Internet Capital Group, Inc.  US 1999 IT 
38. Imperial Innovations Group plc  UK 2006 Diversified 
39. Ingenious Media Active Capital Limited  UK 2006 Media 
40. Intermediate Capital Group PLC  UK 1994 Diversified 
41. IP Group PLC   UK 2003 Health Care 
42. JAFCO Co., Ltd.  JP 1987 Diversified 
43. Japan Asia Investment Co. Ltd.  JP 1996 Diversified 
44. K1 Ventures Limited  SG 1987 Diversified 
45. KKR  US 2010 Diversified 
46. Main Street Capital Corporation US 2007 Diversified 
47. Management & Capitali / M&C SpA  IT 2006 Diversified 
48. Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A.  GR 1994 Diversified 
49. MCG Capital Corporation  US 2001 Diversified 
50. MVC Capital, Inc.  US 2000 Diversified 
51. NAXS Nordic Access Buyout Fund AB  SE 2007 Diversified 
52. New Value AG  CH 2006 Cleantech/Health Care 
53. NGP Capital Resources Company  US 2004 Energy 
54. Onex Corporation  CA 1987 Diversified 
55. Origo Partners PLC   UK 2006 Diversified 
56. Partners Group Holding AG  CH 2006 Diversified 
57. PennantPark Investment Corporation US 2007 Diversified 
58. Promethean PLC  UK 2005 Diversified 
59. Prospect Capital Corporation  UK 2006 Diversified 
60. Ratos AB  SE 1954 Diversified 
61. Safeguard Scientifics  US 1993 Health Care/Technology 
62. Scandinavian Private Equity A/S  DK 2007 Diversified 
63. SPARK Ventures PLC  UK 1999 Diversified 
64. SVG Capital PLC  UK 1996 Diversified 
65. Symphony International Holdings Limited  BM 1995 Diversified 
66. The Carlyle Group LP  US 2012 Diversified 
67. TICC Capital Corp.  US 2003 Diversified 
68. Triangle Capital Corporation  US 2007 Diversified 
69. TVC Holdings PLC  IE 2007 Diversified 
Data sample and descriptive statistics   89 
 
70. Unternehmens Invest AG  AT 1992 Diversified 
71. Wendel   FR 1980 Industrials 
 
All board characteristics related to these companies were hand collected from annual reports 
and other filings.
90
 Table 1 shows the final sample of 71 LPE firms, with names, country of 
incorporation, IPO date, and investment focus. 
The underlying sample includes 71 LPE firms from 24 different countries. Most of the LPE 
firms on this list are incorporated in the US (23 out of 71, which is almost 32% of the total 
sample); 13 are incorporated in the UK and 6 in Germany (18% and 8% respectively). These 
top three countries contain 42 private equity firms, which is 60% of the whole sample.  
After creating a list with stock market private equity firms, I used the annual reports, 10-K 
fillings and proxy filings to hand collect data on private equity board characteristics, 
including board ownership, chairperson ownership and CEO ownership. Table 2 gives an 
overview of the dependent, independent and control variables of LPE firms, as well as 
company and board characteristics, that will be used later for empirical analysis. Thus the 
multivariate analysis in Chapter 5 will use two performance variables
91. First, Tobin’s Q will 
be measured as a ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. 
Second, ROA will be defined as the ratio of net income divided by total company assets. 
The ROA used in this sample is calculated as that of the 12 months trailing average income 
divided by total assets.
92
  
Besides performance several explanatory and control variables are used to explain economic 
performance. The first explanatory variables are the number of board committees and board 
meetings. ‘Board committees’ is defined as the total number of board committees, and 
‘board meetings’ as the total number of board meetings, in a fiscal year. ‘Board size’ 
measures the number of directors appointed for each fiscal year as given in the annual 
report. ‘Number of outside directors’ is computed as the number of non-management 
                                                 
90
 In the case of US-based LPE firms, the board characteristics were hand collected from 10-K filings.  
91
 The two performance variables Tobin’s Q and ROA will be the depending variables in the multivariate 
regression analysis.  
92
 The ROA used in this dissertation is calculated by the standard approach of Bloomberg.  
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directors on the board. ‘Fraction of outside directors’ is defined as the number of outside 
directors divided by the total number of directors.  
The present thesis uses four founder variables to describe the behavior of founders in LPE 
firms. All founder variables are dummy variables and set between 0 and 1. ‘Founder on the 
board’ is 1 if the founder of the private equity firm actively participates on the board of 
directors; otherwise it is 0. ‘Founder CEO’ is set as 1 if the founder of the private equity 
firm is the CEO of the firm; otherwise as 0. ‘Founder chairperson’ is 1 if the founder holds 
the position of the chairperson; otherwise 0. ‘Founder duality’ is 1 if the founder is CEO and 
chairperson of the firm; otherwise 0. Variable duality is 1 if the CEO at the same time holds 
the position of chairperson.  
 
Table 4.9: Summary statistics of private equity board variables 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance 
     Tobin's Q 607 1.207 1.220 0.259 22.161 
ROA 554 0.016 0.174 -1.172 0.818 
Board characteristics 
     Board committees 529 2.505 1.550 0 7 
Board meetings 439 9.169 6.149 0 48 
Board size 661 7.457 3.060 2 22 
No. outside directors 661 5.516 2.571 0 17 
Fraction outside directors 661 0.763 0.227 0 1 
Founder on the board 661 0.254 0.436 0 1 
Founder CEO 661 0.166 0.373 0 1 
Founder chairperson 661 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Founder duality 661 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Duality 661 0.280 0.449 0 1 
Board ownership 409 0.065 0.085 0 0.460 
CEO ownership 387 0.036 0.064 0 0.359 
Chairperson ownership 397 0.027 0.043 0 0.250 
Founder chairperson 
ownership 109 0.039 0.040 0 0.153 
Founder CEO ownership 87 0.045 0.059 0 0.255 
Founder director ownership 24 0.100 0.114 0.008 0.307 
Firm characteristics 
     Stock price return 578 0.026 0.410 -0.959 3.085 
Tobin's Q t-1 545 1.225 1.262 0.259 22.161 
ROA t-1 512 0.017 0.173 -1.172 0.818 
Stock price return t-1 509 0.035 0.424 -0.959 3.085 
Total assets [in bn.] 585 6.750 27.400 0.015 341.000 
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LN total assets 585 20.261 1.957 16.532 26.554 
Total debt ratio 611 0.298 0.234 0.000 1.122 
FYs since IPO 596 9.836 9.409 0 58 
 
The present thesis also provides data on managerial ownership in LPE firms. ‘Board 
ownership’ computes the total equity stakes in percentage held by the board of directors. 
‘CEO ownership’ measures the equity stakes in percentage held by the CEO. ‘Chairperson 
ownership’ is defined as the percentage of equity owned by the chairperson. Finally, the 
following data set includes three founder ownership variables. ‘Founder chairperson 
ownership’ measures the equity ownership of the founder chairperson. ‘Founder CEO 
ownership’ measures the equity stakes of the founder CEO. ‘Founder director ownership’ 
computes the equity ownership of the founder if the founder is only a director on the 
board.
93
  
Finally, the underlying data set includes company characteristics such as lagged 
performance variables, total assets or total debt ratio. Stock price return is calculated as 
percentage stock returns over the past 12 months. For this purpose, the daily stock price data 
are used to calculate the annual stock price return. Moreover, the present sample includes 
three lagged variables that measure the past performance of the sample firms. Tobin’s Q t-1, 
ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined time lagged variables. These variables measure 
the performance over the past fiscal year. Total assets are defined as the total value of assets 
on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. ‘LN total assets’ refers to the logarithmized total 
assets in each fiscal year. The total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by the total 
assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the fiscal years since the initial 
public offering.  
The following table shows the Spearman rank correlation and includes 23 variables. The 
Spearman correlation table shows the correlation between the variables and labels the 
variables on their significance level, defined as *** 0.01 level, ** 0.05 level and * 0.1 level. 
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 Here again, founder ownership variables are measured as percentage equity ownership.  
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Table 4.10: Spearman correlation 
# Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Tobin's Q 1 
           2 ROA 0.266*** 1 
          3 Board committees 0.022 0.060 1 
         4 Board meetings 0.004 -0.007 0.049 1 
        5 Board size 0.060 0.023 0.403*** -0.042 1 
       6 No. outside directors -0.034 0.031 0.295*** 0.040 0.742*** 1 
      7 Fraction outside directors -0.137*** 0.006 -0.257*** 0.061 -0.245*** 0.422*** 1 
     8 Founder on the board 0.155*** -0.080* -0.055 0.205*** -0.081** -0.125*** -0.119*** 1 
    9 Founder CEO 0.077* -0.104** -0.006 0.184*** 0.000 -0.058 -0.091** 0.765*** 1 
   10 Founder chairperson 0.158*** -0.077* -0.064 0.200*** -0.044 -0.080** -0.077** 0.880*** 0.690*** 1 
  11 Founder duality 0.063 -0.124*** 0.034 0.223*** 0.039 -0.038 -0.113*** 0.689*** 0.900*** 0.783*** 1 
 12 Duality 0.054 -0.092** 0.295*** 0.127*** 0.036 -0.079** -0.227*** 0.334*** 0.364*** 0.385*** 0.441*** 1 
13 Board ownership 0.276*** 0.081 -0.131** -0.169*** -0.131*** -0.136*** -0.112** 0.206*** 0.036 0.193*** 0.009 0.127** 
14 CEO ownership 0.039 0.039 -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.203*** -0.135*** 0.121** 0.045 0.103** 0.000 0.039 0.069 
15 Chairperson ownership 0.181*** 0.074 0.103** -0.150*** -0.171*** -0.171*** -0.092* 0.136*** 0.046 0.170*** 0.060 0.290*** 
16 Stock price return 0.234*** 0.445*** 0.069 -0.062 0.051 0.037 -0.003 -0.066 -0.053 -0.051 -0.052 0.020 
17 Tobin's Q t-1 0.497*** 0.088** 0.037 -0.020 0.071* -0.026 -0.135*** 0.154*** 0.075* 0.164*** 0.068 0.057 
18 ROA t-1 0.165*** 0.184*** 0.040 0.000 -0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.089** -0.133*** -0.0869** -0.149*** -0.103** 
19 Stock price return t-1 0.064 0.067 0.106** -0.017 0.049 0.032 -0.004 -0.0733* -0.072 -0.060 -0.073* 0.031 
20 Total assets [in bn.] 0.043 -0.018 0.072 0.194*** 0.053 -0.203*** -0.391*** -0.069* -0.060 -0.078* -0.049 0.168*** 
21 LN total assets 0.026 0.076* 0.280*** 0.301*** 0.318*** 0.132*** -0.254*** 0.021 0.001 0.032 0.048 0.166*** 
22 Total debt ratio 0.038 -0.157*** 0.139*** 0.063 0.114*** 0.004 -0.137*** 0.097** 0.0766* 0.059 0.0892** 0.059 
23 FYs since IPO -0.074* 0.108** 0.002 0.049 0.170*** 0.316*** 0.197*** -0.283*** -0.229*** -0.281*** -0.220*** -0.150*** 
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. ROA is defined as the ratio of net income divided by the total assets of the 
firm. Board committees is defined as total number of board committees in a fiscal year. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a fiscal year. 
Board size measures the number of directors on the board for each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. The Number of outside directors is computed as the number 
of non-management directors on the board. 
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# Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
13 Board ownership 1 
          14 CEO ownership 0.355*** 1 
         15 Chairperson ownership 0.765*** 0.496*** 1 
        16 Stock price return -0.019 0.150*** -0.0168 1 
       17 Tobin's Q t-1 0.230*** 0.019 0.159*** 0.093** 1 
      18 ROA t-1 0.021 -0.003 0.045 0.350*** 0.266*** 1 
     19 Stock price return t-1 -0.039 0.101* -0.020 0.168*** 0.240*** 0.452*** 1 
    20 Total assets [in bn.] -0.094* -0.138*** -0.157*** -0.067 0.060 -0.011 -0.059 1 
   21 LN total assets -0.307*** -0.218*** -0.335*** 0.016 0.051 0.089* 0.046 0.569*** 1 
  22 Total debt ratio -0.080 0.039 -0.105** -0.090** 0.024 -0.145*** -0.029 0.081* 0.427*** 1 
 23 FYs since IPO -0.001 -0.128** -0.136*** 0.068 -0.068 0.118*** 0.090* 0.228*** 0.357*** 0.084** 1 
 
 
‘Fraction of outside directors’ is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. ‘Founder on the board’ is 1 if the founder of the private 
equity firm actively participates on the board of directors; otherwise 0. ‘Founder CEO’ is set as 1 if the founder of the private equity firm is the CEO of the firm; otherwise 0. 
‘Founder chairperson’ equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson; otherwise 0. ‘Founder duality’ equals 1 when the founder is CEO and chairperson of the 
firm; otherwise 0. ‘Variable duality’ equals 1 if the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. ‘Board ownership’ computes the total equity stakes in%age held 
by the board of directors. ‘CEO ownership’ measures the equity stakes in%age held by the CEO. ‘Chairperson ownership’ is defined as the%age equity ownership of the 
chairperson. ‘Stock price return’ is calculated as%age stock returns over the past 12 months. Daily stock price data are used to calculate the stock price returns, and monthly 
data to compute the growth rate of sales revenues. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. 
‘Total asset’ is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. ‘LN total assets’ is the logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. ‘Total debt 
ratio’ is the total value of debt divided by the total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, ‘FYs since IPO’ computes the fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
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4.2. Differences and similarities between industrial, family and LPE firms  
4.2.1. Company characteristics  
 
The first research question of this thesis is whether company characteristics differ between 
industrial, family and LPE firms. For this purpose the present section compares the findings 
on total assets, debt ratio and company age for these three categories. A second question 
posed by the thesis is the impact of board structure on the performance of LPE firms. For 
this purpose I use two performance measures that are widely applied in the corporate 
governance literature to investigate the impact of the cited characteristics on performance.  
The corporate governance literature widely uses total assets as a control measure for 
company size. On the size of industrial firms Adams (2003) reports that Fortune 500 firms 
have mean total assets of $12,701 million. Hayes et al. (2004) further report for S&P 500 
firms that the US industrial firms in their sample have mean total assets of $19,579 million. 
In contrast, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find in their CRSP sample with more than 11,000 
observations that US industrial firms have only mean total assets of $1,341 million. Finally, 
Duchin et al. (2010) report for their CRSP sample with more than 15,000 observations that 
mean total assets are $11,923 million.
94
 In contrast, Pathan and Faff (2013) find for their 
sample, which includes the top 300 banks listed in the US, that banks have mean total assets 
of $38,160 million.
95
  
The corporate governance literature on family firms shows that on average family firms 
have less total assets than their benchmark. For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) show 
that family firms listed in the S&P 500 have mean total assets of $9,617 million, whereas 
non-family firms in the S&P 500 have $14,999 million. Andres (2008) shows a similar 
relation between family and non-family firms as that reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
for German companies. German family firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange
96
 have 
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 Linck et al. (2008) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) quote similar findings for the total assets of US 
industrial firms of $1,580 million and $6,352 million. 
95
 Pathan and Faff (2013) start with a sample of the top 300 banks in the US. For comparability reasons the 
authors reduce their sample size from 300 banks to 212 with 2640 firm-year observations.  
96
 Andres (2008) uses a sample with 275 listed firms on the official market (Amtlicher Handel) of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange.   
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in mean €2,830 million total assets whereas non-family firms have €5,408 million. 
Moreover, Fahlenbrach (2009) finds for his sample of S&P 500 firms that founder firms 
have a mean $2,155 million total assets and non-founder firms $8,257 million. Finally, 
Bergmann et al. (2009) find for 122 globally listed private equity firms that LPEs have a 
mean $94,840 million total assets ‒ this represents an aggregate figure of direct and indirect 
investment portfolios. As well as LPE firms and LPE companies investing directly in private 
equity investments, these portfolios include LPE funds and LPE fund of funds, which only 
transmit capital from investors to private equity firms. In my sample LPE firms have mean 
total assets of $6,755 million. The significant difference between my own findings and those 
of Bergmann et al. (2009) is that Bergmann et al. apply a data set with LPE management 
firms, LPE investment firms, LPE funds and LPE funds of funds. In contrast, I only include 
in my sample LPE firms that have been actively involved in the acquisition of portfolio 
firms.   
One of the key governance mechanisms of private equity transactions is the use of debt in 
portfolio firms to create an incentive for the management to perform well. There is a lot of 
literature on the average use of debt in portfolio firms. For instance, Achleitner et al. (2008) 
establish for leveraged buyout transactions on the German stock market that abnormal 
returns are higher for firms with lower debt to total asset ratio. This supports the hypothesis 
that private equity firms use debt as a restructuring mechanism. Like Achleitner et al. 
(2008), Renneboog et al. (2005) conclude that debt is a governance mechanism for private 
equity transactions in the UK. As far as I know there is no literature on the use of debt in 
private equity firms themselves. In this section I will compare the indebtedness of industrial, 
family and LPE firms, using the ratio of long term debt to total assets as a proxy for 
leverage.  
Hayes et al. (2004) report that US industrial firms listed on the S&P 500 have a mean debt 
ratio of 0.190. Coles et al. (2008), Brick and Chidambaran (2010), and Kim and Lu (2011) 
have similar findings on the debt ratio for their Execucomp samples for US industrial firms. 
For their sample with over 8,000 firm-year observations from Execucomp, Coles et al. 
(2008) report a mean debt ratio of 0.246; Brick and Chidambaran (2010) report a debt ratio 
of 0.216 for their Execucomp sample with over 5,000 firm-year observations; and Kim and 
Lu (2011) report a debt ratio of 0.185 for their sample with over 22,000 firm-year 
observations. In contrast, Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Linck et al. (2008) and Duchin et al. 
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(2010) quote even higher figures for the debt ratio. For instance, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
report a debt ratio of 0.427 for their CRSP sample with over 11,000 observations; Linck et 
al. (2008) report a mean debt ratio of 0.438 for their CRSP sample with over 53,000 firm-
year observations; and Duchin et al. (2010) record a debt ratio of 0.391 for their CRSP 
sample with over 15,000 firm-year observations.  
On the debt ratio of family in comparison with non-family firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
determine that family firms listed on the S&P 500 have a debt ratio of 0.186 and non-family 
firms listed on the S&P500 have a debt ratio of 0.192. In contrast, Andres (2008) reports that 
German family firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange have a higher debt ratio than 
their benchmark: family firms have a debt ratio of 0.430 and non-family firms a debt ratio of 
0.402. Like Anderson and Reeb (2003), Fahlenbrach (2009), and Li and Srinivasan (2011) 
find that founder-managed firms have a lower debt ratio than their benchmark. Fahlenbrach 
(2009) reports a debt ratio of 0.190 for founder firms listed on the S&P 500, whereas non-
founder firms listed on the S&P500 have a debt ratio of 0.220. Li and Srinivasan (2011) 
show an even higher mean debt ratio for the Execucomp sample with over 11,000 firm-year 
observations mentioned above: here non-founder firms have a debt ratio of 0.600, whereas 
in firms where the CEO is the founder the debt ratio decreases to 0.510. In firms where the 
founder is a member of the board the debt ratio decreases even further to 0.480. Finally, for 
their sample of 122 global LPEs Bergmann et al. (2009) report a mean debt ratio of 0.310, 
which is again an aggregate figure of directly and indirectly managed LPEs.  
For the present LPE sample I record a sample debt ratio of 0.137 ‒ quite a small figure. The 
descriptive statistics of my sample show that the debt ratio is between 0 and 0.730 ‒ a 
significant span ‒ and that the median is 0.281, which is relatively low. This implies that 
some LPE firms do not consolidate their portfolio companies on their balance sheet, thus 
reducing their overall indebtedness. Other LPE firms, however, do consolidate their 
portfolio companies on balance sheet, thereby increasing their own formal debt level. As a 
result, the indebtedness of both portfolio and LPE firm increases. But as debt level increases, 
the risk to the LPE firm increases, which allows LPE firms that consolidate their portfolio 
holdings in this area only a limited frequency and scale of debt usage in their transactions. 
Another factor investigated here is the age of LPE firms since their initial public offerings 
(IPO), as two of the biggest private equity players, Blackstone and KKR, filed their IPOs as 
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recently as 2007 and 2010. Figure 1 shows the IPOs of private equity firms from 1992 
through 2012. The bar and line chart shows the number of IPOs in the respective years. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, the IPOs of private equity firms reached their peak in 2007 and 
decreased significantly from 2007 to 2008 with the beginning of the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 4.1: IPOs of LPE firms between 1992 and 2012
97
 
 
 
For their CRSP sample with over 53,000 firm-year observations Linck et al. (2008) report in 
the corporate governance literature that the mean age since IPO for US industrial firms is 
12.9 years. In contrast, Kim and Lu (2011) report a mean age since IPO for their Execucomp 
sample of 23.4 years. On the age of LPE firms, Lahr and Kaserer’s (2010) sample, which 
includes 97 LPE funds, records a mean age of 6.8 years since IPO. My own sample has a 
mean age since IPO of 9.8 years, which is higher that reported by Lahr and Kaserer (2010) 
for LPE funds, but lower than the findings of Linck et al. (2008) and Kim and Lu (2010) for 
US industrial firms.   
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Table 4.1: Firm characteristics of industrial, family and LPE firms  
Author Year Sample Sub-samples Findings 
Total assets 
c)
 
    Industrial firms 
    Adams 2003 Fortune500 firms 
 
12,701.000 
Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
19,579.000 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
1,341.000 
Linck et al. 2008 All firms from Disclosure database, CRSP and Compustat 1,580.600 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 
Execucomp 
 
6,352.986 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
11,923.000 
Banks 
    Pathan and Faff 2013 Top 300 US banks 
 
38,160.000 
Family & founder firms 
   Jayaraman et al. 2000 Forbes 800 most highly paid executives 
 
559.000 
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Family firms 9,617.000 
Non-family firms 14,999.000 
Andres
d)
 2008 All firms listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Family firms 2,830.000 
Non-family firms 5,408.000 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 8,257.430 
Founder Firms 2,154.790 
LPEs 
    Bergmann et al. 2009 122 globally LPE firms LPE companies 94,840.000 
 
    Long term debt / total assets 
   Industrial firms 
    Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
0.190 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.427 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
0.246 
Linck et al. 2008 All firms from Disclosure database, CRSP and Compustat 0.438 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 
Execucomp 
 
0.216 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.391 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
0.185 
Family & founder firms 
   
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Family firms 0.185 
Non-family firms 0.192 
Andres
d)
 2008 All firms listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Family firms 0.430 
Non-family firms 0.402 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 0.220 
Founder Firms 0.190 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
full sample 0.570 
Non-founder firms 0.600 
founder director firms 0.480 
founder CEO firms 0.510 
LPEs 
    Bergmann et al. 2009 122 globally LPE firms LPE companies 0.310 
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    Firm age since founding 
   Industrial firms 
    Adams 2003 Fortune500 firms 
 
54.969 
Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
29.500 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
28.100 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
25.540 
 
 
 
  Family & founder firms 
   Jayaraman et al. 2000 Forbes 800 most highly paid executives 
 
15.400 
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Full sample 84.500 
Family firms 76.000 
Non-family firms 88.610 
Andres
d)
 2008 All firms listed on Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
Family firms 82.270 
Non-family firms 92.130 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 53.600 
Founder Firms 22.140 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
full sample 56.450 
Non-founder firms 66.220 
founder director firms 30.570 
founder CEO firms 23.350 
 
    Firm age since IPO 
    Industrial firms 
    Linck et al. 2008 All firms from Disclosure database, CRSP and Compustat 12.900 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
23.377 
Lahr and Kaserer 2010 97 LPE funds   6.751 
     Note: a) ROA calculated with net income,  b) yearly stock returns, c) in million USD, d) in million EUR and e) excess returns 
 
As well as the differences and similarities in corporate characteristics discussed above, this 
dissertation is concerned with the impact of board structure on performance. The following 
section will focus on this issue for industrial, family and LPE firms, with particular reference 
to Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
Tobin’s Q is a market-based performance measure that reflects the relation between the 
market value of a firm and its replacement costs. The corporate governance literature reports 
different mean values for the Tobin’s Q of industrial firms. For their Execucomp sample of 
over 8,000 firm-year observations, for instance, Coles et al. (2008) calculate a mean Tobin’s 
Q of 1.79 for US firms. Other studies such as Duchin et al. (2010), with a CRSP sample of 
over 15,000 firm-year observations, record a mean Tobin’s Q of 1.93. Similar findings 
(mean Tobin’s of 1.95) are reported by Brick and Chidambaran (2010) for their Execucomp 
sample with over 5,000 firm-year observations. In contrast, Kim and Lu (2011) record a 
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figure of 2.04 for their Execucomp sample with over 22,000 firm-year observations.
98
 A 
recent study by Pathan and Faff (2013) on the structure of US bank boards reports that the 
top 300 banks in the US have a mean Tobin’s Q of 1.07.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Andres (2008) investigate the impact of family blockholders 
on corporate performance. Both papers conclude that family firms outperform non-family 
firms. For their S&P500 sample Anderson and Reeb (2003) record a Tobin’s Q of 1.59 for 
US family firms and 1.32 for non-family firms
99
. Analyzing performance differences 
between family and non-family firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, Andres (2008) 
concludes that family firms have a mean Tobin’s Q of 2.73 and non-family firms of 2.46.  
In contrast to the literature on family blockholdings, Fahlenbrach (2009) and Adams et al. 
(2009) investigate the role of founder-CEOs. Fahlenbrach (2009) employs a sample with 
S&P500 firms and records a mean Tobin’s Q of 2.50 for founder firms100 and 1.76 for non-
founder firms. Using a sample with Fortune 500 firms, Adams et al. (2009) report findings 
similar to Fahlenbrach’s (2009), with  a Tobin’s Q of 2.58 for founder-CEO firms and 1.94 
for non-founder-CEO firms. For their entire sample the mean Tobin’s Q is 2.04  
For my entire sample the mean Tobin’s Q for LPE firms is 1.21, which is comparable with 
the findings of Pathan and Faff (2013) on the performance of US banks. The corporate and 
board characteristics of banks and private equity firms are comparable, as both are financial 
intermediaries. However, Anglo-American and continental European governance systems 
set stricter rules for banks than for private equity firms, so comparing the mean Tobin’s of 
LPE firms with that of banks may not be fully relevant. 
Besides market performance, ROA is a widely used accounting measure in the corporate 
governance literature. For instance, for their CRSP sample with over 11,000 observations 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) record a mean ROA of 0.138. Likewise Coles et al. (2008) cite a 
mean ROA of 0.138 for their Execucomp sample with over 8,000 firm-year observations. 
For their Execucomp sample Brick and Chidambaran (2010) give a figure of 0.140, and for 
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 Like Kim and Lu (2011), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report a mean Tobin’s Q of 2.07. 
99
 Anderson and Reeb (2003) study a sample of US industrial firms and identify family firms by the 
blockholdings of family investors.  
100
 Fahlenbrach (2009) defines founder firms as firms in which the founder held the position of CEO.  
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their CRSP sample Duchin et al. (2010) report 0.126. In contrast, for their Execucomp 
sample of more than 22,000 firm-year observations, Kim and Lu (2011) record a mean ROA 
of 0.027, which is significantly lower than the findings of the other papers mentioned above. 
On the account performance of SMEs in Denmark Bennedsen et al. (2006) record a mean 
ROA of 0.064. Finally, Pathan and Faff (2013) report a mean ROA of 0.047 for the top 300 
publicly traded US banks.  
ROA is also used in the family governance literature. For S&P 500 firms, for example, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) report that family firms have a higher accounting performance 
than their benchmark. More precisely, family firms have a mean ROA of 0.061 whereas 
non-family firms achieve only 0.047. Also for S&P 500 firms, Fahlenbrach (2009) reports  
an ROA of 0.034 for non-founder firms and 0.037 for founder-CEO firms. However, Li and 
Srinivasan (2011) do not confirm the findings of the family and founder literature, reporting 
(for their Execucomp sample with over 11,000 firm-year observations) a mean ROA of 0.09 
for non-founder firms and 0.08 for founder-CEO firms. Finally, Bennedsen et al. (2006) 
show that family SMEs in Denmark have a mean ROA of 0.065, which is slightly higher 
than the ROA of non-family firms in that country. My own sample shows that LPE firms 
have a mean ROA of 0.016. However, ROA changes with the definition of earnings: using 
EBITDA to calculate ROA increases its value from 0.016 to 0.051. 
The corporate governance literature widely uses annual stock price returns to measure 
performance. Thus for their CRSP sample (more than 11,000 observations) Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) cite a yearly stock price return of 0.171, and Duchin et al. (2010), using a 
CRSP sample with more than 15,000 firm-year observations, report a return of 0.145. Both 
Fahlenbrach (2009) and Li and Srinivasan (2011) analyze the difference in stock market 
returns between founder and non-founder firms, Fahlenbrach (2009) citing a yearly stock 
return of 0.132 for his S&P 500 sample of US founder-firms, whereas non-founder firms 
yield a return of only 0.086. For their Execucomp sample (more than 11,000 firm-year 
observations) Li and Srinivasan (2011) report an annual stock price return of 0.160 for non-
founder firms and 0.200 for firms with founder-CEOs.  
There is also an increasing body of literature on the risk and return characteristics of LPE. 
For instance Bilo et al. (2005) investigate the risk and return characteristics of 122 LPEs 
from 1986 to 2002 and report (depending on portfolio strategy and time period) annual 
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portfolio returns of between -0.584 and 0.054. Bergmann et al. (2009) record annual returns 
of between -0.560 and 0.345 for LPX50
101
 firms, depending on the time period, with  the 
highest returns in 2004 and 2007. They call this period the buyout boom.  
My own sample shows a mean yearly return of 0.022 with a standard deviation of 0.385. 
The lowest and highest values are -0.959 and 3.085, which indicates a large spread between 
individual returns.  
The following dataset investigates the characteristics of LPE firms from 1998 to 2012. This 
time period includes the financial crisis, which had a significant impact on the whole 
economy and especially on the financial industry. A report published by the US Treasury 
Department in April 2012 estimated that the financial crisis had destroyed $19.2 trillion of 
household wealth, and the Washington Post reported that private equity firms had to write 
down acquisitions during the financial crisis, with Blackstone announcing its intention to 
sell several portfolio companies in the wake of one of the worst recessions in history, whose 
impact on the private equity industry was evidently significant. Investigating the risk and 
return characteristics of LPEs, Bergmann et al. (2009) report annual stock returns of -0.56 
for LPEs during the financial crisis. To investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the 
performance of my own sample firms, I have analyzed the mean differences between the 
periods before, during and after the financial crisis.  
Table 4.2 shows the mean difference for the entire sample period and the period before the 
financial crisis. The entire sample shows a Tobin’s Q of 1.21 whereas the Tobin’s Q for the 
sub-sample before the financial crisis is 1.43. Tobin’s Q before the crisis is 0.23 higher than 
for the sample period as a whole.   
Table 4.2 also shows the difference in Tobin’s Q for the entire sample and the sub-sample 
during the financial crisis (the sub-sample for the financial crisis covers the fiscal years 2008 
and 2009). The approach seeks to cover the impact of the financial crisis on the performance 
of LPE firms. The findings in Table 3 show that the mean difference is 0.27, which indicates 
that Tobin’s Q during the financial crisis is 0.27 smaller than over the entire sample period ‒ 
a significant variance of c. 1%. The findings for the financial crisis sub-sample also show 
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significant variance for ROA, which decreases from 0.02 for the entire sample to -0.03 
during the financial crisis. This finding is again significant on the 1% level.  
 
Table 4.2: Performance of LPE firms before, during and after the financial crisis 
Performance differences in the financial crisis 
    1998-2012 
      Entire Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
   Tobin's Q 607 1.21 1.22 
   ROA 554 0.02 0.17 
   ROA (EBITDA) 506 0.05 0.47 
   ROA (EBIT) 166 0.02 0.61 
   
       Sub-sample 1998-2007 
      Before the financial crisis Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. t-value 
 Tobin's Q 294 1.43 1.58 -0.23 -2.17 ** 
ROA 265 0.03 0.19 -0.02 -1.26 
 ROA (EBITDA) 244 0.07 0.65 -0.02 -0.48 
 ROA (EBIT) 78 0.05 0.88 -0.02 -0.23 
 
       Sub-sample 2008-2009 
      Financial crisis Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. t-value 
 Tobin's Q 120 0.94 0.58 0.27 3.75 *** 
ROA 115 -0.03 0.17 0.05 2.60 *** 
ROA (EBITDA) 105 0.01 0.29 0.04 1.10 
 ROA (EBIT) 32 0.02 0.27 0.00 -0.03 
 
       Sub-sample 2010-2012 
      After the crisis Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean diff. t-value 
 Tobin's Q 193 1.03 0.73 0.18 2.46 *** 
ROA 174 0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.28 
 ROA (EBITDA) 157 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.38 
 ROA (EBIT) 56 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.75 
  
 
Finally, Table 4.2 again reports clear findings on Tobin’s Q after the financial crisis. The 
mean Tobin’s Q decreases from 1.21 for the entire sample period to 1.03 after the financial 
crisis. This finding is again significant on the 1% level. Taking all these data together, it may 
be concluded that there is a significant relation between the financial crisis and the 
performance of LPE firms.  
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The corporate governance literature on family firms and founder-CEOs shows that family 
blockholdings and founder-managers outperform their benchmark. Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), Andres (2008), Fahlenbrach (2009), and Adams et al. (2009) all find significant 
results on founder performance. According to Forbes Magazine, Stephen Schwarzman, the 
co-founder of Blackstone, is one of the most successful self-made billionaires in the private 
equity industry. Blackstone was founded in 1985 with only $400,000 assets on the balance 
sheet. Today the company has $290 billion assets under management. This incredible 
success story certainly shows that founders in the private equity industry possess value-
creating skills.  
Table 4.3 shows the performance of LPE firms with and without founder-managers. Overall 
the table indicates that founder-managers increase the market performance of LPE firms. 
Compared to non-founder-managed LPE firms, these demonstrate a 0.43 higher Tobin’s Q if 
a founder is on the board. However, the table also shows that ROA is higher for non-
founder-managed LPE firms than for those where the founder is on the board. The findings 
on founder-CEOs again show that founder-CEOs increase Tobin’s Q by 0.32, but decrease 
ROA by at least 0.05 compared to LPE firms with non-founder-CEOs. However, Tobin’s Q 
is not significant here. Finally, founder-chairpersons also have a positive impact on Tobin’s 
Q and a negative impact on the ROA. Table 4 shows that they have the highest positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q by 0.47. Again there is a negative impact on ROA, however this is less 
than in the case of founder-CEOs. Taking all these findings together, there is mixed 
evidence on the impact of founders on the performance of LPE firms. 
In Chapter 5 I will use founder proxies in multivariate analyses to show the impact of 
founders on the performance of LPE firms. In particular, the multivariate analyses will 
control for the proxies ‘founder on the board’, ‘founder CEO’ and ‘founder chairperson’.  
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Table 4.3: Performance of founder and non-founder firms  
Performance of founder and non-founder firms 
     Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   Non-founder LPEs 
       Tobin's Q 445 1.09 0.64 0.26 8.43 
   ROA 406 0.02 0.16 -1.01 0.82 
   ROA(EBITDA) 360 0.07 0.55 -1.04 9.65 
   ROA(EBIT) 119 0.07 0.71 -0.40 7.46 
   Founder on board 493 0 0 0 0 
   Founder-CEO 493 0 0 0 0 
   Founder chairperson 493 0 0 0 0 
   
         Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Diff. in mean t-value 
 LPEs with founder on the board 
      Tobin's Q 162 1.52 2.08 0.38 22.16 -0.43 -2.56 ** 
ROA 148 -0.01 0.20 -1.17 0.59 0.03 1.69 * 
ROA(EBITDA) 146 0.00 0.20 -1.05 0.43 0.07 2.01 ** 
ROA(EBIT) 47 -0.10 0.18 -1.05 0.12 0.17 2.43 ** 
Founder on board 168 1 0 1 1 
   Founder-CEO 168 0.65 0.48 0 1 
   Founder chairperson 168 0.82 0.38 0 1 
   
         LPEs with founder-CEO 
       Tobin's Q 105 1.41 2.14 0.38 22.16 -0.32 -1.51 
 ROA 95 -0.02 0.20 -1.17 0.43 0.05 2.20 ** 
ROA(EBITDA) 94 -0.02 0.17 -0.57 0.23 0.09 2.79 *** 
ROA(EBIT) 35 -0.09 0.11 -0.58 0.00 0.16 2.40 ** 
Founder on board 110 1 0 1 1 
   Founder-CEO 110 1 0 1 1 
   Founder chairperson 110 0.84 0.37 0 1 
   
         LPEs with founder-
chairperson 
       Tobin's Q 136 1.57 2.24 0.38 22.16 -0.47 -2.43 ** 
ROA 126 -0.01 0.21 -1.17 0.59 0.03 1.62 
 ROA(EBITDA) 122 0.01 0.19 -1.05 0.43 0.06 1.73 * 
ROA(EBIT) 41 -0.11 0.20 -1.05 0.12 0.18 2.45 ** 
Founder on board 138 1 0 1 1 
   Founder-CEO 138 0.67 0.47 0 1 
   Founder chairperson 138 1 0 1 1 
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Table 4.4: Performance characteristic of industrial, family and LPE firms  
Author Year Sample Sub-samples Findings 
Tobin's Q 
    Industrial firms 
    Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
2.072 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
1.790 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 
Execucomp 
 
1.952 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
1.930 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
2.039 
Banks 
    Pathan and Faff 2013 Top 300 US banks 
 
1.070 
Family & founder firms 
   
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Full sample 1.410 
Family firms 1.590 
Non-family firms 1.320 
Andres
d)
 2008 German stock market 
Family firms 2.730 
Non-family firms 2.460 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 1.760 
Founder Firms 2.500 
Adams et al. 2009 Fortune500 firms 
Entire sample 2.040 
Founder-CEO firms 2.580 
non-founder-CEO firms 1.940 
 
    ROA 
a)
 
    Industrial firms 
    Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.138 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
0.138 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 
Execucomp 
 
0.140 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.126 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
0.027 
Banks 
    Pathan and Faff 2013 Top 300 US banks 
 
0.047 
Family & founder firms 
   
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Full sample 0.052 
Family firms 0.061 
Non-family firms 0.047 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 0.034 
Founder Firms 0.037 
Adams et al. 2009 Fortune500 firms Entire sample 5.520 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
full sample 0.090 
Non-founder firms 0.090 
founder director firms 0.090 
founder CEO firms 0.080 
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    Stock returns 
b)
 
    Industrial firms 
    Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.171 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.145 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 0.086 
Founder Firms 0.132 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
full sample 0.160 
Non-founder firms 0.160 
founder director firms 0.170 
founder CEO firms 0.200 
LPEs 
    Bilo et al. 2005 122 LPE instruments LPE instruments [-0.584 / +0.054] 
Bergmann et al. 2009 122 globally LPE firms LPE companies [-0.560 / +0.345] 
Lahr and Kaserer 2010 97 LPE funds LPEs funds 0.005
e)
 
     Note: a) ROA calculated with net income, b) Annual stock returns, c) In million USD, d) In million EUR, and e) Excess 
returns.  
 
 
 
4.2.2. Board characteristics   
 
Size and outside directors  
One of the first publications on the governance of the board of directors was the analysis by 
Yermack (1996). For his paper Yermack used a sample with the 500 largest US corporations 
and established that mean board size was 12.25 and fraction of outside directors 54%. Coles 
et al. (2008) used an Execucomp dataset for their investigation, which allowed them to 
determine the board and CEO characteristics of US industrial firms. They record mean board 
size as 10.4, mean number of outside directors as 8.1, and fraction of outsider directors as 
78%. In contrast, Bonne et al. (2007) report board size as 6.21 during IPO, increasing to 
7.52 ten years after IPO, and fraction of outside directors as 62% during IPO, increasing to 
74% ten years after IPO. Bonne et al. (2007) employ a CRSP sample with US industrial 
firms that went public from 1988 to 1991. Using a sample including all the firms listed on 
the Disclosure, CRSP, and Compustat databases, Linck et al. (2008) report that small firms 
have an average board size of 5.9, medium firms of 7.2, and large firms of 10.0. On the 
fraction of outsiders the authors find that small firms have 58.2%, medium firms 65.7%, and 
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large firms 73.3%. Using a sample with IRRC and CRSP data, Duchin et al. (2010) report an 
average board size of 9.55 and a fraction of independent directors of 60%. Finally, for a 
sample comprising the top 300 US banks, Pathan and Faff (2013) record a mean board size 
of 12.68 and a mean fraction of outside directors of 85%.
102
  
The literature on family firms provides few findings on the structure of the board of 
directors. For instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) determine the fraction of outside 
directors in family firms as 43.59% whereas the fraction of outside directors in non-family 
firms is 61.16% for S&P 500 firms. Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007) quote only 12.21% outside 
directors for German family firms.
103
 Investigating the board structure of small and medium 
firms in Denmark, Bennedsen et al. (2006) report a mean board size of 3.67 for small and 
medium family firms, compared with 3.69 for non-family firms. Goergen et al. (2015) 
investigate the impact of age difference between chairperson and CEO for the largest 
German stock market listed companies. For a sample including firms listed on DAX, 
MDAX and SDAX they find that family status has a positive effect on the age difference 
between chairperson and CEO, which they explain in terms of the succession structure and 
founder chairman status in family firms.  
The sample of this dissertation reveals a mean board size of 7.46 for LPE firms, which is 
comparable with the findings of Bonne et al. (2007) for firms that have been on the stock 
market for ten years. Here the mean number of outside directors is 5.52 and the fraction of 
outsiders is 76%, which is again similar to the findings of Bonne et al. (2007). Comparing 
this fraction for LPE firms with the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003) of 43.59% for 
family firms listed on the S&P 500, it would seem that LPE firms have a significantly larger 
fraction of outside directors.  
Bonne et al. (2007) argue that the primary function of the board of directors is monitoring, 
and that board size and composition is determined by the firm’s business and information 
environment. Adams et al. (2008) point out that the board provides monitoring, but also 
advice. Larcker and Tayan (2011) discuss the costs and benefits of board size: large boards 
                                                 
102
 Pathan and Faff start their analysis with the top 300 publicly traded US banks. For comparability reasons 
the authors exclude 88 banks, which reduces their sample size to 212 publicly traded bank holdings with 2640 
firm-year observations.   
103
 For their analysis Jaskiewicz and Klein (2007) use a random sample with all listed companies in Germany. 
In particular, the authors apply a sample with firms which had sales of more than €1 million in 2000.  
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have wider competencies and can therefore fulfill their monitoring and advice functions on a 
higher level than small boards; on the other hand, they are more costly than small boards, 
have coordination and decision-making problems, and suffer from responsibility and risk 
aversion. Taking these arguments together, there might be a tradeoff between the costs and 
benefits of large boards, and scholars such as Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Larcker and 
Tayan (2011) conclude, in fact, that there is an optimal board size.  
In light of these findings and the theoretical framework of the board of directors, it seems 
that private equity firms have a similar structure in board size and fraction of outside 
directors as industrial firms after ten years listing, as reported by Bonne et al. (2007).  
 
Meetings and committees 
On the number of board meetings and board committees, Vafeas (1999) investigates a 
sample with the 300 largest US firms listed in Forbes and finds that the mean number of 
board meetings is 7.45 and the mean number of board committees is 4.29. Adams (2003) 
reports similar findings for her sample based on Fortune 500 companies. She reports that the 
average number of board meetings is 7.6 and the average number of board committees 4.4. 
For their sample with S&P 500 firms, Hayes et al. (2004) establish the mean number of 
board meetings as 7.26 and of board committees as 4.45. Finally, for their Execucomp 
sample Brick and Chidambaran (2010) report the mean number board meetings as 7.26. On 
the meeting and committee structure of family and non-family firms, Ali et al. (2007) report, 
for their S&P 500 sample, that family firms disclose less information on their meetings and 
committees actions than non-family firms.  
The private equity sample of the present dissertation has a mean number of board meetings 
of 9.17, which is relatively high compared with the reported findings in the corporate 
governance literature. This finding might suggest that the boards of LPE firms require more 
advice, as argued above. However, LPE firms have on average 2.5 board committees, which 
is a relatively small figure compared with the findings of Vafeas (1999), Adams (2003) and 
Hayes et al. (2004). In contrast to board meetings, board committees seem not to have an 
important function in private equity companies.  
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There is anecdotal evidence that during the financial crisis of 2008 executives of Lehman 
Brothers negotiated with different institutions to rescue the bank from Chapter 11. The 
Guardian reports negotiations with Barclays Bank, the Bank of America and the Federal 
Reserve Bank, and adds that Richard Fuld, Lehman’s former CEO, also contacted the Oval 
Office to persuade the President to bail out the bank. This suggests that the board of a 
financial firm will meet frequently to bring their firm to a safe haven during a financial 
crisis. Moreover, private equity firms are engaged in the real estate business, and the 
Financial Times reports that Blackstone sold a highly leveraged business tower for $36 bn. a 
few months before the crisis started. This anecdotal evidence suggests that private equity 
firms, as part of the financial industry, are especially active during a financial crisis.  
 
Table 4.5: Board committees and board meetings from 2005-2012 
Fiscal Year # of firm obs. # board comm. Mean Standard Div. Mean diff. t-value 
 2005 40 88 2.200 1.601 0.111 1.146 
 2006 49 100 2.041 1.613 -0.049 -0.519 
 2007 64 117 1.828 1.694 -0.261 -2.839 *** 
2008 67 134 2.000 1.474 -0.089 -1.068 
 2009 68 137 2.015 1.438 -0.075 -0.904 
 2010 69 141 2.043 1.379 -0.046 -0.567 
 2011 70 151 2.157 1.356 0.068 0.851 
 2012 72 175 2.431 1.346 0.341 4.384 *** 
Entire sample 62.375 130.375 2.089 1.476 
   
        Fiscal Year # of firm obs. # board meetings Mean Standard Div. Mean diff. t-value 
 2005 40 270 6.750 7.197 0.444 0.552 
 2006 49 329 6.714 7.768 0.409 0.513 
 2007 64 373 5.828 5.188 -0.477 -0.697 
 2008 67 455 6.791 5.682 0.485 0.710 
 2009 68 441 6.485 5.525 0.180 0.264 
 2010 69 427 6.188 4.540 -0.117 -0.177 
 2011 70 473 6.757 6.669 0.452 0.639 
 2012 72 355 4.931 4.154 -1.375 -2.079 ** 
Entire sample 62.375 390.375 6.306 5.851 
    
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2 illustrate the number of board committees and board meetings in 
the private equity industry before, during and after the financial crisis. Board committees 
show a significant decrease in 2007, with a mean of 2.089 for the period 2005 to 2012, 
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decreasing to 1.828 in 2007, which is significant on the 1% level. In 2012 the number 
increased to 2.431, which is again highly significant.  
 
Figure 4.2: Number of board committees and meetings from 2005 to 2012  
 
 
Table 4.5 also shows that the number of board meetings, like the number of board 
committees, decreased in 2007. That the number of board meetings increased in 2008 and 
2009 indicates that private equity boards reacted to the financial crisis. The mean number of 
board meetings increased in 2008 to 6.791, its highest level during the whole period. Table 
4.5 and Figure 4.2 also show that the number of board meetings decreased in 2009 and 2010, 
increased again in 2011, before significantly decreasing once more in 2012.   
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Table 4.6: Overview of the literature on board size, fraction of outside directors, board meetings and 
board committees 
Authors Year Sample Sub-sample Findings 
Board size 
    Industrial firms 
    Yermack 1996 500 largest public US corporations 
 
12.250 
Vafeas 1999 300 largest firms listed in Forbes 
 
11.770 
Adams 2003 Fortune500 firms 
 
11.301 
Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
11.680 
Bonne et al. 2007 
CRSP US industrial firms went  
public from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 6.210 
t10 7.520 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
10.400 
Linck et al. 2008 
All firms from Disclosure database,  
CRSP and Compustat 
Total sample 7.500 
Small firms 5.900 
Medium firms 7.200 
Large firms 10.000 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 Execucomp 
 
9.297 
Duchin et al. 2010 IRRC & CRSP 
 
9.550 
Banks 
    Pathan and Faff 2013 Top 300 US banks 
 
12.680 
Family firms 
    
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
Full sample 9.660 
Non-founder firms 9.880 
Founder director firms 8.820 
Founder CEO firms 8.220 
     Fraction of outside directors 
  Industry firms 
    Yermack 1996 500 largest public US corporations 
 
0.540 
Vafeas  1999 300 largest firms listed in Forbes 
 
0.527 
Bonne et al. 
2007 CRSP US industry firms went 
public  
from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 0.620 
 
t10 0.740 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.637 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
0.780 
Linck et al. 2008 
All firms from Disclosure database,  
CRSP and Compustat 
Total sample 0.343 
Small firms 0.418 
Medium firms 0.343 
Large firms 0.267 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 Execucomp 
 
0.678 
Banks 
    Pathan and Faff 2013 Top 300 US banks 
 
0.853 
Family firms 
    
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Full sample 0.554 
Family firms 0.436 
Non-family firms 0.612 
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Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
Full sample 0.640 
Non-founder firms 0.670 
Founder director firms 0.530 
Founder CEO firms 0.580 
     Number of board committees 
  Vafeas 1999 300 largest firms listed in Forbes 
 
4.290 
Adams 2003 Fortune500 firms 
 
4.369 
Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
4.370 
     Number of board meetings 
   Vafeas 1999 300 largest firms listed in Forbes 
 
7.450 
Adams 2003 Fortune500 firms 
 
7.574 
Hayes et al. 2004 S&P500 firms 
 
7.260 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 Execucomp 
 
7.265 
 
 
 
Founder on board of directors 
The corporate governance literature on family ownership and founder management 
investigates mostly how founder families and founders affect economic performance. For 
instance, Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the impact of founding families on the 
performance of companies listed on the S&P 500. They establish that 14.54% of family 
firms are managed by founder CEOs and 30.43% by descendant CEOs. A similar study by 
Andres (2008) investigates the impact of founding families on the German stock market, 
reporting for a sample with 275 firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange that 18.37% of 
family firms are managed by founder CEOs and 19.65% by descendant CEOs.  
Besides the impact of founding families, there are studies showing the impact of founder-
CEOs on firm performance. For instance, Jayaraman et al. (2000) quote an overall sample 
from Forbes with the 800 most highly paid executives in the US; this includes 5.88% firms 
managed by their founders.
104
 Two other studies on the impact of founder-CEOs show that 
the%age of founder-CEOs is between 10 and 13. Fahlenbrach (2009) records 10.6% of S&P 
                                                 
104
 In contrast to the studies of Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Andres (2008) on 
the impact of family firms, more recent studies like those of Fahlenbrach (2009) or Li and Srinivasan (2011) 
only analyze the impact of founder-CEOs. These studies do not differentiate between family and non-family 
firms.  
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500 firms, and Adams et al. (2009) record 13% of Fortune 500 firms, as managed by 
founder-CEOs. Finally, using a sample derived from Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP, Li 
and Srinivasan (2011) analyze the role of founders on the board of directors and conclude 
that 13% of CEOs, as well as 12% of board members, are founders.  
In the present sample of LPE firms I find that 25% of board members, 21% of chairpersons 
and 17% of CEOs are founders. Compared to the figures quoted in the general founder-CEO 
literature, the incidence of founders on the board of directors of LPE firms is relatively high. 
For instance, Fahlenbrach (2009) and Adams et al. (2009) report 10.6‒13% founder-CEOs 
in industrial firms, which is relatively low compared to 17% founder-CEOs in private equity 
firms. In contrast, the family ownership literature reports 18.37% founder-CEOs in family 
firms, which is comparable with my findings. However, I investigate LPE firms in general 
and do not differentiate between family-owned and non-family-owned LPE firms. For a 
meaningful comparison, the findings of the present sample should be compared with those 
of Fahlenbrach (2009), Adams et al. (2009), and Li and Srinivasan (2011). Together with the 
present sample on LPE firms, these findings suggest an overall relatively high number of 
founders and founder-CEOs on the boards of private equity firms. 
 
Ownership in the board of directors  
Since the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976), several papers have investigated the 
impact of managerial ownership on company performance. One of the first publications on 
ownership structure is the paper of Morck et al. (1988), which investigated the ownership 
structure of Fortune 500 firms and established that mean board ownership is 10.6%. Short 
and Keasey (1999) investigated the managerial ownership for all UK firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 1988 to 1992 and determined a mean board ownership 
of 13.34%. According to Adams et al. (2009), mean CEO ownership in Fortune 500 firms 
stands at 2%. Applying a sample based on the IRRC and CRSP database, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2013) quote a mean director ownership of 13.70% and CEO ownership of 1.78%. With a 
sample based on Execucomp, Kim and Lu (2011) find CEO ownership of 2.9‒3.2% 
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(depending on the approach of their equity stake calculation
105
); in the same sample mean 
ownership of board members is 9.6%.  
The founder literature also reports on the ownership structure of board members and CEOs. 
For S&P 500 firms, for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report a mean ownership of 
1.35% for board officers and directors in family firms, whereas officers and directors in non-
family firms have 1.45% ownership.
106
 Examining differences in ownership structure 
between founder-CEOs and non-founder-CEOs for S&P 500 firms, Fahlenbrach (2009) 
reports that founder-CEOs own on average 11.1% equity stakes, whereas non-founder-CEOs 
hold only 2.1% equity stakes.  
The sample of the present dissertation indicates that in general board ownership is 6.5%, 
chairperson ownership is 2.7% and CEO ownership is 3.6% for LPE firms. Ownership in 
founder-managed LPE firms is between 3.9 and 10.0%. Founder chairpersons have a mean 
ownership of 3.9%, founder-CEOs 4.5% and founders on the board 10.0%.
107
  
These figures are relatively small compared to the findings of Short and Keasey (1999) for 
all UK firms listed on the LSE, as well as of Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Kim and Lu 
(2011) for US firms.
108
 CEO ownership in LPE firms is comparable with the findings of 
Kim and Lu (2011), who determine a CEO ownership of 3.2% for US industrial firms. 
However, founder-CEO ownership in LPE firms is only 4.5%, which is again smaller than 
the 11.1% founder-CEOs reported by Fahlenbrach (2009) for S&P 500 firms. Comparing 
the managerial ownership structure of industrial and family firms with private equity firms 
might fall short. Industrial and family firms tend to incentivize their board members with 
equity stakes, as reported by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Fahlenbrach (2009). In contrast, 
the private equity industry triggers the incentive mechanism with a compensation structure 
for their managers in the private equity funds. For instance, general partners receive an 
                                                 
105
 Kim and Lu (2011) calculate CEO ownership with and without stock options: ownership increases from 
2.8% without stock options to 3.2% with stock options.  
106
 Additionally to the ownership in family and nonfamily firms, Anderson and Reeb (2003) report an average 
officers and directors ownership of 1.42% for their entire sample. 
107
 The number of observations is limited and is between 24 and 108.  
108 
Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Kim and Lu (2011) both use samples for US industrial firms. Bhagat and 
Bolton (2013) use a sample based on IRRC and CRSP. The analysis of Kim and Lu (2011) is based on a 
sample from Execucomp.  
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annual management fee of approximately 2% of the assets under management and a carry 
fee of approximately 20% after a declared hurdle rate has been achieved.  
 
Table 4.7: literature overview on founder CEOs, ownership and duality  
Authors Year Sample Sub-sample Founder CEO 
Founder CEO 
    Industrial firms 
    
Bonne et al. 2007 
CRSP US industrial firms went  
public from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 0.430 
t10 0.210 
Family firms 
    
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Family firms 0.145 
Non-family firms 0 
Andres 2008 
All firms listed on Frankfurt  
Stock Exchange 
Family firms 0.184 
Non-family firms 0 
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Founder Firms 0 
Other firms 0.102 
Adams et al. 2009 Fortune500 firms Entire sample 0.130 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP Full sample 0.130 
     Board ownership 
    Industrial firms 
    
Bonne et al. 
2007 CRSP US industrial firms went  
public from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 0.520 
 
t10 0.250 
Linck et al. 2008 
All firms from Disclosure 
database,  
CRSP and Compustat Total sample 0.195 
Family firms 
    
Anderson and Reeb 2003 S&P500 firms 
Full sample 0.014 
Family firms 0.014 
Non-family firms 0.015 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP Full sample 0.096 
     CEO ownership 
    Industrial firms 
    
Bonne et al. 
2007 CRSP US industrial firms went  
public from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 0.160 
 
t10 0.070 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.029 
Coles et al. 2008 Execucomp 
 
0.019 
Linck et al. 2008 
All firms from Disclosure 
database,  
CRSP and Compustat Total sample 0.061 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
0.032 
Family firms 
    
Fahlenbrach 2009 S&P500 firms 
Other firms 0.021 
Founder Firms 0.111 
Li and Srinivasan 2011 Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP 
Full sample 0.026 
Non-founder firms 0.018 
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Founder director firms 0.028 
Founder CEO firms 0.070 
     Duality 
    Industrial firms 
    
Bonne et al. 2007 
CRSP US industrial firms went  
public from 1988 to 1992 
IPO 0.600 
t10 0.600 
Bhagat and Bolton 2008 IRRC & CRSP 
 
0.776 
Linck et al. 2008 
All firms from Disclosure 
database,  
CRSP and Compustat 
Total sample 0.583 
Small firms 0.514 
Medium firms 0.564 
Large firms 0.710 
Brick and 
Chidambaran 2010 Execucomp 
 
0.653 
Kim and Lu 2011 Execucomp 
 
0.634 
 
 
Summary: Chapter 4 has described the dissertation’s unique panel data set covering 71 LPE 
firms with over 600 firm-year observations. Moreover, sub-chapter 4.1 has presented first 
descriptive findings on the board data of LPE firms. Finally, sub-chapter 4.2 has compared 
the findings on the board and firm characteristics of industrial, family, and LPE firms.  
Chapter 5 will present the methodology and findings of the multivariate analysis used to 
investigate the link between LPE performance and the board of directors in LPE firms. For 
this purpose, sub-chapter 5.1 will discuss the empirical methods that can be applied in order 
to estimate panel data sets. Sub-chapter 5.2 will then present the empirical findings on LPE 
performance and the board of directors in LPE firms.  
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5. Multivariate analysis 
 
“It is not knowledge, but the act of learning, not possession but the act of getting there, 
which grants the greatest enjoyment. [Wahrlich es ist nicht das Wissen, sondern das Lernen, 
nicht das Besitzen sondern das Erwerben, nicht das Da-Seyn, sondern das Hinkommen, was 
den grössten Genuss gewährt.]” 
Carl Friedrich Gauss 
 
This chapter will present the methodology and findings of the multivariate analysis used to 
investigate the link between LPE performance and the board of directors of LPE firms.  
First, I will describe the empirical methods which can be applied in order to estimate panel 
data sets. In particular, sub-chapter 5.1 presents the basic assumptions of the ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimate method that is the foundation of panel data analysis, before going on 
to discuss the fixed effects and random effects models. These models represent the state of 
the art in panel data set estimation as presented in corporate governance literature. A further 
test presented here is the Hausman test, which provides an efficient and consistent 
econometrics basis for estimating panel data sets, inasmuch as it supports choice between 
the fixed effects and random effects models. Sub-chapter 5.1 thus provides the foundations 
for the multivariate analysis that follows.   
Sub-chapter 5.2 presents the empirical findings of my research on the estimates with fixed 
effects and random effects models. In this sub-chapter I will estimate my advice, founder 
and ownership proxies for corporate performance. It should be noted that this thesis applies 
the performance measure Tobin’s Q and ROA. In order to answer my hypotheses on LPE 
firms, I will estimate my explanatory variables for advice, founder status and managerial 
ownership in terms of corporate performance.  
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5.1. Methodology  
 
This chapter first introduces the assumptions for a data set with random data over time. Time 
series data can be pooled data in different time periods or panel data sets with observations 
over a certain time period (Baum 2006: 45-46). The chapter will then discuss the Gauss-
Markov theorems that apply in general to ordinary least square (OLS) regression models and 
panel data analysis (Wooldridge 2009: 349). This will be followed by a presentation of the 
fixed and random effects models and their application to panel data sets. The chapter will 
close with the Hausman test, which allows researchers to decide if the fixed effects or the 
random effects model is more efficient for estimating their panel data.  
 
Sub-chapter 5.1 first discusses the differences between pooled cross-section and panel data. 
A specific issue for time series data is the potential problem of fixed effects. The 
econometric literature provides two common methods for dealing with fixed effects which 
will be discussed here: the first differences and the fixed effects models. The sub-chapter 
will also show the differences between the fixed effects and random effects models and their 
application to panel data sets. The section will close with the Hausman test, which provides 
a way of choosing between the fixed effects and random effects models based on the 
explanatory variables in their panel data sets.   
 
 
5.1.1. Regression analysis with time series data  
 
In general, panel data sets are characterized by random data over a certain time period 
(Wooldridge 2009: 342). For example, panel data sets can investigate the impact of the 
interest rates of the European Central Bank over the last 10 years on house prices in Europe 
over the same time period. In doing so, the model investigates the impact of an independent 
variable on a dependent variable (Baum 2006: 220). This statistic model can be defined as:  
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 0 1t t ty ß ß z u          (5.1) 
 1,2,...,t n        
 
The statistic model above postulates that a change in z  has an impact on y  in period t . 
Usually, a regression model includes several explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009: 
342).
109
 For instance, equation 5.2 explains the impact of board size, fraction of outside 
directors, and founder-CEO on firm performance tQ .  
 
 0 1 2 3t t t t tQ boardsize fractionOD founderCEO u         (5.2) 
 
The model can also use lagged time variables to show that an independent variable in 1t   
has an impact on ty  (Patterson 2000: 42-45). For example, lagged performance variables 
might explain why the CEO is replaced by a new CEO. The econometrics literature refers to 
lagged relationships in terms of the finite distributed lag model as described in equation 5.3.  
 
0 0 1 1 2 2t t t t tgfr pe pe pe u              (5.3) 
 
For the regression analysis with time series data the econometrics literature uses the 
mechanics and inferences of the ordinary least squared (OLS) regression model (Wooldridge 
2009: 345). The following paragraphs will present the Gauss-Markov theorem, which 
defines the assumptions for the OLS regression model (Wooldridge 2009: 349). For a better 
understanding of time series analysis it is necessary to understand the theorem of 
unbiasedness of OLS. This theoretical concept contains three assumptions that will be 
discussed in the following paragraph.  
 
The first assumption of the unbiasedness of OLS postulates that the time series process 
follows a stochastic model with linear parameters. Under this assumption the stochastic 
process and the linear model are defined as follows: 
                                                 
109
 The econometric literature also uses the term explanatory or independent variable.  
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 0 1 1 ...t t k tk ty x x u             (5.4) 
 1 2{( , ,..., , ) : 1,2,..., }t t tk tx x x y t n  
 { : 1,2,..., }tu t n     
 
Second, the unbiasedness of OLS assumes that no independent variable is constant or a 
perfect linear combination of other explanatory variables. This assumption is also called ‘no 
perfect collinearity’ in the econometrics literature.  
Finally, the unbiasedness of OLS assumes the zero conditional mean. This last assumption 
for the unbiasedness of OLS postulates that the expected value of the error term tu  given 
any explanatory variable X  for all periods is equal to zero (Baltagi 2002: 159).  
 
( ) 0tE u X          (5.5) 
1,2,...,t n  
1( ,..., ) ( ) 0t t tk t tE u x x E u x        (5.6) 
 
On the other hand, if the expected value of tu  under the condition of any explanatory 
variable over all time is not equal to zero, this means that the explanatory variables are 
biased (Ruud 2000: 189). In this case the estimated parameter *  would be biased by the 
population parameter
P . The zero conditional mean assumption can be also described by 
the covariance between iu and ix . In this case the covariance between iu  and ix  has to be 
equal to zero, which means that there is no significant relationship between these two 
variables. The assumption on the covariance between iu  and ix  will be used for the 
Hausman test to show if the fixed effects or the random effects model is more efficient to 
estimate certain panel data sets (Brooks 2010: 500).  
 
The assumption of homoskedasticity means that the variance of the error term tu  given the 
explanatory variables tx  is equal to 
2 . In other words, the variance of tu  given tx  must be 
constant over time. Given this assumption, the errors of the chosen model are equal over 
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time. If the given assumption that the variance of tu  given tx   is not equal to 
2 , then the 
conclusion is that the chosen model is heteroskedastic. As consequence, the error term of the 
chosen model will increase over time (Brooks 2010: 132-133):  
 
2( ) ( )t tVar u X Var u         (5.7) 
1,2,...,t n  
 
In the case of heteroskedasticity there are other estimators which have a lower sampling 
variance. Obviously, estimators with lower sampling variance increase the efficiency of the 
model (Wooldridge 2009: 349).  
The final assumption for the Gauss-Markov theorem is that there is no serial correlation 
among the error terms. The econometric literature uses the term serial correlation or 
autocorrelation to describe the correlation among error terms. In this context the literature 
uses tu  and su  to label different error terms in time, and assumes that these errors are 
uncorrelated in the different time periods (Wooldridge 2009: 350). Therefore, the final 
Gauss-Markov theorem is defined as: 
 
 ( , ) 0t sCorr u u X         (5.8) 
for all t s . 
In general, time series data can increase or decrease over time. However, the common 
tendency of economic data is that many economic time series increase over time. Two 
widespread examples for growing time series data in the economic literature is the increase 
in GDP or the market capitalization of firms over the last six decades. In using a sample with 
time series data to draw economic conclusions, it is necessary to understand that the time 
series can underlie an increasing
110
 tendency over time, which is also known as a time trend 
in the econometric literature. Therefore, the econometric model has to recognize that time 
trends impact the outcome of regression estimates (Wooldridge 2009: 360).  
A statistical model that captures the time trend can be defined as follows: 
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 As already mentioned above, most time series data increase over time, however the tendency is also 
possible in the opposite direction.  
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 0 1t ty t e            (5.9) 
 1,2,...,t n  
 
In the equation above, ty  is the dependent variable in period and t  and 0 are the constant 
terms. The parameter te  is the error term in period t , where te  is an independent, identically 
distributed sequence with the expected value of zero and variance of 
2  (Patterson 2000: 
225): 
 
( ) 0tE e           (5.10) 
2( )t eVar e          (5.11) 
 
The equation above includes on the right hand side 1  multiplied by t , which represents a 
linear time trend. The parameter t  measures the change in the dependent variable ty  from 
one period to the next (Wooldridge 2009: 361). This causality can be written as: 
 
 1 1t t ty y y            (5.12) 
 
 
The equation above can also be defined as: 
 
 0 1( )tE y t           (5.13) 
 
The equation (5.9) shows that the dependent variable ty  grows over time if 1  is 0 . On 
the other hand, if 1  is 0  than the trend in equation (5.9) is downward.   
 
In some cases economic data are exponentially distributed. For instance, the distribution of 
compound interest is exponentially distributed over time, and characterized by an increasing 
growth over time. In cases of exponential trend the economic literature suggests capturing 
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the exponential trend by modeling the natural logarithm of the series as a linear trend (Baum 
2006: 177). Such a model can be defined as: 
 
 0 1log( )t ty t e           (5.14) 
 1,2,...,t n  
 
 
 
5.1.2. Pooled cross-section and panel data analysis  
 
The following section will discuss econometric models that are state of the art for analyzing 
cross-sectional data across time. Pooled cross-section analysis is a common method in 
econometrics to analyze the difference in population characteristics at different points in 
time. For analyzing pooled cross-section data it is necessary for the data to be characterized 
as independent over time. This assumption means that the sample of a population is random 
at different points in time. For instance, one might observe the wages of a particular 
population in 2005 and the wages of the same population on many occasions in the future, 
for instance in 2012. These samples have an important feature that they consist of 
independently sampled observations. In other words, pooled cross-sectional data from a 
single random sample of a certain population at different points in time might lead to 
observations that are not distributed identically (Wooldridge 2009: 444).  
Generally, pooled cross-sections can be used to evaluate the impact of exogenous shocks 
such as specific events or policy changes. The method then analyzes cross-sectional data sets 
before and after the event. For instance, the literature on the board of directors investigates if 
there is a significant change in board size and composition after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
introduce in 2002 in the US. The outcome of the analysis with pooled cross-sections can 
shed light on economic questions (Wooldridge 2009: 445).  
 
Second, panel data sets provide data on population characteristics over a certain time period. 
Panel data sets obtain data that are distributed both cross-sectionally and across time 
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(Brooks 2010: 487). Longitudinal data for an individual value across time (e.g. wages or 
corporate value) are also called panel data in the econometrics literature. For example, a 
panel data set can observe corporate value over a period of 10 years. In this case the panel 
data set will contain information on corporate value for every single year from year 1 to year 
10. The information on the panel data across time is an important aspect and assumes that 
the observations are not independently distributed across time (Brooks 2010: 488).    
 
 
 
5.1.3. Fixed effects estimation  
 
The fixed effects model uses a transformation to remove unobserved effects. In particular, 
the fixed effects model removes any time constant variable that the model uses to explain 
the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Baum 2006: 221).  
 
In general, the econometrics literature provides two methods to deal with fixed effects. On 
the one hand, the concept of first differences estimates the differences among the 
characteristics of a certain observation (Wooldridge 2009: 458). This can be first differences 
in corporate characteristics at different points of time. The first differences can investigate if 
corporate value increases with an increase in board size. Under this hypothesis the estimate 
would analyze the impact of differences in board size on differences in corporate value. On 
the other hand, the fixed effects transformation can be applied to deal with fixed effects, 
which achieves better results under certain assumptions.  
For the fixed effects estimate, the econometrics literature assumes a simple model with a 
single independent variable over the observed time period i : 
 
 1it it i ity ß x a u          (5.15) 
 1,2,...,t T  
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In the next step the fixed effects transformation uses the average of the equation 5.15 to deal 
with the fixed effect illustrated by ia  (Wooldridge 2009: 481-482). The equation of 5.15 is 
defined as: 
 
 1it it i ity ß x a u          (5.16) 
 
In the fixed effects transformation equation 5.16 will be subtracted from equation 5.15 to 
remove the fixed effects ia  (Brooks 2010: 492). This operation is defined as: 
 
 1( ) ( )it it it it i i it ity y ß x x a a u u            
 
The fixed effects transformation is thereby completed. It is also called a ‘within’ 
transformation. The result of the transformation is that the unobserved effect ia  has 
disappeared (Baum 2006: 221). The fixed effects transformation is defined as 
 
 1it it ity ß x u           (5.17) 
 
In general, the fixed effects transformation is also expandable from a model with a single 
independent variable to a model with more than one independent variable. Equation 5.18 
defines a model with additional independent variables (Wooldridge 2009: 482).  
 
 1 1 2 2 ...it it it k itk i ity ß x ß x ß x a u           (5.18) 
 1,2,...,t T  
 
As described above the fixed effects transformation is obtained by the subtraction of the 
equation 5.18 subtracted by its time average. As a result equation 5.19 defines the fixed 
effects transformation for a model with several independent variables.  
 
 1 1 2 2 ...it it it ity ß x ß x u          (5.19) 
 1,2,...,t T  
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The econometrics literature postulates the exogeneity assumption, which states that the 
independent variables in the regression model are unbiased by idiosyncratic error. In other 
words, the model assumes that the error term itu is uncorrelated with each independent 
variable itx  across all time periods. Therefore, the covariance between the independent 
variables and the error term is equal to zero as defined in equation 5.20 (Wooldridge 2009: 
382).  
 
 ( , ) 0it itCov x u           (5.20) 
 
As a consequence, independent variables which are constant over time for all i will 
disappear through the fixed effects transformation. Therefore, variables such as gender or 
the status of a founder in firms cannot be included in the fixed effects model (Brooks 2010: 
492). Finally, the fixed effects model assumes that the error term itu  is homoscedastic and 
that the error terms are uncorrelated over time (Baltagi 2002: 108).  
The fixed effects model can be applied on balanced and unbalanced panels. A balanced 
panel is defined as a dataset that contains both cross-section and cross-time observations. In 
contrast to unbalanced panels, the number of time periods for the cross-section is equal in 
balanced panels (Baum 2006: 46). For instance, if a panel contains observations on 
corporate characteristics over a certain time period (e.g. ten years) then this panel will 
include all corporate characteristics over ten years. In other words, there is no time lag in a 
balanced panel. In contrast, an unbalanced panel has missing time periods in its cross-
section. There might be data missing in the time period because firms disappeared from the 
market. For instance, in an analysis on the corporate characteristic of US banks from 2005 to 
2015 there will be gaps in the data due the fact that banks merged, were acquired or filed 
chapter 11 after the financial crisis erupted (Brooks 2010: 488).  
Using an unbalanced panel for the fixed effects model is not much more difficult than using 
a balanced panel. The more difficult part is the question why the unbalanced panel has time 
gaps. Taking the example above, the question is why certain banks disappeared from the 
market and others did not. One potential problem is that idiosyncratic error explains why 
specific firms disappeared from the market. In other words, idiosyncratic error is correlated 
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with the independent variables in the regression model. In this case idiosyncratic error 
causes biased estimators (Wooldridge 2009: 456).  
 
 
 
5.1.4. Random effects estimation  
 
The random effects model considers unobserved effects ia  that are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables itx . In particular, the random effects model should be applied if 
heterogeneity only causes serial correlation in the composite error term. As a consequence, 
the random effects model assumes that unobserved effects cause no correlation between the 
composite errors and the independent variables (Brooks 2010: 498). The equation for the 
random effects model is: 
 
 0 1 1 ...it it k itk i ity ß ß x ß x a u           (5.21) 
 
The random effects model defines that the unobserved effect ia  is uncorrelated with each 
independent variable itx . According to this model, therefore, the covariance between itx  and 
ia  is zero (Ruud 2000: 619).  
 
 ( , ) 0it itCov x a          (5.22) 
 1,2,..., ; 1,2,...,t T j k   
 
If the covariance between itx  and ia  does not equal zero, then the fixed effects model or the 
first differences are more appropriate estimators.  
As a consequence the random effects model includes all assumptions which are valid for the 
fixed effects model and adds the assumption that ia  is independent of all independent 
variables in all time periods. Additionally to the fixed effects and random effects models, the 
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pooled OLS regression can be used to estimate panel data. Thus, all three models can help to 
understand the unobserved effects ia  caused entirely or partly by the error term (Wooldridge 
2009: 496).  
 
 
 
5.1.5. Hausman test  
 
The previous section discussed the fixed effects and random effects models. The question 
arises, which of these models should be applied to panel data sets. On the one hand, the 
fixed effects model allows arbitrary correlation between ia  and itx , which the random 
effects model does not allow. For estimation of ceteris paribus effects the fixed effects 
model is a more convincing tool. Finally, the fixed effects model allows panel data to be 
used without controlling for time-constant variables (Baum 2006: 230).  
On the other hand, the random effects model can be applied to panel data sets where the key 
independent variables are constant over time. For instance, investigating the effect of a 
founder on the board of directors, the independent variable that considers the founder effect 
is a binary variable equal to zero if there is no founder on the board and equal to one if there 
is a founder on the board. Obviously, the founder effect estimate would be eliminated by the 
transformation in the fixed effects model. However, the random effects model requires as 
many time-constant control variables as possible among all other independent variables 
(Brooks 2010: 273).  
The Hausman test estimates if fixed effects or random effects estimators are more 
appropriate to estimate a specific panel data set. In general, the assumption for the Hausman 
test is that ( , ) 0it iCov x a  . If the assumption on covariance is satisfied, the fixed effects and 
random effects model will have consistent estimators. However, the random effects model is 
more efficient than the fixed effects model, because the standard error of random effects 
estimators is smaller than that of fixed effects estimators. However, if the covariance 
Multivariate analysis   130 
 
assumption is violated, the fixed effects model will alone be consistent (Wooldridge 2009: 
493).  
Technically, the Hausman test states a null hypothesis: that the covariance between itx  and  
ia  is equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is that the covariance between itx  and  ia  
does not equal zero. As stated above, on the assumption that the covariance between itx  and  
ia  is zero, the fixed effects and random effects model can both be applied for the purposes 
of estimation. But here again, the random effects model is more efficient than the fixed 
effects model (Baum 2006: 230).  
 
 
 
5.2. Empirical findings 
 
This sub-chapter will present the empirical findings on the underlying panel data set of LPE 
firms as introduced in the previous sub-chapter. The purpose of the following estimates is to 
show which explanatory variables best describe the performance of LPE firms. I will start 
with estimates containing all my explanatory variables on corporate performance. I will then 
apply estimation models with only my advice, founder and ownership proxies, to determine 
whether or not theses proxies have a positive or negative impact on corporate performance. 
Finally, this sub-chapter will close with a robustness check on my governance variables in 
sub-chapter 5.2.2.  
The sub-chapter also presents the findings of the fixed effects estimations, then those of the 
random effects estimations, and finally the findings of the Hausman test. I use this order 
because the statistics literature describes estimation procedure with the fixed effects model, 
the random effects model, and the Hausman test in that order.  
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5.2.1. Empirical findings on selected governance variables  
 
Table 5.1 shows the first empirical findings estimated with the fixed effects model using the 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q. I estimate my proxy variables in seven different models to 
show the impact of the proxy variables on the performance of LPE firms and to demonstrate 
the robustness of my findings.   
The finding in model (7) shows that the impact of the advice proxy ‘board meetings’ is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. In other words, board meetings have a positive 
impact on the performance of LPE firms. According to Jensen (1993), board meetings are an 
important advice mechanism, because it is useful for directors to meet and exchange with 
other directors and the management. Taking Jensen’s argumentation into account, board 
meetings seem to increase the performance of LPE firms in terms of the advice provided by 
the board members.  
Likewise, CEO ownership has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q. The coefficient CEO 
ownership is positive at the 1% level. This finding is in line with the ‘alignment of interest 
hypothesis’, which indicates that an increase in CEO ownership increases the incentives of 
the CEO to perform well. 
Turning the focus onto the control variables, the fixed effects regression models show the 
variable total assets coefficient is positive at the 1% level. On the other hand, the control 
variables ‘total debt ratio’ and ‘fiscal years since IPO’ both have a negative coefficient at the 
1% level.  
The interpretation of the control variables is difficult, due the fact that the outcome of the 
coefficients can have different reasons. However, it is interesting to observe that the control 
proxy ‘total debt ratio’ has a negative impact on the performance of LPE firms, because debt 
is described in the private equity literature as an incentive mechanism for portfolio firm 
managers. In particular, debt is a monitoring instrument, because a firm faces bankruptcy if 
it does not maintain its principal and interest payments. However, the finding on ‘total debt 
ratio’ in Table 5.1 contradicts this view.   
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The estimates in Table 5.2 show the impact of governance proxies on ROA. The findings in 
Table 5.2 show no significant outcome for governance proxies. Only three controls show 
significant coefficients. The coefficient of the control variable Tobin’s Q t-1 is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The control variable ROA t-1 is negative and significant at the 
10% level. Finally, the control variable ‘total debt ratio’ is again negative and significant at 
the 1% level.   
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Table 5.1: Fixed effects regression models on Tobin’s Q 
  Tobin's Q 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   
Board meetings 0.044 2.200 ** 
               
0.057 2.120 ** 
Board size 
   
-0.079 -1.43   
            
-0.070 -0.640   
Fraction outside directors 
      
-0.130 -0.140   
         
-2.090 -1.090   
Founder CEO 
         
0.986 1.570   
      
0.260 0.250   
Duality 
            
0.400 0.870   
   
-0.210 -0.290   
CEO ownership 
               
10.249 3.18 *** 13.703 3.070 *** 
Tobin's Q t-1 -0.018 -0.120   0.102 0.860   0.104 0.870   0.090 0.760   0.095 0.810   0.0952 0.81   -0.178 -1.020   
ROA t-1 0.313 0.550   0.238 0.510   0.258 0.550   0.255 0.540   0.263 0.560   0.263 0.560   0.421 0.550   
Stock return t-1 -0.093 -0.420   -0.067 -0.370   -0.049 -0.270   -0.022 -0.120   -0.043 -0.240   -0.043 -0.240   -0.091 -0.310   
LN total assets 0.570 3.010 *** 0.489 3.500 *** 0.439 3.210 *** 0.459 3.370 *** 0.425 3.100 *** 0.425 3.100 *** 0.921 3.740 *** 
Total debt ratio -1.391 -2.460 ** -0.866 -1.900 * -0.733 -1.630   -0.650 -1.450   -0.706 -1.580   -0.706 -1.580   -2.145 -2.770 *** 
FYs since IPO -0.123 -4.310 *** -0.092 -4.490 *** -0.085 -4.230 *** -0.084 -4.220 *** -0.082 -4.040 *** -0.082 -4.040 *** -0.143 -3.520 *** 
Constant -1.070 -0.940   -0.226 -0.270   -0.517 -0.470   -0.942 -1.140   -0.670 -0.830   -0.670 -0.830   -1.435 -0.650   
Number of Obs. 308 
  
413 
  
413 
  
413 
  
413 
  
283 
  
232 
  Number of Groups 49 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
48 
  
42 
  R
2
 (within) 0.106 
  
0.072 
  
0.067 
  
0.073 
  
0.069 
  
0.120 
  
0.177 
  Rho 0.525     0.480     0.480     0.518     0.461     0.576     0.612     
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a fiscal year. Board size measures the number of 
directors on the board for each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. Fraction of outside directors is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Founder CEO is 1 if the 
founder of the private equity firm is the CEO of the firm, otherwise 0. Moreover, variable duality equals 1 if the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. CEO ownership measures the equity stakes in % 
held by the CEO. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as 
mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. Total assets is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal 
year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
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Table 5.2: Fixed effects regression models on ROA 
  ROA 
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(11) 
 
(12) 
 
(13) 
 
(14) 
   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   
Board meetings -0.004 -1.680 * 
               
-0.003 -0.930   
Board size 
   
0.003 0.420   
            
0.014 1.170   
Fraction outside directors 
      
-0.011 -0.080   
         
-0.067 -0.320   
Founder CEO 
         
-0.131 -1.170   
      
-0.131 -0.970   
Duality 
            
-0.014 -0.210   
   
0.035 0.450   
CEO ownership 
               
0.674 1.600   0.503 0.950   
Tobin's Q t-1 0.104 6.270 *** 0.094 5.780 *** 0.094 5.740 *** 0.095 5.870 *** 0.094 5.780 *** 0.090 4.920 *** 0.101 5.410 *** 
ROA t-1 -0.136 -1.990 ** -0.085 -1.280   -0.087 -1.300   -0.089 -1.340   -0.087 -1.300   -0.090 -1.080   -0.151 -1.770 * 
Stock return t-1 -0.033 -1.270   -0.021 -0.840   -0.022 -0.880   -0.023 -0.920   -0.022 -0.880   -0.040 -1.310   -0.048 -1.550   
LN total assets 0.045 1.950 * 0.051 2.520 ** 0.053 2.710 *** 0.051 2.660 *** 0.053 2.740 *** 0.036 1.510   0.028 1.010   
Total debt ratio -0.382 -5.620 *** -0.386 -5.960 *** -0.393 -6.280 *** -0.404 -6.400 *** -0.394 -6.280 *** -0.463 -5.870 *** -0.407 -4.730 *** 
FYs since IPO 0.004 1.210   0.002 0.790   0.002 0.710   0.002 0.620   0.002 0.660   0.003 0.760   0.006 1.350   
Constant -0.266 -1.960 * -0.349 -2.920 *** -0.324 -2.110 ** -0.298 -2.540 ** -0.332 -2.920 *** -0.229 -1.620   -0.242 -1.030   
Number of Obs. 294 
  
390 
  
390 
  
390 
  
390 
  
267 
  
223 
  Number of Groups 49 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
47 
  
42 
  R
2
 (within) 0.248 
  
0.189 
  
0.189 
  
0.192 
  
0.189 
  
0.249 
  
0.300 
  Rho 0.376     0.409     0.401     0.399     0.398     0.343     0.434     
 
ROA is defined as ratio of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a fiscal year. Board size measures the number of directors on the board for 
each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. Fraction of outside directors is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Founder CEO is 1 if the founder of the private equity 
firm is the CEO of the firm, otherwise 0. Moreover, variable duality equals 1 if the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. CEO ownership measures the equity stakes in % held by the CEO. Stock price 
return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure 
the performance of the past fiscal year. Total assets is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total 
value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering.  
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The findings in table 5.1 and 5.2 present the empirical evidence of the fixed effects model 
using two different performance proxies: Tobin’s Q and ROA. In the next section I will 
present the empirical findings estimated with the random effects model, again using the 
performance proxies Tobin’s Q and ROA. Finally, I will use the Hausman test to determine 
whether the fixed effects or the random effects model is the more efficient model for the 
estimation of my panel data set.  
Table 5.3 shows the empirical findings estimated with the random effects model. In general, 
Table 5.3 indicates that the advice proxies ‘board meetings’ and ‘board size’ have a positive 
impact on Tobin’s Q. Moreover, ‘founder CEO’ and ‘CEO ownership’ both have a positive 
coefficient in the random effects models. However, none of the coefficients in model (21) 
are significant.  
Table 5.4 presents the empirical findings estimated with the random effects model and the 
performance proxy ROA. First, Table 5.4 shows that the proxy ‘founder CEO’ has a 
negative and significant impact on ROA. The coefficient ‘founder CEO’ is significant at the 
1% level. The negative outcome of the governance proxy ‘founder CEO’ suggests that 
founders in LPE firms might desire to retain control over corporate decisions and funds. 
This phenomenon is known in the corporate governance literature as ‘founder 
entrenchment’.   
On the other hand, the proxy ‘CEO ownership’ has a positive and significant coefficient at 
the 5% level. This finding suggests that CEO ownership has a positive impact on ROA. This 
finding is in line with the ‘alignment of interest hypothesis’, which suggests that CEO 
ownership increases the effort and performance of CEOs in LPE firms.  
The control variables Tobin’s Q t-1 and ‘total assets’ have a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 1% level. Furthermore, ‘total debt ratio’ again has a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level.  
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Table 5.3: Random effects regression models on Tobin’s Q 
  Tobin's Q 
 
(15) 
 
(16) 
 
(17) 
 
(18) 
 
(19) 
 
(20) 
 
(21) 
   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   
Board meetings 0.011 0.800   
               
0.017 0.870   
Board size 
   
0.017 0.650   
            
0.021 0.410   
Fraction outside directors 
      
-0.286 -0.770   
         
-0.889 -1.090   
Founder CEO 
         
0.169 0.850   
      
0.147 0.430   
Duality 
            
0.141 0.830   
   
0.065 0.220   
CEO ownership 
               
0.553 0.370   2.622 1.190   
Tobin's Q t-1 0.286 2.360 ** 0.333 3.280 *** 0.343 3.410 *** 0.331 3.270 *** 0.338 3.350 *** 0.399 3.290 *** 0.213 1.420   
ROA t-1 0.029 0.050   0.035 0.080   0.027 0.060   0.058 0.130   0.070 0.160   0.028 0.050   0.049 0.070   
Stock return t-1 -0.065 -0.300   -0.057 -0.320   -0.060 -0.340   -0.058 -0.330   -0.066 -0.380   -0.107 -0.420   -0.058 -0.200   
LN total assets 0.060 0.890   0.052 1.100   0.047 1.030   0.058 1.300   0.052 1.130   0.044 0.620   0.090 0.910   
Total debt ratio -0.273 -0.620   -0.124 -0.370   -0.129 -0.390   -0.142 -0.430   -0.118 -0.360   -0.112 -0.240   -0.760 -1.200   
FYs since IPO -0.021 -1.860 * -0.019 -2.110 ** -0.016 -1.750 * -0.016 -1.820 * -0.017 -1.860 * -0.014 -1.390   -0.014 -0.930   
Constant 0.700 1.760 * 0.559 1.890 * 0.891 1.950 * 0.597 2.110 ** 0.615 2.180 ** 0.660 1.540   1.007 1.170   
Number of Obs. 308 
  
413 
  
413 
  
413 
  
413 
  
283 
  
232 
  Number of Groups 49 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
48 
  
42 
  R
2
 (within) 0.073 
  
0.021 
  
0.020 
  
0.022 
  
0.022 
  
0.011 
  
0.056 
  Wald X
2
 10.370     17.140     17.800     17.450     17.470     12.920     9.730     
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a fiscal year. Board size measures the number of 
directors on the board for each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. Fraction of outside directors is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Founder CEO is 1 if the 
founder of the private equity firm is the CEO of the firm, otherwise 0. Moreover, variable duality equals 1 if the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. CEO ownership measures the equity stakes in % 
held by the CEO. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as 
mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. Total assets is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal 
year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
 
Table 5.4: Random effects regression models on ROA 
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  ROA 
 
(22) 
 
(23) 
 
(24) 
 
(25) 
 
(26) 
 
(27) 
 
(28) 
   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   
Board meetings -0.002 -1.260   
               
0.000 -0.260   
Board size 
   
-0.003 -0.930   
            
-0.006 -1.330   
Fraction outside directors 
      
0.044 0.930   
         
-0.108 -1.410   
Founder CEO 
         
-0.063 -2.660 *** 
      
-0.091 -2.750 *** 
Duality 
            
-0.057 -2.790 *** 
   
0.010 0.350   
CEO ownership 
               
0.380 1.990 ** 0.475 2.170 ** 
Tobin's Q t-1 0.062 4.470 *** 0.058 4.340 *** 0.059 4.400 *** 0.060 4.550 *** 0.058 4.430 *** 0.054 3.790 *** 0.059 3.940 *** 
ROA t-1 -0.048 -0.760   0.012 0.200   0.007 0.120   -0.001 -0.020   -0.013 -0.220   -0.012 -0.160   -0.081 -1.100   
Stock return t-1 -0.013 -0.490   -0.003 -0.120   -0.003 -0.110   -0.003 -0.110   0.001 0.040   -0.018 -0.580   -0.029 -0.930   
LN total assets 0.029 3.880 *** 0.017 3.110 *** 0.018 3.110 *** 0.017 3.170 *** 0.020 3.550 *** 0.042 5.020 *** 0.049 5.300 *** 
Total debt ratio -0.286 -5.590 *** -0.193 -4.450 *** -0.198 -4.510 *** -0.184 -4.300 *** -0.202 -4.680 *** -0.299 -5.430 *** -0.363 -5.720 *** 
FYs since IPO 0.000 -0.050   0.001 1.300   0.001 0.820   0.001 0.650   0.001 0.590   0.000 -0.270   -0.001 -1.030   
Constant -0.125 -2.860 *** -0.100 -2.820 *** -0.154 -2.670 *** -0.105 -3.140 *** -0.109 -3.210 *** -0.235 -4.640 *** -0.106 -1.300   
Number of Obs. 294 
   
390 
 
390 
  
390 
  
390 
  
267 
  
223 
  Number of Groups 49 
   
63 
 
63 
  
63 
  
63 
  
47 
  
42 
  R
2
 (within) 0.236 
   
0.164 
 
0.169 
  
0.172 
  
0.170 
  
0.238 
  
0.262 
  Wald X
2
  53.320       46.500   47.090     53.250     54.390     54.790     66.220     
 
ROA is defined as ratio of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a fiscal year. Board size measures the number of directors on the board for 
each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. Fraction of outside directors is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Founder CEO is 1 if the founder of the private equity 
firm is the CEO of the firm, otherwise 0. Moreover, variable duality equals 1 if the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. CEO ownership measures the equity stakes in % held by the CEO. Stock price 
return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the 
performance of the past fiscal year. Total assets is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value 
of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering.  
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A further analysis of the fixed effects and random effects estimators is presented in Table 
5.5. The findings there present the results of the Hausman test. As mentioned in sub-chapter 
5.1, the explanatory variable xi might be correlated with an unobserved effect ai which has 
an impact on the consistency and efficiency of the selected estimators. The fixed effects 
estimators are consistent when the explanatory variables xi are correlated with the 
unobserved effect ai. Given this assumption, only the fixed effects estimators are efficient, 
whereas the random effects estimators are not consistent.  
 
Table 5.5: Hausman test 
  Tobin's Q    ROA 
  FE RE Diff. S.E.   FE RE Diff. S.E. 
Board meetings 0.057 0.017 0.040 0.019 
 
-0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.002 
Board size -0.070 0.021 -0.091 0.098 
 
0.014 -0.006 0.020 0.011 
Fraction outside directors -2.090 -0.889 -1.201 1.726 
 
-0.067 -0.108 0.041 0.197 
Founder CEO 0.260 0.147 0.113 0.977 
 
-0.131 -0.091 -0.040 0.130 
Duality -0.210 0.065 -0.274 0.652 
 
0.035 0.010 0.025 0.071 
CEO ownership 13.703 2.622 11.082 3.882 
 
0.503 0.475 0.028 0.485 
Tobin's Q t-1 -0.178 0.213 -0.391 0.087 
 
0.101 0.059 0.042 0.011 
ROA t-1 0.421 0.049 0.372 0.254 
 
-0.151 -0.081 -0.070 0.043 
Stock return t-1 -0.091 -0.058 -0.034 . 
 
-0.048 -0.029 -0.019 0.002 
LN total assets 0.921 0.090 0.831 0.225 
 
0.028 0.049 -0.021 0.026 
Total debt ratio -2.145 -0.760 -1.385 0.445 
 
-0.407 -0.363 -0.044 0.058 
FYs since IPO -0.143 -0.014 -0.129 0.038 
 
0.006 -0.001 0.008 0.004 
X
2
 45.640 
    
19.240 
   
Prob>X
2
 0.000         0.083       
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. ROA is defined as ratio 
of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Board meetings is defined as the total number of board meetings in a 
fiscal year. Board size measures the number of directors on the board for each fiscal year as mentioned in the annual report. 
Fraction of outside directors is defined as the number of outside directors divided by the total number of directors. Founder 
CEO is 1 if the founder of the private equity firm is the CEO of the firm, otherwise 0. Moreover, variable duality equals 1 if 
the CEO at the same time holds the position of chairperson. CEO ownership measures the equity stakes in % held by the 
CEO. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate 
the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the 
performance of the past fiscal year. Total assets is defined as the total value of assets on the balance sheet in each fiscal 
year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by 
total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering.  
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In contrast, if the explanatory variables xi are uncorrelated with the unobserved effect ai,, the 
random effects estimator will be consistent and efficient, whereas the fixed effects estimator 
will still be consistent, but not efficient. 
Based on the theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented in Table 5.5, the fixed 
effects model should be applied to the explanatory variables selected in the full model 
approach. In particular, Table 5.5 shows that the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis for 
the estimate with Tobin’s Q, as well as with the estimate with ROA. The null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test states that the random effects estimator is consistent. This hypothesis is 
rejected with a X
2
 of 45.640 for the estimate with Tobin’s Q and with a X2 of 19.240 for that 
with ROA. The probability that the rejection of the null hypothesis is false is relatively small 
due to a probability of 0.000 for Tobin’s Q and 0.083 for ROA. 
Summary: The fixed effects regression models show that board meetings and CEO 
ownership have a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q. The empirical findings on 
the governance proxy ‘board meetings’ confirm the advice hypothesis stated in Chapter 3. In 
line with the argumentation of Jensen (1993), board meetings are an important mechanism, 
because it is useful for directors to meet and exchange with other directors and management.  
Moreover, the finding on CEO ownership confirms the ‘alignment of interest hypothesis’, 
which suggests that CEOs increase their effort and performance with an increase in 
ownership.  
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5.2.2. Robustness check  
 
The previous sub-chapter discussed initial empirical findings on the impact of selected 
governance proxies on the performance of LPE firms. In particular, the regression models 
used in sub-chapter 5.2.1 contained data relevant to the advice, founder and ownership 
hypotheses for LPE firms. The present sub-chapter will use comparable governance proxies 
concerning the robustness of the findings presented in sub-chapter 5.2.1. 
Table 5.6 contains the empirical findings of the fixed effects model on Tobin’s Q. Its results 
show that no governance proxies are significant: significant coefficients are only recorded 
for the control variables. The control variable ‘total assets’ is positive and significant at the 
1% level. On the other hand, the control variables ‘total debt ratio’ and ‘fiscal years since 
IPO’ both have negative coefficients. Total debt ratio is significant at the 5% level and fiscal 
years since IPO is significant at the 1% level.   
Table 5.7 presents the empirical findings of the fixed effects model on ROA, which indicate 
that ‘founder chairperson’ has a negative and significant coefficient at the 10% level. This 
finding suggests that founders might desire to retain control over corporate decisions and 
funds.   
The control variable Tobin’s Q t-1 has a negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level, 
as does the control variable ‘total debt ratio’.   
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 Table 5.6: Robustness check fixed effects regression models on Tobin’s Q 
  Tobin's Q   
 
(29) 
 
(30) 
 
(31) 
 
(32) 
 
(33) 
   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   
Board committees -0.222 -1.570   
         
-0.215 -1.030   
No. outside directors 
   
-0.084 -1.380   
      
-0.119 -1.200   
Founder chairperson 
      
0.009 0.020   
   
-0.426 -0.520   
Chairperson ownership 
         
4.950 0.950   4.664 0.810   
Tobin's Q t-1 0.060 0.460   0.114 0.960   0.102 0.860   0.051 0.350   0.037 0.240   
ROA t-1 0.240 0.450   0.235 0.500   0.260 0.550   0.418 0.650   0.400 0.600   
Stock price return t-1 -0.071 -0.330   -0.067 -0.370   -0.048 -0.260   -0.102 -0.380   -0.120 -0.430   
LN total assets 0.518 3.300 *** 0.461 3.380 *** 0.441 3.230 *** 0.584 3.250 *** 0.634 3.330 *** 
Total debt ratio -1.054 -2.010 ** -0.821 -1.820 * -0.729 -1.630   -1.178 -1.820 * -1.610 -2.300 ** 
FY since IPO -0.095 -3.950 *** -0.089 -4.410 *** -0.086 -4.220 *** -0.106 -3.380 *** -0.110 -3.170 *** 
Constant -0.324 -0.350   -0.241 -0.280   -0.624 -0.770   -1.301 -1.210   -0.108 -0.080   
Number of Obs. 355 
  
413 
  
413 
  
293 
  
278 
  Number of Groups 57 
  
63 
  
63 
  
50 
  
46 
  R
2
 (within) 0.082 
  
0.072 
  
0.067 
  
0.083 
  
0.101 
  Rho 0.477     0.477     0.450     0.422     0.465     
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. Number of outside directors is computed as the number of non-
management directors on the board. Founder chairperson equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson, otherwise 0. Chairperson ownership is defined 
as the % equity ownership of the chairperson. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the 
stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. LN total 
assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO 
computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
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Table 5.7: Robustness check fixed effects regression models on ROA 
  ROA 
 
(34) 
 
(35) 
 
(36) 
 
(37) 
 
(38) 
   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   
Board committees 0.023 1.210   
         
-0.002 -0.070   
No. outside directors 
   
0.005 0.570   
      
0.008 0.640   
Founder chairperson 
      
-0.160 -2.110 ** 
   
-0.185 -1.850 * 
Chairperson ownership 
         
-0.827 -1.210   -0.198 -0.270   
Tobin's Q t-1 0.100 5.950 *** 0.093 5.720 *** 0.096 5.950 *** 0.098 5.300 *** 0.100 5.310 *** 
ROA t-1 -0.088 -1.220   -0.084 -1.270   -0.087 -1.310   -0.085 -1.010   -0.081 -0.950   
Stock price return t-1 -0.028 -0.970   -0.020 -0.820   -0.022 -0.880   -0.039 -1.150   -0.037 -1.090   
LN total assets 0.036 1.690 * 0.051 2.650 *** 0.056 2.930 *** 0.036 1.550   0.038 1.530   
Total debt ratio -0.370 -5.310 *** -0.386 -6.080 *** -0.389 -6.260 *** -0.469 -5.680 *** -0.423 -4.810 *** 
FY since IPO 0.003 1.000   0.002 0.760   0.001 0.430   0.002 0.430   0.003 0.700   
Constant -0.304 -2.470 ** -0.355 -2.970 *** -0.312 -2.760 *** -0.192 -1.380   -0.224 -1.390   
Number of Obs. 334 
  
390 
  
390 
  
278 
  
265 
  Number of Groups 56 
  
63 
  
63 
  
49 
  
46 
  R
2
 (within) 0.204 
  
0.190 
  
0.200 
  
0.223 
  
0.240 
  Rho 0.392     0.408     0.448     0.380     0.463     
 
ROA is defined as ratio of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Number of outside directors is computed as the number of non-management directors 
on the board. Founder chairperson equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson, otherwise 0. Chairperson ownership is defined as the % equity 
ownership of the chairperson. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price 
returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. LN total assets is 
logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the 
number of fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
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Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the empirical findings of the random effects models using 
Tobin’s Q and ROA as performance proxies. First, the results in Table 5.8 show that in 
model (43) only the control variable Tobin’s Q t-1 has a significant coefficient. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Table 5.9 shows the empirical findings of the random effects models on ROA. The 
coefficient of the governance proxy ‘founder chairperson’ is negative and significant at the 
1% level. ThIS negative outcome expresses the desire of founders to retain control over 
corporate decisions and funds. As mentioned above, the corporate governance literature 
describes this behavior as founder entrenchment.  
The ownership proxy ‘chairperson ownership’ has a positive coefficient and is significant at 
the 5% level. This finding supports the hypothesis that managerial ownership increases the 
effort of managers and hence, too, corporate performance.   
Finally, Table 5.9 presents the findings on the control variables. The control variables 
Tobin’s Q t-1 and ‘total assets’ both have a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% 
level. In table 5.9 the coefficient of total debt ratio is negative and significant at the 1% 
level.   
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Table 5.8: Robustness check random effects regression models on Tobin’s Q 
  Tobin's Q 
 
(39) 
 
(40) 
 
(41) 
 
(42) 
 
(43) 
   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   
Board committees 0.022 0.420   
         
0.020 0.260   
No. outside directors 
   
0.004 0.130   
      
0.016 0.300   
Founder chairperson 
      
0.221 1.250   
   
0.214 0.930   
Chairperson ownership 
         
4.803 2.220   5.134 2.020   
Tobin's Q t-1 0.404 3.810 *** 0.341 3.380 *** 0.340 3.380 *** 0.371 3.120 *** 0.324 2.590 *** 
ROA t-1 0.024 0.050   0.039 0.090   0.068 0.160   0.049 0.090   0.223 0.360   
Stock price return t-1 -0.076 -0.350   -0.064 -0.360   -0.059 -0.340   -0.041 -0.160   -0.081 -0.290   
LN total assets 0.029 0.560   0.060 1.340   0.051 1.150   0.091 1.370   0.083 1.100   
Total debt ratio -0.026 -0.070   -0.123 -0.370   -0.133 -0.400   0.011 0.030   -0.099 -0.210   
FY since IPO -0.016 -1.780   -0.018 -2.040   -0.014 -1.530   -0.013 -1.390   -0.013 -1.090   
Constant 0.666 2.150 * 0.597 1.910 ** 0.582 2.100   0.221 0.540   0.139 0.290   
Number of Obs. 355 
  
413 
  
413 
  
293 
  
278 
  Number of Groups 57 
  
63 
  
63 
  
50 
  
46 
  R
2
 (within) 0.013 
  
0.021 
  
0.019 
  
0.020 
  
0.022 
  Wald X
2
 18.120     16.730     18.990     18.660     61.310     
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. Number of outside directors is computed as the number of non-
management directors on the board. Founder chairperson equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson, otherwise 0. Chairperson ownership is defined 
as the % equity ownership of the chairperson. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the 
stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. LN total 
assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO 
computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public offering. 
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Table 5.9: Robustness check random effects regression models on ROA 
  ROA   
 
(44) 
 
(45) 
 
(46) 
 
(47) 
 
(48) 
   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   
Board committees 0.005 0.610   
         
0.004 0.440   
No. outside directors 
   
-0.002 -0.520   
      
-0.009 -1.520   
Founder chairperson 
      
-0.045 -2.030 ** 
   
-0.084 -3.070 *** 
Chairperson ownership 
         
0.552 1.950 * 0.794 2.510 ** 
Tobin's Q t-1 0.069 4.760 *** 0.056 4.260 *** 0.061 4.550 *** 0.057 3.830 *** 0.062 4.120 *** 
ROA t-1 -0.022 -0.340   0.010 0.170   -0.007 -0.120   0.022 0.310   -0.007 -0.090   
Stock price return t-1 -0.012 -0.420   -0.002 -0.080   -0.002 -0.090   -0.020 -0.590   -0.018 -0.520   
LN total assets 0.028 3.410 *** 0.016 2.990 *** 0.018 3.210 *** 0.041 4.850 *** 0.050 5.540 *** 
Total debt ratio -0.273 -5.200 *** -0.193 -4.460 *** -0.200 -4.550 *** -0.270 -4.890 *** -0.263 -4.610 *** 
FY since IPO 0.000 0.210   0.001 1.360   0.000 0.430   0.000 0.100   -0.001 -0.970   
Constant -0.178 -3.640 *** -0.101 -2.660 *** -0.106 -3.020 *** -0.253 -4.880 *** -0.239 -4.150 *** 
Number of Obs. 334 
  
390 
  
390 
  
278 
  
265 
  Number of Groups 56 
  
63 
  
63 
  
49 
  
46 
  R
2
 (within) 0.195 
  
0.166 
  
0.180 
  
0.186 
  
0.240 
  Wald X
2
 52.870     45.820     50.960     52.760     61.310     
 
ROA is defined as ratio of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Number of outside directors is computed as the number of non-management directors on the 
board. Founder chairperson equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson, otherwise 0. Chairperson ownership is defined as the % equity ownership of the 
chairperson. Stock price return is calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA 
t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the performance of the past fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal 
year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public 
offering. 
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Table 5.10 shows the results of the Hausman test. The findings of the Hausman test reject 
the null hypothesis for the estimate with Tobin’s Q, as well with the estimate with ROA. 
This hypothesis is rejected with a X
2
 of 21.970 for the estimate with Tobin’s Q and with a X2 
of 30.780 for that with ROA. The probability that the rejection of the null hypothesis is false 
is relatively small, due to a probability of 0.015 for Tobin’s Q and 0.001 for ROA. In 
particular, the results of the Hausman test suggest that the fixed effects model is more 
appropriate for the estimation of selected explanatory variables than the random effects 
model. 
 
Table 5.10: Hausman test 
  Tobin's Q    ROA 
  FE RE Diff. S.E. 
 
FE RE Diff. S.E. 
Board committees -0.215 0.020 -0.235 0.194 
 
-0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.025 
No. outside directors -0.119 0.016 -0.134 0.085 
 
0.008 -0.009 0.017 0.011 
Founder chairperson -0.426 0.214 -0.640 0.783 
 
-0.185 -0.084 -0.101 0.096 
Chairperson 
ownership 4.664 5.134 -0.469 5.142 
 
-0.198 0.794 -0.992 0.674 
Tobin's Q t-1 0.037 0.324 -0.287 0.088 
 
0.100 0.062 0.038 0.011 
ROA t-1 0.400 0.223 0.178 0.268 
 
-0.081 -0.007 -0.074 0.040 
Stockprice return t-1 -0.120 -0.081 -0.038 0.041 
 
-0.037 -0.018 -0.019 . 
LN total assets 0.634 0.083 0.551 0.175 
 
0.038 0.050 -0.012 0.023 
Total debt ratio -1.610 -0.099 -1.511 0.514 
 
-0.423 -0.263 -0.160 0.067 
FY since IPO -0.110 -0.013 -0.097 0.033 
 
0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.004 
X
2
 21.970 
    
30.780 
   Prob>X
2
 0.015         0.001       
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the market value of the firm divided by its replacement costs. ROA is defined as ratio 
of net income divided by the total assets of the firm. Number of outside directors is computed as the number of non-
management directors on the board. Founder chairperson equals 1 when the founder holds the position of chairperson, 
otherwise 0. Chairperson ownership is defined as the % equity ownership of the chairperson. Stock price return is 
calculated as % stock returns over the past 12 months. I use daily stock price data to calculate the stock price returns. 
Tobin’s Q t-1, ROA t-1 and stock price return t-1 are defined as mentioned above and measure the performance of the past 
fiscal year. LN total assets is logarithmized total assets in each fiscal year. Total debt ratio is the total value of debt divided 
by total assets in each fiscal year. Finally, FYs since IPO computes the number of fiscal years since the initial public 
offering. 
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Summary: The robustness check first applied the fixed effects model and the random effects 
model in order to use the results of these models for the Hausman test in the next step. The 
findings of the Hausman test in sub-chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 suggest that the fixed effects 
model is more efficient as an estimation model for my selected governance variables than 
the random effects model. 
First, the empirical findings of the robustness check present non-significant results for the 
advice proxies ‘board committees’ and ‘number of outside directors’. Sub-chapter 5.2.1 I 
only refers, therefore, to the findings on the advice proxy ‘board meetings’. The findings on 
the proxy ‘board meetings’ are positive and significant, which suggests that board meetings 
are an important mechanism, because it is useful for directors to meet and exchange ideas 
with other directors and with the management. 
Second, my empirical findings in sub-chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 show that ownership ‒ 
indicated by the proxies ‘CEO ownership’ and ‘chairperson ownership’ ‒ has a positive and 
significant impact on the performance of LPE firms. These empirical findings are in line 
with the ‘alignment of interest hypothesis’, which suggests that ownership increases the 
effort and performance of managers. 
However, there is some evidence that founders have a negative impact on the performance 
of LPE firms. For example, sub-chapter 5.2.1 shows that the proxy ‘founder CEO’ has 
negative and significant coefficient at the 1% level in the random effects model. 
Furthermore, in sub-chapter 5.2.2 the proxy ‘founder chairperson’ also has a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 10% level in the fixed effects model. The corporate governance 
literature refers to the downside of founders as founder entrenchment. The governance 
literature suggests that founders might desire to retain control over corporate decisions and 
funds. As mentioned above, the outcome of the founder proxies is not clear in my empirical 
results and therefore has to be tackled in further research.    
Finally, the control variable ‘total debt ratio’ has a negative and significant coefficient at the 
1% level in both sub-chapters 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. This finding is interesting, because the private 
equity industry uses debt as a monitoring and incentive instrument in portfolio firms. In 
general, the governance literature describes debt as an instrument that reduces the 
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probability of management using the firm’s free cash flow for investment projects with a 
negative net present value. Further research might deliver findings why debt has a positive 
impact on the performance of portfolio firms and a negative impact on LPE firms.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
In the literature on private equity investments, the board of directors as a corporate 
governance instrument has received much attention in the past few decades. In particular, 
scholars have investigated from different perspectives not only the impact of private equity 
investments on the performance of private equity portfolio firms, but also the governance 
structure of the board of directors. The present thesis investigates the impact of board 
structure on the performance of LPE firms.  
In Chapter 2, the thesis describes the principal-agent theory and corporate governance 
mechanisms. In general, the principal-agent theory constitutes the foundation of corporate 
governance research. In this thesis I follow Jensen and Meckling (1976) and discuss four 
aspects of the theory, describing, in particular, managerial power, managerial risk aversion, 
the free cash flow problem and three approaches to solving the principal-agent problem. 
Moreover, I show that in general corporate governance can tackle the issue described in the 
principal-agent theory.  
Chapter 2 closes with an overview of the private equity industry, pointing out that there is a 
difference in the organizational structure of private equity firms. In particular, I differentiate 
between the structure of unlisted and listed private equity firms and show why private equity 
can be classed as a market-based corporate governance mechanism.  
In order to investigate the impact of board structure on the performance of LPE firms, 
Chapter 3 presents the performance measures used in this thesis. In particular, I estimate the 
performance of LPE firms with Tobin’s Q and ROA. These performance measures are state 
of the art and widely used in corporate governance literature.   
Chapter 3 also provides a literature overview on the board of directors. This overview 
contains a spectrum of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence relating to the board of 
directors that forms the basis for a number of hypotheses developed on the advice function 
of the board of directors, and on founder status, leadership structure and managerial 
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ownership of LPE firms. These hypotheses are used to investigate the impact of the board of 
directors on the performance of LPE firms in Chapter 5.   
Chapter 4 is divided into two sections. Sub-chapter 4.1 introduces the underlying panel data 
set that will be applied in the multivariate analysis of Chapter 5. Sub-chapter 4.2 provides an 
overview of the empirical findings on the board of directors literature with particular 
reference to corporate and board characteristics relating to corporate governance.  
Chapter 5 opens with an introduction into methods that can be applied to analyze panel data 
sets and presents the empirical findings of the research project. In line with previous 
empirical investigations I estimate my panel data set using the fixed and random effects 
models. Chapter 5 discusses these models as empirical approaches to analyze panel data sets 
and introduces the Hausman test as a means to help scholars choose an efficient and 
consistent estimation model. In other words, the outcome of the Hausman test helps one to 
choose between the fixed effects and random effects models in pursuit of meaningful results.   
Chapter 5 then presents the findings of this thesis. The thesis finds empirical evidence for 
the advice hypothesis. In particular, the advice proxy ‘board meetings’ has a positive and 
significant impact on the performance of LPE firms. Moreover, the control variable ‘total 
debt ratio’ has a negative and significant impact on that performance. These findings suggest 
that the governance of LPE firms improves with an increase in board meetings and a 
decrease in total debt. Based on the theoretical argumentation of the thesis, it may be 
concluded that the role of LPE boards is primarily advising the executive management rather 
than monitoring its actions.  
The empirical evidence in Chapter 5 shows that founder CEOs and founder chairpersons 
have a negative impact on the performance of LPE firms. This suggests that founder CEOs 
and chairpersons are entrenched in LPE firms. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence 
supports the hypothesis that founders have certain skills that create corporate value. A prime 
example is Blackstone, whose founders started their private equity company with $400,000 
assets on the balance sheet and increased its assets under management to $290 bn. within 
three decades.  
Finally, Chapter 5 shows that ownership has a positive and significant impact on the 
performance of LPE firms. In particular, CEO ownership and chairperson ownership have a 
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positive impact on the performance of LPE firms. These findings are in line with the 
theoretical argument that ownership increases the effort of CEOs to behave in the interest of 
shareholders ‒ a relationship known in the corporate governance literature as the alignment 
of interest hypothesis.  
As most private equity firms do not disclose their activities, the understanding of the private 
equity industry presented here is not very clear cut. Further research might yield a better 
understanding of the private equity industry in general and the actions of company boards in 
particular.  
One possible research question might consider whether the disclosure requirements of LPE 
firms bring them a competitive advantage vis à vis unlisted private equity firms. In other 
words, investors might be willing to commit more equity to funds of LPE firms than to those 
of unlisted private equity firms. This further research question could be addressed through a 
regression model.  
Another question that arises is whether or not the composition of the board of directors in 
LPE firms has an impact on the performance of portfolio firms. The existing literature on 
private equity reveals that the announcement of private equity investments has a positive 
impact on the performance of portfolio firms. In such an analysis the skills and risk tolerance 
or aversion of the founder might play a significant role. This research question could be 
investigated with an event study and an ordinary least square regression model.  
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